Intra-Shia strife is further evidence that after five years the US occupation cannot provide stability in Iraq, writes Ibrahim Nawwar The six-day war between the Mahdi Army militia of Moqtada Al-Sadr and Iraqi government armed forces supported by the United States in the last week of March reveals a lot about the situation in Iraq after five years of US occupation. The new political system in Iraq set up by the US is not respected enough to ensure stability. Armed groups in the country are strong enough to challenge the government in Baghdad, including its armed forces. The conflict that lasted six days in Basra, the capital of the south, and in Baghdad, has also highlighted that intra-Shia strife is a severe problem despite all US propaganda that disgruntled Sunnis are responsible for Iraq's current instability. American support for the government of Nuri Al-Maliki during the conflict is clear proof that there exists a "grand deal" between the US administration and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) under Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim and the Daawa Party under Al-Maliki to divide Iraq into three federal regions: one, which is already there, for Iraqi Kurds; a second for Iraqi Shias in the southern provinces; and third for Iraqi Sunnis in the west of Iraq. Sadr has repeatedly expressed his opposition to the idea of a federal southern Iraq, as has Mohamed Al-Yaaqoubi, leader of the Fadhila Party. Many Iraqi secular political leaders, such as Iyad Allawi, and Sunni religious leader Harith Al-Dhari also oppose federalism. The fierce military confrontation in Basra and Baghdad was a culmination of tension between the two sides as members of the Mahdi Army came under heavy pressure from government- backed militias, mainly the Badr Brigades and Al-Baqir, and the Iraqi police and armed forces. The conflict between the Arab-oriented Shia community, represented by the Sadrist current, and the Iranian-oriented Shia community represented by SCIRI and some factions of the Daawa Party is deeply rooted in Iraqi history and culture. The fact that both communities belong to the same sect has not prevented about four centuries of hatred between them. It is well- known that even in modern times, until the end of Saddam's regime, Iraqis were divided between two background nationalities, Ottoman and Persian. Acts of discrimination that reached the point of expulsions, as happened to large numbers of Shia Iraqi Kurds (Failis) in the 1980s, were justified on the basis that these Iraqis were considered Persian subjects. Although many Arab tribes are divided between the two Muslim sects, as Sunnis and Shias, they managed to maintain their integration and unity until the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq. FEDERATION FEVER: The US administration learnt the lesson of "divide and rule" from the British who once occupied Iraq and accompanied the Americans in their 2003 invasion. The principle of divide and rule has been cleverly deployed in all aspects of life in Iraq. Exploiting differences between Iraqi Shias made it easy for American political leaders to manipulate immature Iraqi political figures that emerged on tribal and religious grounds. The prospect of establishing a southern federal province first surfaced in June 2004 during preparations for the conference that elected the Transitional National Assembly later. Some delegates chanted "Basra oil for Basra!" at the conference, indicating their wish to follow the model of Iraqi Kurdistan. Political developments that followed marked the dedication of SCIRI to promoting a southern federation. The US received the idea positively, despite the fact that SCIRI and militant Sadr loyalists in December 2005 launched a campaign of sectarian cleansing in order to secure votes in their provinces and to prepare for a "Shia" south free of Sunnis and Christians. In supporting this political drive to divide Iraq alongside sectarian lines, the US administration is failing the Iraqi people. The federal state proposed in the blueprint prepared for the US administration by the American Enterprise Institute prior to March 2003 was based on the clear principle that federalism should be established along administrative lines only, warning vociferously against any form of federalism based on ethnic lines. Further irony is that SCIRI delegates to opposition meetings held under US patronage before the fall of Saddam always rejected the idea of federalism, including a federal region for Iraqi Kurds. The US-drafted Iraqi constitution grants permission to any three neighbouring provinces to seek to establish a federal region within Iraq. It does not safeguard against federal regions being set up along ethnic or sectarian lines. Nor does it protect against the alteration of provincial borders. As sectarian politics spread all over Iraq, the so-called "deprived" Iraqis of the south have been encouraged to establish their own federal region. SCIRI and Daawa Party activists clearly have a vision of a "Shia" region, despite the fact that about 20-25 per cent of the population in Basra, the largest southern province, are Sunni. Federal fever has been sweeping the south since August 2004. Tens of thousands of non-Shia southern Iraqis have fled, joining around 2.5 million Iraqis that have fled the country in fear for their lives since 2003. About the same figure are internally displaced inside Iraq. These Iraqi citizens are occupying old military camps, deserted schools and empty public buildings. Many have joined their relatives in Baghdad and its surrounding environs. Against the backdrop of "federation fever", the Sadrist political leadership sent a wake up call strongly warning against federalism and especially against building a federal region in the south of Iraq. Sceptical Arab tribal, religious and secular leaders carefully listened to that call. Five years of US occupation have proved manna for Iran, which established diverse network of influence in the south. Iranian influence can be clearly seen on the road from the Iraqi-Iranian border to Kufa, Karbala, Najaf and Basra. When you walk in the streets of Basra you wonder whether you are in Iraq. Persian can be heard more than Arabic in some southern cities, even in police stations. Iranian posters, political and religious slogans and habits are sweeping the south. The stealing of Iraqi oil and the smuggling of drugs and arms by Iranian agents are talked about everywhere, including in Iraqi intelligence reports and debates in the Iraqi parliament. The spread of prostitution