In Focus: Recipe for failure The roots of Lebanon's current turmoil were in evidence when it first gained independence, and little has been done in the intervening years to nip their growth, writes Galal Nassar Lebanon might just make it into the top 20 of that exclusive club for failed states. To be admitted, countries must fail to perform the basic functions of government, such as maintaining law and order, spreading wealth and achieving growth. The Failed States Index has 12 criteria comprising social, political and economic variables. Score high enough in any and you are well on your way to official ineptitude. The main criteria include divisions among the political elite, ongoing repression and a desire of particular groups to avenge themselves against other segments of society. Foreign interference in the country's affairs is a plus. According to the 2007 Failed States Index, Lebanon is now 28th on the list. It needs to leapfrog just eight countries, among them Liberia, Congo and Sri Lanka, to make it into the top 20. Judging by how things are going this could well happen, for Lebanon is where Arab and international diplomacy goes to die, a land in which mediators feel helpless. President Hosni Mubarak warned the Lebanese that the Arabs and the international community may despair and decide to abandon them to their own fate. A few days more of the current turmoil in Lebanon could be enough. Army commander General Michel Suleiman recently admitted that Lebanon was a ticking bomb. Most Lebanese, who have experienced war and devastation in recent years, do not want to see the bomb explode but their concerns are not adequately addressed by politicians. Unless a political solution is reached the unfolding horror of assassinations and bloodshed is likely to continue. The Lebanese must address the delicate issues that have brought them to the current impasse. They need to agree on the identity of their country, relations with their neighbours and the outside world. They must introduce changes in their political system that ensure the inclusion of all segments of society. These issues have been around since Lebanon was created, and the failure to address them explains why the country keeps plodding from one crisis to another. The Lebanese have yet to agree on their country's identity let alone the political system that best serves it. Some worry about the nation's identity while giving no thought to what kind of regime the country should have, while others take the opposite view, focussing on the regime rather than identity. For example, some Lebanese imagined that the National Charter was about patriotism not democracy. The National Charter states that Lebanon is an Arab nation, in other words independent from both France and Syria. But what about partnership among the Lebanese? Lebanon's malaise, which has afflicted it throughout most of its history, is its tendency to exclude certain segments of society from wealth and power. Lebanon's founding fathers agreed to include everyone in the political process. They agreed to promote a sense of social and economic equality in the country. This now seems to be forgotten. The tendency to exclude part of the nation from wealth and power is common in dictatorships, although even democracies are known to suffer from it. But true democracies, sociologists say, are the ones in which the largest number of individuals and groups are given a say in the country's affairs. We're not talking social engineering here, just the normal play of politics. Progress happens when the political elites abandon exclusionist policies because they cannot deal with the consequences, or when political strife becomes too arduous to bear. First a group of the political elite sides with a group of the "excluded", then another elite -- just to strengtahen its own position -- follows. Soon a pluralistic system emerges. Why hasn't this happened in Lebanon? A policy of exclusion accompanied the birth of the Lebanese state and has survived to this day. The policy was evident under the French mandate and continued under Syrian influence. Forms of exclusion persisted, to various degrees, from 1943 to 1989. Occasionally some segments of the ruling elite -- as happens in more established democracies -- would reach out to underprivileged groups and use them either to bolster their own position, overcome certain difficulties, or both. But why hasn't this process taken Lebanon down the path of democratic evolution? One reason is that rival Lebanese groups often preferred to forge alliances with non-Lebanese parties instead of local ones, thus consolidating the sense of alienation in the country. Another is that powerful Lebanese elites often went into alliance with the underprivileged who belonged to the same sect, exacerbating sectarian tensions. These two factors are still in evidence today. Lebanon is a country torn by sectarian rivalries and foreign interference, more so now than in 1943. When Lebanon gained independence it tried its best to defuse sectarian tensions and keep foreign influences at bay. Today this doesn't seem to be the case.
