The US has reason to be concerned about post-revolution Egypt, given that the people are in no mood to pander to Israel, as Mubarak did. But pragmatism in Cairo and Washington will likely prevail, writes Amr Abdel-Atty* Due to Egypt's strategic position in the Middle East and because of the possible impact of domestic circumstances in Egypt on the stability of the region and on US interests, the US takes a close interest in political developments in Egypt. This interest was not just sparked by the 25 January Revolution; it has existed for decades before this. But the fall of the Mubarak regime, the strategic ally of the US and Israel, naturally aroused more concern than usual, and today, as Egypt stands on the threshold of presidential elections, Washington is keeping close tabs. A range of factors has converged to shape US opinion on these elections. The first is mounting popular anger against the US for its vacillation at the time of the revolution. One day, US officials were pleading with the Mubarak regime to reform, but once it appeared that the regime was about to crumble they shifted their support to the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square and called on the regime to step down. The message that this delivered to Tahrir Square and Egyptians as a whole was that the US is ever ready to place the principles and values it espouses second to its interests. The wave of anti-American hostility reached its height in the popular approval of the decision to turn the heads of US NGOs operating in Egypt over to trial and the support for the call to reject US aid to Egypt. A Gallop poll conducted at the time found that 71 per cent of Egyptians oppose US economic aid to Egypt and that 74 per cent of these oppose direct US assistance to Egyptian civil society organisations. Another manifestation of anti-US resentment is to be found in the populist appeals by presidential candidates, which have shaped the second factor. Most contenders for the presidency have voiced a desire to revise US- Egyptian relations in a manner that prioritises Egyptian interests and favours the resumption of Egypt's regional role, which had diminished over the years of deferring to US and Israeli demands. Presidential hopefuls are playing on the sentiments of a large portion of the Egyptian electorate that regards fawning on the US as one of the most salient traits of the 30 years of Mubarak rule. Of course, the candidates vary in the levels of stridency their statements display on the subject. Those representing the Islamist and Arab nationalist trends pledge to totally reorder US-Egyptian relations while those associated with the former regime are less adamant. The third factor is the rising power of the Islamist trend, as embodied in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in the political process. These facets of the Islamist movement in Egypt, as represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and El-Nour Party respectively, now control the majority in the Egyptian parliament. Neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor the Salafists have declared their positions on a number of issues of concern to the US in the Middle East, foremost among which is recognition of Israel and the use of armed force on the part of resistance movements in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan -- movements that the US State Department brands as "terrorist" in its annual reports. The Muslim Brotherhood and its FJP, and the Salafists and their El-Nour Party, have been ambiguous on their foreign policy outlooks in general in the post-revolutionary phase. The fourth factor is the tensions in Egyptian-Israeli relations, which in the Mubarak era were typified by submissiveness to Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories and in the region in general, and in the areas of Egyptian influence in particular. Cairo has recently taken a number of measures opposed to Israeli interests, the most recent being to cut off gas exports to Israel. Fifthly, in tandem with the foregoing factor, Egypt has entertained the possibility of reviving relations with Iran, which Washington regards as hostile to the US and US interests in the region. In addition, it has drawn closer to Turkey, the US ally that has staunchly opposed many US policies in the region. The sixth factor relates more to domestic politics in the US. As the US presidential elections in November approach, the competition is growing more intense between the incumbent president who seeks a second term and whose party hopes to regain its congressional majority, and the Republican rivals who have lashed out against his policies in the Middle East. The Middle East is the area in which inconsistencies between the principles and values that Obama, like all US presidents before him, claims to champion and the policies he pursues are the most glaring. The foregoing factors have been fuelling an increasingly heated debate between two major camps of opinion in the US over the stance Washington should take towards the first Egyptian presidential elections since the 25 January Revolution. On one side are those who maintain that a democratic Egypt and the legitimacy a president would have if brought to power through free and fair polls would augment Egypt's soft power. In other words, a democratic Egypt would be much stronger than a non- democratic Egypt, which could inspire the next president in a state that is strategically vital to the US and that is a pivotal force in the Middle East to pursue policies opposed to the US and Israel. Proponents of this view make no secret of the fact that they would not mind if the Egyptian presidential elections were postponed and SCAF continued to remain in command, even overtly bypassing the elections and the handover of power to a civilian authority entirely, if this ensures the continuation of that special relationship that bound the two countries so closely together on security and military matters during the Mubarak era. The members of this staunchly pro-Israeli camp, who abound in the pro-Israeli lobbies and think tanks such as the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, the Heritage Institute, the Hudson Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute, fault the Obama administration for abandoning Mubarak and shifting its support to the revolutionaries at the last moment. The opposing camp is more realistic. Its members, who are to be found in independent academic and research centres such as the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the International Peace Institute, argue that it is extremely important at this juncture that the US administration support free, fair and transparent elections, offer whatever assistance possible to enable the Egyptian authorities to hold these elections properly, and refrain from intervening in any way that might influence Egyptian voters. Then, after the elections, the US administration should enter into talks with its democratically elected Egyptian counterpart over how to re-establish the US-Egyptian relationship on a basis of mutual respect and common interests. They also caution that, in view of the current fluidity in rivalries and alliances between the different political forces in Egypt, the US should remain neutral and avoid supporting one faction at the expense of another. Because of the tense fluidity of the political situation in Egypt and the populist pledges being mouthed by presidential candidates, which if followed through in certain ways could jeopardise US relations with a cornerstone of US policy in the Middle East, Washington is very concerned who the next Egyptian president will be, and all the more so in view of the many crises the US is facing both at home and abroad. It is little wonder, therefore, that Senator John Kerry, who is serving as chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, made a special visit to Cairo, during which he met with Amr Moussa and the FJP's candidate Mohamed Mursi. Still, this does not indicate that the US administration will back a particular candidate or team against another, or reduce its perception of its strategic relationship with Cairo to the personality of the president or the identity of the winning team. The US has been sobered by the failure of the Bush administration and its neoconservative foreign policy engineers in imposing their vision on the people in Iraq and Afghanistan. In spite of the unimaginably costly US invasion and occupation of these countries, with the purpose of establishing new systems of government, the people ultimately had the final say in the choice of their new leaders. Today, therefore, the only factor that would spark US alarm in the person of the next Egyptian president is if he is deemed to pose a threat to US strategic interests which, with respect to Egypt, centre around three points: upholding the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the continuation of military and security cooperation, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation in the region. As none of the candidates have come out against any of these points, none would threaten to jettison the strategic relationship with the US. In light of the change that will occur in US-Egypt relations with the advent of a new Egyptian president, the US will have three alternatives for dealing with the next Egyptian leadership. 1. Containment. This would entail policies and strategies to forestall any potential threat to US interests in the region. The strategies could include soliciting the assistance of other regional or international powers. 2. Accommodation. Washington could alter its Middle East policies in a manner that would minimise any conflict between Egyptian interests and outlooks under its new leadership and the US's long established interests in the Middle East. 3. Confrontation, which could arise in the event that Washington and Cairo fail to come to new understandings on the bases of their strategic relationship. The last scenario is unlikely for various reasons, foremost among which is that both countries need each other. The only difference, this time, is that Egypt will be determined not to subordinate its interests or its will to the US and Israel. On the other hand, Egypt's current fiscal and economic straits will compel any new Egyptian leader to turn to international donor agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, which are controlled by Western forces close to Washington, so as to be able to turn his electoral pledges into achievements that can be tangibly felt by the people who voted for him in the elections. This need favours the first and second scenarios above. Ultimately, pragmatism will prevail in relations between the two countries regardless of the person at the helm in both. * The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
