In Focus: The promise of democracy Allied with a spirit of resistance, democratic impulses are much needed as Arabs confront foreign, occupying powers and domestic regimes, writes Galal Nassar Following the 1967 War, Arab elites began looking for the causes of defeat and identified a main one: absence of democracy. Some blame was placed at the doorstep of foreign powers, but the main elite consensus was that greater democracy could have saved us from the worst. Since then, Arab countries have tried their hand at democracy but only with reluctance, at snail's pace. Truth be said, this wasn't the fault of Arab regimes alone. Our social structures weren't conducive to healthy democracy and as nations we lacked many of the required cultural traits. As our new century started, and especially since the 9/11 attacks, a foreign factor was introduced into the equation. Having concluded that terror is borne of political despotism, economic backwardness and educational extremism, the US administration began advocating democracy in the Arab world. Iraq was the first target of US policy. And then, in February 2004, came the Greater Middle East Initiative, a scheme involving a broader vision for democratisation. Despite widespread Arab opposition to US intentions, some people welcomed the new-found interest on democracy, hinting that the Arab people could use some outside help to rid them of their despotic governments. Nothing came of this, for it wasn't long before the US, badly shaken in Iraq, decided to focus on stability rather than democracy. A blend of foreign and domestic factors impeded democratisation in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. In Iraq, legislative elections, which took place under military occupation, gave birth to a government with dual loyalties: part American; part Iranian. The Iraqi government couldn't democratise, maintain law and order, or start reconstruction. Democracy suffered in Iraq at the hands of American-friendly groups that wanted to exclude opponents and settle old scores. Had these groups pursued the interests of society at large, things would have been different. But as extremists hid behind the occupation while following their own narrow agenda, turmoil triumphed over democracy. In Palestine, the US administration swallowed its own democratic rhetoric. Once Hamas came to power, the US and its allies used economic measures to force the Islamic group to change political tack. The economic blockade caused real problems for the Hamas government. But the worst part was that some Palestinian factions, especially Fatah, sided with foreign pressure. As a result, Hamas ended up in a situation where it had power but couldn't use it. Things got worse when the Palestinian president commandeered more power in an attempt to marginalise Hamas. As Fatah and Hamas fought over everything, from security to foreign policy, the Palestinians went down a road towards civil war, forgetting their quest for an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. A historic opportunity was lost in Palestine, for Hamas could have been coached on democracy and the rotation of power. Instead, Hamas was forced onto the defensive and had no chance to assess its policies. Democratisation was a risk worth taking in Palestine, which is more than one could say about Egypt. In my last article ( Al-Ahram Weekly, 1- 7 February), I argued that Egypt can't afford a religious state and mustn't allow a religiously inspired government to take office. In Lebanon, the US administration pushed, following the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri in 2005, for parliamentary elections. The elections brought to power a dominantly anti-Syrian government, although one could still view it as a government of national unity, because it included Hizbullah. But things changed when Israel attacked Lebanon in 2006. The historic steadfastness of the resistance brought about another shift in power. Now the opposition, led by Hizbullah, is asking for a "controlling" one-third quota of cabinet seats -- either that or early elections. This latter demand is rejected by the majority, which has the backing of regional and international powers. In response, the opposition took to the streets and now the country teeters on the brink of civil war. There are some interesting differences among the above three cases. In Iraq and Lebanon, the resistance wants to change the status quo. In Palestine, the resistance wants to keep the status quo. In Iraq, the resistance wants to change the status quo in order to get rid of foreign occupation. In Lebanon, the resistance wants a bigger share in government. But while the Iraqi resistance cannot possibly achieve its objectives without resort to violence, the Lebanese resistance has other options. The Lebanese resistance recognises that its rivals, however discontented they may be, are partners in the political process. This is what makes the recent general strike by the Lebanese resistance, more than two weeks ago, rather odd. This was not a strike in the usual sense of the word, but rather in the sense of disrupting traffic and business. Such actions contrast with the opposition's claims of self-restraint, and many interpreted it as an attempt to seize decision-making powers in the country. For various domestic and foreign reasons, democracy has become more of a distant dream in the Arab world than ever before. In Lebanon, the resistance has defied democratic procedures in a manner reminiscent of what had happened to Hamas in Palestine, presaging what might happen to the Lebanese resistance in the future. After all, using non-democratic means to challenge an elected government is a risky game. As one sees the spectre of civil war travel from one Arab country to another, one wonders if democracy could ever have a chance. One wonders if the day will come when various political parties accept their rivals as true partners and refuse to side with foreign -- or occupation -- powers. Democracy is becoming but a mirage at the time when it is most needed.
