While victory appears to be Ahmadinejad's, political realities on the ground betray a reconfiguration of the conservative current in a way that leaves him little room for manoeuvre, writes Mustafa El-Labbad With all the minute details, subtle shades and contours, and the tangle of convoluted lines that compose the backdrop of the current situation in Iran, any attempt to analyse what is happening now and what will happen next is akin to reading the dregs in a coffee cup, the Middle Eastern equivalent of the crystal ball. Both processes require an imagination that can decipher a jumble of symbols, dig beneath them so as to sort the chafe from the wheat, and then discern the latent possibilities in the most probable combination of elements. In Iran at present the conservative alignment that holds the reins of power seems to have secured overwhelming dominance to the exclusion of the reformist alliance, which enjoys widespread support among certain strata of society. Yet, despite appearances, the fact is that the balances of power in Iran have never favoured the absolute hegemony of a single political faction or hue over the state and society, and it is hardly likely that this will change. Granted, President Ahmadinejad (in the foreground) and the forces that support him (in the background) have succeeded in securing the official results of the 10th presidential elections, these results having been confirmed and, hence, finalised by the Supreme Guide in accordance with the Iranian constitution. Yet, the continued sporadic eruption of demonstrations in major cities and the verbal expressions of protest among the political elites detract from Ahmadinejad's moral legitimacy. Meanwhile, the sharpening confrontation between the conservative and reformist alignments seems calibrated to obviate compromise, reflecting the Ahmadinejad camp's inclination to believe that with tougher measures they can eventually force the opposition to submit to the new de facto reality. In general, compromise becomes desirable in instances where there is a standoff between two relatively equal forces. But the Iranian president has largely succeeded in keeping demonstrators off the streets, using strong-arm tactics in the form of the Republican Guards and the Basij. In addition, some 100 reformist campaigners have been brought to trial on charges varying from jeopardising national security to colluding with foreign powers. With the --confessions� of Mohamed Ali Abtahi, who had served as advisor to former president Khatemi and who managed Mahdi Karoubi's campaign in the recent elections, Ahmadinejad has a powerful political instrument for discrediting the opposition and its supporters at home and abroad. Abtahi charged that key reformist leaders such as Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mahdi Karoubi, Mohammed Khatemi and even Hashemi Rafsanjani had conspired against the Supreme Guide. It makes little difference that Abathi's wife affirmed that these confessions were obtained by force or that the history of the revolutionary courts and the circumstances surrounding the current trials are tinged in blood. What counts is the overall impact of the proceedings on Iranian public opinion. This instrument could acquire even greater force if the Ahmadinejad camp takes up the suggestion of one of the president's most important supporters, Yedalla Jawani, a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guards, and brings Khatemi, Karoubi, Mousavi and other such opposition leaders to trial. But the arrest and trial of these opposition leaders is most unlikely. As tempting as it might be to some conservatives to use this means to tighten the noose around the opposition alignment, domestic balances of power would not permit it and the regime's image abroad would be almost irremediably tarnished. If Iran wants to continue to boast of the dynamism and plurality of its political system, for which there is considerable basis, especially when compared to other Middle Eastern countries, it can not arrest key opposition figures, for to do so would render the boast hollow and forfeit one of the regime's strongest cards. In fact, even the prosecution of second rank opposition figures can at best serve as a temporary propaganda ploy, because in the middle to long term it could backfire against Ahmadinejad because it crosses a major red line of the political conventions of the revolutionary order. The dynamics of the political game in Iran are not limited to confrontation across the conservative-reformist divide and the --ground rules� prohibit the total elimination of one side or the other. What is playing out within each of the two camps is a new manifestation of the dialectic between unity and conflict. If President Ahmadinejad represents the fundamentalist trend in the conservative alliance, the majority of the clergy represent the traditionalists and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani represents the pragmatists. Thus, while battling the reformist alignment, Ahmadinejad simultaneously has to hold his ground against potential rivals and maintain a semblance of cohesion within his own conservative alignment. Hence the significance of his appointment of Sadeq Larijani, the speaker of parliament's younger brother, to replace Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi as head of the judiciary. But the appointment not only serves Ahmadinejad. Having descended from his loftier realm of impartial overseer into the political fray when he openly sided with Ahmadinejad during the post-election uproar, the Supreme Guide sees the appointment of Sadeq Larijani as a pragmatic check to an impulsive and headstrong president. The result is a new equation within the conservative camp, with two pragmatists heading the legislative and judicial authorities versus one fundamentalist in the executive branch. Sadeq Larijani's appointment is significant in another respect. Until now the judiciary has always been headed by senior clerics bearing the title Ayatollah. With this appointment, all three branches of government are headed -- for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic -- by laymen. In all events, the Larijani brothers are certain to pose a formidable counterweight to Ahmadinejad that will stay his rasher tendencies during his second term and pave the way for a greater parliamentary say in shaping domestic and foreign policies. But the president also faces a third challenge in the form of his long-time foe Rafsanjani. Currently serving as both chairman of the Assembly of Experts and chairman of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani has been the unofficial imam of the reformists in their demonstrations, in the corridors of power, and in the international press. Thus, Ahmadinejad may appear the winner, judging by the official ratification of the election results, the suppression of public demonstrations and the "confessions" wrested from reformists facing prosecution. Yet, as important as these victories are for the moment, he will probably find that the new balances of power within the conservative alignment will hem him in as never anticipated. If he is gloating over the upper hand he has won, he would nevertheless be wise to heed the old Persian saying: "Don't count your chickens until the end of autumn."
