The US presidential elections mark a potential turning point in Egyptian-American relations and offer the opportunity for rebuilding the Middle East on the basis of shared values, writes Abdel-Moneim Said* Following this November's US presidential elections, the new American president will need to take a closer look at Egyptian-American relations. Historically, the relationship between the two countries suffered from a period of estrangement in the three decades following World War II, with the 1970s witnessing the reconstruction of an Egyptian-American alliance that was to promote deep changes in the security and strategic environment of the Middle East over the next two decades. However, from the beginning of the 21st century onwards this Egyptian-American alliance has shown signs of losing momentum and sometimes also of friction and tension. Part of the reason for this has been the two countries' growing gap in perceptions of the security and strategic challenges facing the Middle East, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001. Nevertheless, the relationship between Egypt and the US has consistently been defined as "strategic," and over the past three decades Egypt and the United States have shared a common interest in realising five strategic objectives. The first of these objectives has been the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This has continued without abating since the 1948 War, and it has long been the focus of common endeavours. The conflict has been destabilising not only for the Middle East, but also for world security. Due to the efforts of both countries, it has however changed from being an existential conflict -- in which the Arab side denied Israel the right to exist and the Israeli side denied Palestinians the right to statehood -- into one over how Arabs and Israelis can live together. A second joint objective has been security in the Gulf, which has been bedeviled by the radical states of Iran and Iraq since the late 1970s. The Gulf region has the world's largest share of oil and gas reserves, together with serious demographic and strategic imbalances. In fewer than three decades it has lived through three major wars: the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Kuwait War (1991) and the American War in Iraq (2003). However, it has also been secured against the revolutionary and expansionist tendencies of Iran and Iraq: with the exception of the short period of the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s, Egypt and the US have worked closely together to ensure security in the Gulf and to contain Iran's revolutionary reach and Iraq's expansionism. The stability and security of the Middle East as a whole in the face of different forms of radical fundamentalism over the last three decades has been a third shared objective. Interstate and intrastate wars have been common in the region, as have other forms of violence, including terrorism. Marxist and "Islamic" fundamentalist movements in Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and Ethiopia have been defeated or rendered incapable of destabilising their respective regions. In the international war against terrorism, Egypt and the US have also cooperated in depriving terrorists of bases from which to operate in Afghanistan and in keeping them on the defensive. A fourth shared objective has been the development of Egypt as a cornerstone for the achievement of the other objectives. Historically, Egypt has been a pivotal country in the Middle East. While its early modernisation in the 19th century gave it weight in the politics of the region, its involvement in four wars in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as in two decades of revolutionary and socialist politics, weakened the country. Yet, over the course of the past three decades Egypt has become a different country, so much so that by the1990s it was considered to be a "promising emerging market." A final shared objective between Cairo and Washington has been a joint interest in fighting terrorism. Since 6 October 1981 and the assassination of former president Sadat, Egypt has been involved in a war against fundamentalism, with terrorist attacks in Egypt in the 1990s costing some 1,300 lives. Since at least the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, both Cairo and Washington have had a shared interest in fighting terrorism. However, despite these shared objectives and the appreciation among the leaders of both countries of what each has gained from good relations, members of the political elite on both sides have not always appreciated the fact that differences can inevitably arise between allies or strategic partners. Egyptian-American affairs have been plagued by mutual mistrust as a result, something that has been especially the case in the wake of the US "war on terror", Washington's effective disengagement from the Israeli- Palestinian peace process and serious differences between the two countries over the crisis in Iraq. A number of factors have contributed to this mistrust. While fighting terrorism continues to be a common strategic goal for both Egypt and the US, and while Egypt has supported the US in its efforts to hunt down terrorists abroad, Egypt has vehemently opposed any loose definition of terrorism, as well as the link the US has sought to make between terrorism, on the one hand, and the Palestinian and Iraqi questions, on the other. Egypt continues to affirm that the violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories is the result of continued Israeli occupation. The US, on the other hand, has looked at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through the narrow prism of its global war on terror since the events of September 2001 and has required the Palestinians to end the use of violence irrespective of surrounding circumstances. America's war on Iraq has also been an important source of tension between the two allies. Egypt opposed the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, and it has challenged the main objectives given to justify the invasion: alleged Iraqi support for terrorism, the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme, and regime change. The gaps in perception between the two countries have led to changing policy orientations in Cairo and Washington. Divergences regarding the situation in the Middle East have given rise to divergences in the two countries' visions of the region and to differences regarding regional and international issues and policies to achieve the objectives that made the two countries allies in the first place. Nevertheless, good Egyptian-American relations remain of paramount importance to the interests of both countries and to Middle East stability and global security. The relationship between the two countries should therefore not be subjected to ad hoc management, tied to the volatile Arab-Israeli conflict, or linked to the use of force and idealistic designs of forced change. Instead, the relationship should be seen in terms of a strategic international alliance in which common values, institutions and strategic objectives determine policies and help manage differences. While Egypt and the US belong to two different worlds, particularly in their cultural and political values, if the two countries do not succeed in building a system of common values then their relationship will be in danger of losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the elites. Five shared values need particularly to be underlined. The first of these shared values is transparency. Most Egyptian-American interactions are not well known to the public in Egypt and the US. Little is known in Egypt of Washington's role in the liberation of Egyptian territories, of American aid to Egypt, or of the depth of cooperation between the two countries. Similarly, very