Political conflict in Iran has moved from the streets to the corridors of power, with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad facing conservative opposition to his choice of cabinet, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* Iran is on the threshold of a new phase now that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has submitted his list of cabinet nominees to parliament for approval, as stipulated under the country's constitution. While the parliament will announce its decisions at the end of the month, the process may not be as routine as it appears. This time the decisions will be made within an unprecedented political context shaped by a new type of rivalry, not between conservatives and reformists this time but rather within the conservative camp itself. The latter consists of three basic trends: the fundamentalists, led by Ahmadinejad, the pragmatists, represented by parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani and his brother Sadeq Larijani, recently appointed head of the judiciary, and the traditionalists, who come primarily from the elite of the religious establishment. As the wave of demonstrations against the official results of the presidential elections has ebbed in Iran, the impetus of the reformists has seemed to shrink in the face of the trials of prominent reformists and the security forces tightening their grip on the country as a whole. At the same time, lines within the conservative camp have begun to sharpen and deepen. From a glimpse at the names on the list of cabinet nominees, one cannot help but conclude that Ahmadinejad has been guided by two basic criteria in his selection process. The first is loyalty to him personally. Ahmadinejad previously dismissed six ministers primarily because they objected to his appointment of his son-in-law, Rahim Mashai, as first vice- president of Iran. His second criterion is the close connection of the cabinet nominees to the country's Republican Guards, which applies to the majority of those on the list. None of Ahmadinejad's nominees, however, are close either to the pragmatists or the traditionalists in the conservative camp. This is unusual for the revolutionary regime in Iran, in which presidential powers approximate to those of prime ministers in presidential republics and whose presidents have always taken pains to make conciliatory gestures towards rival political trends by allowing them at least token representation in the cabinet. Former Iranian presidents, such as Mohamed Khatami and Rafsanjani, subscribed to this tradition in forming their governments. Yet, while loyalty and the Republican Guard connection have weighed heavily with Ahmadinejad, competence has not, and, if approved, the overall level of professionalism of the prospective government will set an all-time low for Iran. This is all the more unfortunate in that the country is not lacking in the necessary talents to form not one outstanding cabinet but several. Turning to Ahmadinejad's nominees, for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic these contain three women. By including these women on the list, Ahmadinejad has even surpassed former president Khatami, who managed to get one woman, Maasuma Ibtikar, appointed minister of environment, though with great difficulty. Ahmadinejad's female nominees, who naturally all belong to the fundamentalist camp, include Marziyeh Vahid Dastjerdi as health minister, Fatemah Ajorlou as minister of welfare and social security, and Sousan Keshavarz as minister of education. Of these, the first stands the best chance of parliamentary approval because of her acknowledged qualifications for the ministerial portfolio for which she has been nominated, something that does not apply to the other two candidates. In making these nominations, however, Ahmadinejad is hardly in the process of an ideological about-face, and his inclusion of women is purely tactical. Ahmadinejad would like to win the support of women, who generally vote reformist, and at the same time, he would like to be able to use the female nominees as bargaining chips in order to win the traditionalists' approval for candidates for more important portfolios, including defence, the interior and intelligence, to which all Iranian governments, regardless of orientation, attach the highest priority. For this reason, decisions made when filling them are also potentially the most politically touchy. In addition to these key ministerial appointments, there is also an oil minister in Iran who has a seat in the cabinet, and this appointment is particularly important given that the ministry oversees the sector that furnishes 80 per cent of the national income of Iran, which is the world's fourth largest oil exporter. Ahmadinejad has appointed Seyyed Masoud Mir- Kazemi to this post, even though members of the Iranian parliament have voiced concern that he lacks the experience and know-how necessary to manage such an important ministry. While Mir-Kazemi may previously have been minister of trade, the skills required to run that ministry do not necessarily overlap with what it takes to oversee oil. What perhaps counted most with Ahmadinejad was Mir-Kazemi's close connection with the Revolutionary Guards. Ahmadinejad's opponents in parliament have also criticised