The impact of the forthcoming presidential elections will again illustrate the fine art of balance upon which Iran's political system is founded, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* Iran is in the run-up to its 10th presidential elections since the 1979 revolution. Scheduled for 12 June, the elections come at a critical juncture in the history of the Islamic republic, at the domestic, regional and international levels. The outcome is certain to affect internal power balances between Iranian political wings and, abroad, it will have a profound impact on Iranian influence within its geopolitical sphere. Further afield, the outcome surely will impact the future of overtures initiated by US President Barack Obama. As developments on the foreign front will proceed from the domestic situation arising from the elections, this article will focus on that level. First, it is important to shed light on the political map in Iran and then proceed to identifying the fulcrum points in present balances of power between various shades across the political spectrum, delineating the areas of convergence and divergence between them. The Iranian ruling establishment is a multi-tiered, constantly fluctuating entity, for which reason no analysis of the current political scene can remain valid for long. Indeed, it is rare to see so many successive twists and variegations in the topography of a country's political map elsewhere in the Middle East. What with the fortunes of Iranian politicians and parties rising and falling and rising again in keeping with the dictates of the shifts and adjustments in balances of power, the Iranian revolutionary regime resembles a mythical bird tilting this way and that as it soars through the air, its wings constantly changing shape and sometimes even sprouting a third. However, the most significant transmogrification occurred with the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005. It was at this point that the Iranian political roc shed its reformist wing and readjusted its equilibrium between shades of the conservative spectrum. In the run-up to the upcoming elections, the Iranian political map consists of three major forces. To the "left" are the moderate conservatives who will be represented in the elections by Mir Hussein Musavi (metaphorically referred to as the "reformist" candidate). In the centre are the conventional conservatives led by certain figures from the clerical hierarchy as well as prominent businessmen. Their candidates have not yet been announced. Finally, there is the radical right as embodied in the National Revolutionary Guard, to which Ahmadinejad belongs as well as his current rival in that camp former Revolutionary Guard head Mohsen Rizai. To these we can add a hypothetical force represented by Sheikh Mehdi Karroubi, associated historically with former president Khatemi and the erstwhile reformist movement. However, without a significant socio-economic base to enable him to pose a serious challenge to the other contestants, he can be eliminated from the electoral equations. In describing the three chief political forces, we should add that "left" and "right" are more in the nature of designators of their relative geographical position with respect to each other than indicators of ideological and political platforms. Above the three sits the supreme guide, manipulating the strings that control the equilibrium between them. By all indications the majority of the moderate conservatives regard Ahmadinejad as an obstacle to the potential that Obama's overtures offer for strengthening Iran's national security and for offsetting risks in the event that Iranian-US negotiations fail. The radicals, by contrast, believe that it was Ahmadinejad's hardline style that ultimately forced Washington's hand, compelling it to make conciliatory gestures and to shelve the military option. While the moderates may concede this, they do not agree that sustaining a rigid approach at this time will yield further American concessions. For their part, the conventional conservatives and the radical camp as epitomised by the Revolutionary Guard fear that talks with Washington will pave the way for a deepening political rift within the Iranian regime. In their opinion, if Tehran relinquishes the "rejectionist" stance it will be lured out of its ideological trenches and rendered exposed and vulnerable to divide-and-conquer tactics from abroad. The moderates believe that the primary threat to the regime comes from within it rather than from abroad. Tehran would therefore be wiser to capitalise on the window of opportunity that Obama has opened in order to accomplish important domestic and foreign policy objectives that would bolster Iran economically and strategically, while promoting social cohesion and stability. If the forthcoming elections will be a crucial determinant of which way Tehran turns with respect to current challenges and potential opportunities, they will not be the sole determinant. Unlike in many Arab countries, regardless of fluctuations on the political map in Iran, no single political camp within the regime has succeeded in commandeering the powers of the state. Contrary to appearances on the surface, Iran is not governed by a single monolithic class -- the Shia clergy -- but rather by a broad alliance between diverse political trends with different socio-economic outlooks whose rivalries play out against an ideological backdrop that is defined by certain boundaries. This has shaped into a significant factor in the Iranian political system. Rather than being restricted to a narrow elite with a particular social allegiance, the decision-making process is a lengthy and complex one because of the need to reach a form of "consensus" between the various camps. As a result, as far apart as the diverse trends of opinion may be, when it comes to the most fateful questions, decisions have always landed at the ideological midway point. The primary agent responsible for the delicate manipulation of the scales in the consensus-making process is the supreme guide, a position currently occupied by Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. One could liken the part the supreme guide plays in the Iranian decision- making process to the weaver of an elegant Persian carpet. Both processes require an expert eye and high-precision skill. When laying out his design, the Persian carpet weaver must bear in mind a number of considerations: the harmony of his pallet, the symmetries in his distribution of colour across the field, and the originality of his patterns while adhering to the design criteria associated with a particular place of origin, such as Tabriz or Isfahan. As different as the aesthetic heritages of these places are in the art of carpet weaving, designers adhere to a common principle, which is to designate fulcrums for aesthetic balances from the outset and to work outwards from these, arranging patterns and colours at carefully calibrated interstices so as to create the most elegant and harmonious effect. Needless to say, the more intricate the work and the subtler the contrasts, the finer and more precious is the final product. For this reason, the designer in this ancient Iranian art and trade is ultimately more important than the weaver and the merchant in the bazaar. In like manner, the supreme guide through whose hands pass so many threads has the ultimate say when it comes to ordering the weft and warp of the Iranian political fabric. His fulcrum will be determined by the forthcoming presidential elections. As for the outcome of these elections, it is still too early to make predictions, but we should bear in mind that the president in Iran is more or less equivalent to the premiership in other parliamentary democracies. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