little is known in the US of how Egypt has been a strategic partner for America during and after the Cold War. The elites on both sides should be aware of the accomplishments and problems of the relationship. A second value entails that both countries come to realise that it is policies that decide differences and not deep-seated images of the other. Public- opinion surveys clearly show that the declining popularity of Egypt in America and of America in Egypt is not rooted in the religious or ethnic characteristics of the other, but rather in the specific policies that have been carried out, particularly those related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is time that both countries accept the historical and moral ties they have to the parties in the conflict. In this way, they will be able to differentiate between situations in which their interests dictate a common policy and situations in which their interests instruct them to differ. A third value is an emphasis on the "legitimacy" of the Egyptian-American relationship. In many quarters in Cairo the relationship with Washington is questioned because of the inequality of power between the two countries. American leadership of the world is not accepted in Cairo in the way that it is in Europe. A similar situation exists in Washington. Egypt is questioned as an American ally not only because it is underdeveloped politically and economically, but also because of the lack of common political values. However, despite these doubts, the history of the relationship and its achievements attest to a common effort by a superpower and a regional power to rebuild the Middle East region. This should be seen as giving moral, as well as political, value to the relationship. The fourth value is the centrality of the Arab- Israeli conflict in the Middle East region. The US and Egypt should realise that this conflict is one of strategic magnitude and is not one that time will necessarily ameliorate. Finally, the fifth value is a belief in the necessity of building a regional coalition for moderation and modernisation. A concert of regional powers including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the new Iraq and Turkey in alliance with the US and the EU would be able to work for the reconstruction of the Middle East and its integration into the globalisation process. In order for all these things to come about and for the US and Egypt to enhance their relationship, reassessments need to be made of the two countries' military and security relations in view of the changes unfolding in the Middle East. Drawing up a mutually understood strategic vision for the region, in addition to re-defining the roles and interests of the actors, will have a paramount impact on political, economic and military and security cooperation between the two countries. Egyptian-US relations need to be rehabilitated on three different levels: the political, the economic and the cultural or societal. Cooperation between Egypt and the US over the past three decades has been concentrated in the economic and military realms. Political interactions between the two countries have been restricted to leadership levels. Increased interaction between the political elite in Egypt and in the US needs to be encouraged and institutionalised if negative perceptions and divergent interests are to be successfully managed. A "political council" bringing together representatives from political parties and research institutes in Egypt and the US on a periodic basis to deepen each side's knowledge and familiarity of the other and to forge a common understanding and vision for the Middle East would be welcome. Another valuable form of enhanced cooperation between the two countries would be a cultural initiative between Egypt and the US that promoted the dialogue of religions, cultures and civilisations. This would help to improve negative perceptions and increase each society's knowledge and understanding of the other. Finally, American investment in Egypt remains relatively low. An economic council to attract increased American investment and redirect current investment into more viable export-oriented activities is needed. This council could supplement the work of the Egyptian- American Business Council (EABC), whose activities have focused almost exclusively on lobbying for a free-trade agreement between Egypt and the US, and it could venture into areas like encouraging Egyptian-Americans to invest in their country of origin. Creating such new institutions and initiatives will also require reassessment of the US and Egypt's military and security relations. The overall goal would be to form an international and regional coalition for the transformation of the Middle East from being a conflict-ridden region to a developmental one. One area that urgently needs such reassessment is the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where a system of incentives should be built that could make it possible for all parties to achieve their interests. The cornerstone of this system would be an American commitment to resolving the conflict based upon Israeli withdrawal to something like the 1967 borders. In exchange, the Arab countries would put the Arab Initiative into effect in parallel with the Road Map, which has been accepted by all the parties. Another area in which convergence of interests could be obtained is Iraq, and here the US administration needs to understand the depth of its problems, and Egypt and the rest of the Arab states need to understand that it is not in their interest to be passive bystanders. A solution needs to be found in which the US is able to bring about a decent exit from Iraq, and Iraq can be assured a democratic and undivided future. A third area for reassessment is the need for endogenous reform in the region, with Egypt and the US differing on the proper mix of external and internal interventions to bring about progressive change in the Arab countries, including in Egypt, and the links between these policies and the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US can help by understanding the complexity of the reform issue and by working to create the conditions for change. The expansion of the Egyptian middle class is essential in order to create the political demand for democratisation that is currently lacking. More American investment and more expansion in the work of American companies in Egypt will contribute to such a goal. Yet, the fight against terrorism and the work being done to bring about conflict resolution in the Middle East and the region's economic and political reform will be in vain unless a more comprehensive vision for regional building is sought and implemented. During the Clinton administration such a vision was available. However, it was tied too closely to the Arab-Israeli conflict, such that as soon as the peace process came to a halt, so did the regional project. A more ambitious vision is needed to take in both the geo-political and the geo-economic problems of the region. The US, acting with a concert of regional powers, particularly Egypt, could work to develop such a vision. The Arab Initiative of March 2002 could be a starting point, but a common project for the future needs to be elaborated if the Arab Initiative is to play its proper role. Some moments in history are understood in retrospect as being defining for the shape of the future as a whole. Moments such as those at the end of World War II, at the end of the Cold War, and after the events of 11 September 2001 and the wars in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. A new American president is also a potential new point of departure. After the agonies of the recent past, this is an opportunity that should not be missed. * The writer is director of the Al-Ahram Centrefor Political and Strategic Studies.
