In focus: The aftershocks of war The ramifications of Israel's attack on Lebanon last year continue to cause tremors throughout the region, writes Galal Nassar In assessing the significance of last summer's war in south Lebanon one fact must be borne in mind: Israel, convinced of its ability to force its own political agenda on the region, was defeated and forced to withdraw unconditionally. The Israeli army had hoped for a quick war that would allow it to reach the banks of Al-Litani River, from where it would be able to dictate its conditions, one of which, according to plans drawn up by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, was to secure a share of the waters of the river. The other condition was to disarm the resistance, as per UN Security Council Resolution 1559 which calls on the Lebanese government exercise control over all of Lebanon, disarm Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and expel non-Lebanese troops from the country. The Israelis thought they could accomplish something the Lebanese government had singularly failed to do. They were wrong. Aware of the structural imbalance in Arab strategies of confrontation and the poor training and planning that had led to repeated military failure, the Israelis went to war in July 2006 with no doubt that victory would be theirs. This perception is what tempted them to attack in the first place. Israel, which to this day refuses to admit it was defeated in the October 1973 War, still believed it was invincible. There are lessons for Arab states in the Lebanese conflict. That the existence of a strong conventional army, one capable of achieving a strategic balance in weaponry and combat capabilities with the enemy, is not a prerequisite for victory is among the most important. Guerrilla forces, if well trained and equipped, can paralyse enemy forces and inflict major damage. This type of war is less costly and -- as it turned out -- more effective. Another fallacy -- that has existed since 1967 -- is that air force can win a war. The Israeli air force wrecked bridges, flattened residential areas, and created general mayhem in Lebanon. Its aim was to break the morale of the pro-resistance civilians. Again it failed. Another lesson concerns the types of weapons used by the opposing forces. The war showed that light weapons can be effective in modern warfare. Light-weight ballistic weapons are effective, accurate, and have a potentially long range. This fact undermined Israel's long-held security theory based on deterrence, pre-emption and the acquisition of sophisticated weapons. Arrogance blinded the Israelis to the changes happening around them. The success of the Iraqi resistance in undermining the US project should have been treated as a warning that the Arab-Israeli conflict was moving beyond the stage of confrontation with badly-structured Arab regular armies. The Winograd Commission's report concluded that Israeli had underestimated the Lebanese resistance. The commission's report notes that the Israeli general staff, along with the chief of the general staff, failed to respond appropriately to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. Israel's military command failed to keep the prime minister informed of the true situation. It failed to come up with emergency plans to deal with the situation, just at it failed to correctly gauge the combat capabilities of its army. When the Israeli army had to flee south Lebanon following a war of attrition with the Lebanese resistance, a psychological trauma was inflicted on the Israelis that undermined the combat capabilities of Israeli forces. Last year's war, the Winograd Report says, shook the foundations of the Israeli military. The war had demonstrated that despite its vastly superior firepower the Israeli military was unable to secure Israel's borders. Viewed objectively, the war in Lebanon should end any Arab inferiority complex. The enemy quite clearly is not invincible. One corollary of this is that the Arabs should stop seeking an absurd peace that meets only Israel's needs. Israel doesn't have what it takes to break the political resolve of Arab nations. The Arabs know now that they can win. And Israel's barbaric conduct -- as well as its systemic destruction of bridges, power stations and hospitals -- shows we cannot trust any negotiated peace treaty or agreement with Israel. From a moral and patriotic viewpoint, no peace is acceptable unless it upholds our rights and security. Anything else is capitulation. The Lebanese war also illustrated that the economic, geographic and demographic weight of particular Arab countries is less important than the determination of their populations when it comes to securing victory. What matters is resistance, historic presence and the ability to manage cultural and military confrontation. These are the lessons of last year's war. Yet are we capable of learning them? As usual the war left rifts within Arab ranks. Some people supported the resistance and others denounced it. It was as if the war was a football game and not a confrontation on which the fate of the region rests. The war was a major earthquake, and the aftershocks continue.