in the south, including in Karbala, is an additional feature Iranian influence is connected with. Despite the fact that some Arab Iraqi tribal and religious leaders believe that the Mahdi Army is infiltrated by elements loyal to Iran, they think their best option for the time being is to support Sadr and help his political current to increase its influence and rid itself of pro-Iranian elements and extremists responsible for aggressive acts against Sunnis. It has to be said that Sadrist supply lines depend heavily on Arab tribal leaders in the south of Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranian game inside Iraq appears to be one of maintaining a general state of instability that will keep the Americans busy until they reverse their declared hostility towards Iran. On this point, Iran has a vested interest in keeping the Sadrists active to the extent that they pose a threat to the Americans. Iran's goal is to replace the US in Iraq, not to share power with it in Baghdad. Iran aims to manipulate the Sadrists in the short and medium term as a means of agitating the Americans, while reinforcing their frontline and long term allies, SCIRI and Daawa, not only for political but also for religious reasons. RELIGIOUS RIVALRY: The Iraqi city of Najaf is the historic capital city of the Shia world. The "Hawza Almiya" (religious schools) of the city have always enjoyed the respect of religious clerics of the Shia sect. However, as Ayatollah Khomeini grasped power in Iran in 1979, the importance of the Iranian city of Qom surpassed that of Iraqi Najaf. As Iranian clerics became the political leaders of Iran, they wanted their country to be the centre of Shia political and religious movements worldwide. As fatwas and political directives issued by the supreme guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) should be respected and followed by Shias everywhere, Iran's political leaders are already claiming that they have achieved that goal. Although Qom is now the most influential religious city in the Shia world, the hearts and minds of Shias all over the world connect to the Iraqi cities of Najaf, Karbala, Kufa, Samaraa and Baghdad and the holy Shia shrines there. Qom may, for sometime, maintain its place as the "scientific" centre of the Shia, but in no way it can compete spiritually with the Shia holy city of Najaf in Iraq. The spiritual supremacy of Iraqi Shia holy places presents the Iranian leadership with a challenge. To win that challenge, they have to keep the Iraqi hawza in Najaf under control. What is at stake if the challenge is lost is not only the central role of Iran in the Shia world, but also and perhaps mainly the financial status of high Iranian clerics who receive a large proportion of the so-called akhmas of their followers, which is 20 per cent of their net profits. The continuity of the complicated structure of Shia clerics depends on resources received from their followers, especially merchants and investors who pay their cleric or "Moqallad" in return for fatwas they need to ease their personal, financial and commercial transactions. The wealthier the Moqallad becomes, the more influential he is, and the higher he goes in the hierarchy of the supreme religious body. Although there is no audit system by which the wealth of Shia clerics or Moqallads can be judged, it is known that they receive billions of dollars in cash and in kind (especially in gold) every year and spend this money outside any kind of state control. In order for Iranian religious and political leaders to remain in the centre of the Shia world they act aggressively to control the religious hawza in Najaf through extending favours and advantages for non-Iraqi clerics, especially Iranians; promoting the role of the special representative of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei in Najaf (following the fall of Saddam, leading Shia cleric Mohamed Mahdi Al-Assefi has been playing a central role in Najaf. Assefi is the former leader of the Iraqi Daawa Party, the centrepiece of the Shia political alliance in Iraq); controlling Shia holy sites in Iraq through religious, administrative and military means; and controlling the logistics of pilgrimage routes extending from the Iran-Iraq border to the heart of Iraq's holy Shia cities (most of those who work in the service sector for pilgrims -- transportation, accommodation, catering and entertainment -- are either Iranians, from Iranian origin, or loyal to Iran). The struggle to control Najaf has been central and took drastic turns between 2003 and 2004. The first incident was when followers of Sadr murdered Sayed Majeed Al-Khoie, 10 April 2003, on his return to Najaf. No one has spoken openly about the role of Iran in the killing of Sayed Majeed, who was never friendly to the Iranian intervention in Iraqi affairs and presented himself as the guardian of true Shia traditions and principles. The battle to control Najaf in the summer of 2004 highlighted the conflict of interest between factions loyal to Iran and those of Sadr, who also introduces himself as representing the Arab Shia in the south and the centre of Iraq, and as the leader of the hawza. POLITICAL PROSPECTS: On the political side, the latest call by the Iraqi government to dismantle structures of armed militia groups is mainly directed at the Mahdi Army ahead of the October 2008 provincial elections. Both Iran and the present Iraqi government don't want to see the Sadrists continue as a popular military power. They are now trying to control Sadr's supply lines, push members of his political movement into a corner, and accommodate obedient figures in the official political process. But the battle between the Americans, Iranians and their allies in Iraq against Sadr and his followers will likely prove a much longer one than anticipated, especially as the political process in Iraq runs into certain trouble in the coming months. The US administration, eager to finalise a strategic cooperation agreement with Iraq, will soon be acting out of frustration. Iran will be more than happy to see more attacks against the Americans, forcing them into their bases around Baghdad. The Iraqi government, failing to run the daily business of the country, will need the Sadrists' support in parliament. The Sadrists themselves, learning from past experiences in Najaf, Sadr City and Basra, will resist any call to lay down their arms. In sum, five years into the US occupation, stability in Iraq, a pre-condition for reconstruction and political reconciliation, looks more remote than ever.