his choice of Mohamed Ali-Abadi as energy minister on the grounds that Ali-Abdai, a relation, lacks the appropriate qualifications. However, the problems become even more pronounced with regard to ministries connected with national security. Here, the selection of Ahmed Vahidi as minister of defence is certain to court sustained international criticism, since Vahidi allegedly took part in a terrorist attack in Argentina in 1994. Although Mustafa Mohamed Najjar was a member of Ahmadinejad's last cabinet, in which he served as minister of defence, his nomination this time round as minister of the interior may prove equally controversial, with some perceiving this as a bid to tighten the control of the Revolutionary Guards over the key posts of government. As for Hojjat Al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi, Ahmadinejad's choice for intelligence minister, this man once served as the representative of Imam Khomeini in the Basij militia, and he was subsequently a senior officer in the Revolutionary Guards intelligence agency. Under Iranian law, the minister of intelligence should be a mujtahid, a member of the highest ranking jurists in the Shia clergy, which Moslehi is not. To become a mujtahid, it is necessary to complete a lengthy course of religious studies in one of the prestigious theological institutes of Qom or Mashhad in Iran or to gain the relevant certification from An-Najaf in Iraq. The Iranian constitution stipulates that ministerial candidates must obtain a vote of confidence from parliament and that each candidate must be approved individually, rather than a vote being taken on the list as a whole. The voting thus offers parliament and parliament speaker Ali Larijani the opportunity to demonstrate its power to clip Ahmadinejad's wings from within the institutional framework of the regime. Parliament may well withhold its confidence from certain candidates on objective grounds, thereby trimming the margin of manoeuvre that Ahmadinejad has been trying to expand. The dynamics between the various trends in the conservative camp will thus soon occupy centre stage in Iranian domestic politics, not long after the spotlight was trained on the conservative-reformist rift. Adding weight to this prognosis is the fact that the new judiciary chief, Sadeq Larijani, has recently appointed Mohseni Ejeie as prosecutor-general. The latter, a former intelligence minister, was dismissed by Ahmadinejad for objecting to his choice of Mashai as vice-president. Larijani's choice has therefore been designed to drive home the distinction between the judiciary and the executive branch headed by Ahmadinejad. Parliament may also turn down several candidates. If Vahidi is one of them, likely on the grounds of his lack of appropriate qualifications, this might actually come as a relief to Ahmadinejad, since at least it would spare the next Iranian government the strains and embarrassment that could arise from having someone in its ranks who has long been on Interpol's wanted list. Much less to Ahmadinejad's liking would be objections to his choices for the oil and energy portfolios. The predictions are, however, that such refusals may mark the beginning of a trend, with parliament beginning to assert its authority. If so, the hurdles that Ahmadinejad had to overcome with the reformists may prove easy compared with the new challenges he will now have to face. Although the former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has resigned as Imam of the University of Tehran, an important symbolic post, and in spite of his tactical retreat when he declared that people should yield to the orders of the Supreme Guide, he still heads both the Islamic Republic's Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council and thus remains within the tiny circle of the most powerful figures in Iran. Alongside Rafsanjani are the Larijani brothers, who also occupy key positions, Ali as parliamentary speaker and his younger brother Sadeq as chief justice. On the other hand, as president Ahmadinejad has the strong backing of the Revolutionary Guards, and above them there is the Supreme Guide, Ali Khamenei, himself, though whose hands pass all the strings of power. While it proved necessary for Khamenei to descend to street level to defend Ahmadinejad and his camp against the reformists after the recent presidential elections, the forthcoming political contest within the narrow circle of the conservative establishment should allow him to resume his perch above the fray. Now that the political conflict has moved from the streets to the corridors of power, Khamenei will be able to watch as Ahmadinejad is cut down to size, though not to the advantage of the reformists, of course, but rather in favour of Rafsanjani and the Larijani brothers. Since the contest will unfold in a narrow arena directly beneath Khamenei's gaze, the Supreme Guide may want to give a nudge or two to make sure that it yields the desired outcome. From this perspective, the forthcoming vote in parliament over Ahmadinejad's choice of cabinet will be an important stage in the process of producing a new balance of power within the Iranian regime and one preparatory to meeting the challenges that lie ahead for the country. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
