In focus: Lessons unlearned There are no surprises in Lebanon, just an obvious case for change, writes Galal Nassar The outbreak of fighting in Lebanon, however dramatic it may have seemed, could have come as no surprise to anyone who has followed Lebanese politics since the assassination of prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. The Lebanese have long been split over how that crime should be dealt with, the divisions less a response to the assassination itself than an indication of international and regional affiliations. The war of July 2006, triggered by the abduction by some members of Hizbullah of several Zionist soldiers, divided the Lebanese even further. The pro-government majority accuses the opposition of acting to further Syrian and Iranian agendas while the opposition says the majority has bowed to US and Zionist pressure. Neither side is wholly right or wrong. The alliances we see in Lebanon are often less ideological than they are expedient. The enemies of today become the allies of tomorrow and vice versa. It has happened before and will happen again, not least because of Lebanon's susceptibility to international and regional influences. Lebanon has been prey to two civil wars, in the late 1950s and again in the mid- 1970s through to the early 1990s. Both wars were driven, superficially, by domestic rivalry, though the underlining causes were a reflection of regional and international divisions. The first civil war was born of Arab resistance to foreign-dominated alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact, also known as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan took the lead in opposing the formation of such alliances in the region. Lebanon, though, was undecided. Camille Chamoun, Lebanese president at the time, wanted his country to join the Baghdad Pact. Chamoun was seeking to renew his presidency for another term in order to have time to prepare Lebanon for joining the pact. The opposition objected and a civil war erupted. Chamoun accused Gamal Abdel-Nasser, then leader of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), of arming and funding the opposition. The US navy sailed to Lebanon and made threats. The crisis ended with Chamoun's resignation. He was replaced as president by army commander Fouad Chehab. Both civil wars were intertwined with developments in the Cold War. The Baghdad Pact was generally seen as a Western attempt to contain the Soviet Union and dampen anti-Western zeal in the Arab region. In one sense the first Lebanese civil war was merely a footnote to the Cold War, and the second Lebanese civil war was not very different. The war was triggered by the presence of the Lebanese resistance in some parts of south Lebanon. Thousands of Palestinians had fled to Lebanon during the presidency of Charles Helou and Lebanon's traditional Christian leaders feared the influx of Palestinians would distort the social fabric of the country. When the Lebanese army asked the Palestinians to stop bearing weapons things quickly got ugly. Trying to defuse the conflict, Egypt sponsored a deal, known as the Cairo Agreement, allowing the Palestinians to carry arms within the boundaries of their camps. Security within the camps became the responsibility of the Palestinian resistance, not the Lebanese army. But the agreement failed to defuse the crisis and Christian militias started to stockpile weapons. In 1975, the second Lebanese civil war broke out, pitting the Palestinians against right-wing Lebanese groups. The opposition, led by Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), took sides with the resistance. The Syrian army then went into Lebanon to support President Suleiman Franjieh. The war came to a close with the signing of the Saudi-brokered Al-Taif Agreement. Throughout the war alliances had continued to shift, with the Syrian army supporting right-wing Christians at times and the Palestinians and the PSP at others. Interestingly, the PSP under Kamal Jumblatt was part of the opposition whereas under his son, Walid Jumblatt, it is allied to the majority. Regional tensions once again shaped events in Lebanon, with the Arab-Israeli conflict dictating the course of the country's second civil war. But why are the Lebanese so susceptible to foreign factors? Lebanon's politics are based on factional quotas. Every faction in Lebanon, however fragile it may seem, has a domain within which it acts with virtual independence. In order to maintain its political status each faction needs a backer. The stronger the backer, the larger the share of the national cake, or so many Lebanese believe. The system of factional quotas was formulated by the French who, instead of giving the country a proper system of citizenry left behind a legacy of factional rivalries that is as divisive as it is volatile. In Lebanon's wars there are no victors and no vanquished. Until the entire political dispensation is reviewed it will be hard for the Lebanese to move ahead. Lebanon needs a constitutional system in which sectarian quotas are abandoned and all citizens become equal in the eyes of their government. In the meantime, we can only appeal to those who took part in the recent fighting to listen to reason and end the bloodshed. When fighting erupts among the sons of the same country every bullet strikes the very heart of the nation. Let us hope that reason will prevail and the Lebanese once again find it in their hearts to get along.
