Scores of political groups have sprung up since the US invasion of Iraq, but the silent majority still lack democratic representation, writes Salah Hemeid The Bush administration's claim that its 2003 invasion of Iraq brought freedom to the country once ruled by Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime makes sense. Iraq of 2008 is actually different from that of 2003, and the war has been the engine for that transformation, although it is not as democratic as the war planners had claimed. As their state collapsed and law and order gave way to chaos, today, Iraqis can do whatever they like with their newly acquired freedom. In addition to the unstoppable spiral of violence, nothing can be more cynical about the American democratic venture in Iraq than the dozens of artificial political parties it let emerge in a country with no democratic tradition and almost no independent political centre. For the Bush administration, that was a significant development that couldn't have occurred without the war that toppled Saddam and his three decades of one-party rule. Yet for many observers the political landscape in post-war Iraq is not as rosy as the Americans want to portray. They argue that democracy cannot be built in a war-torn nation where the political process is in standstill, the economic conditions are ruinous, violence is rising and militias rather than political parties have the upper hand in running a rocky government. "Instead of emerging victoriously from post-war reconstruction, Iraq has plunged into a crisis of governance, with a popularly elected but weak government, unremitting insurgency, growing sectarian strife and rule by militia," said the International Crisis Group in a recent report on Iraq's post-war political process. After the invasion, former exiled opposition groups moved their offices from places like London, Tehran and Damascus to Iraq, while new parties emerged in Baghdad and other major cities. But with their conflicting visions about the role of their communities in the country's past, and in its future, they all failed to develop cross-sectarian political alliances and national platforms. Instead, deep polarisation has afflicted the political arena and sectarianism has become the norm of life. Whether that was the intention of the American war planners or not, ethnic separatism and religious sectarianism are likely to shape the country's future for generations to come, that is of course, if the country will still remain united. One of the major consequences of this transformation is the empowerment of the Iraqi Shia majority that has upset the sectarian balance and alienated the Sunni minority. Shias argues that their assent to political power, through the one-man-one vote ballot system, was not only a reverse of centuries of subjugation at the hands of Sunni minority, but also a genuine exercise of democracy. Although there is some validity to this argument, close examination reveals that sectarianism coupled with a strong religious belief, as it is the case with the main Shia groups, is anti-democratic. Today, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Sadrist current and Al-Daawa Party play a key role in representing Shias and in trying to create a strategic opportunity for their community. Their ideology hails from the teachings of Al-Hawza Al-Ilmia, or the Shia powerful theological establishment, as well as from profound sectarian inclinations. Sectarianism is also a trend among Sunni Arabs whose focus is now on preserving the leading role Sunnis have had in running the country starting with the establishment of the modern Iraqi state in the beginning of the 20th century. The reactions of some religious and political Iraqi Sunni groups to their dramatic loss of political power, social status and wealth have been so radical that they emerge bent on destroying the new experiment which has made their Shia and Kurdish compatriots the new rulers of the country. Some of these Sunni groups, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party, established by the remnants of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, have been active in the US-backed political process. Others, like the National Accordance Front and the National Dialogue Front, are in the parliament but not actively involved in the government, while other Sunni groups claim to represent the Sunni resistance to the US occupation. As they did before the war, the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, still dominate the political arena in Iraqi Kurdistan, though small political groups also function in the semi-independent region. It is ironic, as Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, a staunch proponent of the war, noted recently that the post-war reconstruction period never made Kurdish leaders democratic nor Iraqi Kurdistan itself is a "practicing democracy." Indeed, the two Kurdish parties have been sharing power in the provinces of the Kurdish region and imposing their style of single party rule, exactly like many Third World autocratic governments. In addition, their emphasis on Kurdish ethnic identity and their relentless attempts to consolidate their community's gains are seen by many Iraqis as separatism that is tantamount to Shia and Sunni sectarianism. So, can one now find any shred of evidence that suggests that the Bush administration has built real democracy in Iraq, or to support its claim that all these Shia, Sunni and Kurdish groups are true representatives of their communities? The Americans tend to claim that these parties were elected in a public franchise but everyone knows by now that the electoral process was based on closed national lists by means of which Iraqis naturally rallied to their sectarian-ethnic grouping. A closer look reveals that this system has created a first generation of Iraqi political groups that played the sectarian and ethnic game to rally constituents, thus making politics a destabilising scramble for sectarian-ethnic power at a national level. Even worse, all these groups are bolstered by strong militias vying for control over their areas, with each other and with the central government. At a time when the challenge for Iraq is to stay a united nation, sectarian and separatist political groups are the last things Iraqis need. Overcoming this challenge seems only possible when the excluded majority speaks out, when no more explosions are heard, and the guns of the militias fall silent.
