With Bush and attendant ideologues gone from the White House, a new beginning is opening in US-Egypt relations, writes Gamal Gawad Soltan* President Mubarak's first visit to the US in five years is a turning point in Egyptian-American relations. The visit indicates that the US and Egypt have been able to overcome the damage that was inflicted on their relations during the past eight years. The crisis in Egyptian-American relations of the past eight years has exposed the vulnerabilities and weakness of the ties between the two countries. The recent rapprochement between Cairo and Washington, however, demonstrates the resilience of their mutual interests. Since resumed in 1974, Egypt's relations with the US have gone through circular ups and downs. The 1970s were the years of great hope, aspirations, and illusions also. Sadat's reorientation of Egypt's foreign policy westward was an integral part of a grand transformation of Egypt's regional role from a revolutionary / revisionist to a status quo power. Bringing stability to the troubled Middle East after two decades of revolutionary upheaval, regional wars, and social turmoil was Sadat's strategic objective. Egypt's overture towards the US was designed to serve this strategy. Winning American support and involvement in a fruitful peace process that ought to lead to comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis was seen by President Sadat as the cornerstone of such a transformation. If not well defined, a functioning strategic understanding between President Sadat and Jimmy Carter was developed along these lines. Sadat was successfully able to employ his relations with the US to end the Israeli occupation of Egyptian territories seized in the 1967 conflict. However, Sadat was not successful in bringing the major transformation he sought for the entire region. Sadat's goal of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace was reduced to peace between Israel and Egypt only. In new and different forms, instability continued to characterise the Middle East. The resilience of US-Israel relations was instrumental in upsetting Sadat's ambitious goals. Creating a rift between the US and Israel was a central, if implicit, goal President Sadat sought when making his early overtures towards the US. Sadat thought that transformed relations between Egypt and the US would reduce Israel's strategic value to the US. Apparently, he failed to grasp the depth and complexity of the relation between the US and Israel. Contrary to what he planned, relations between the US and Egypt are closely linked to the relations between Egypt and Israel. Indeed, during most of the past three and half decades American-Egyptian relations have been a function of relations between Israel and Egypt. Sadat's high expectations with regard to the kind of change he could bring to the Middle East through the reorientation of Egyptian foreign policy proved unrealistic. Sadat's plan was upset by a number of factors, particularly the coming to power of the right wing administration of Ronald Reagan. The --New Cold War� mentality that dominated President Reagan's foreign policy could not accommodate Sadat's vision. The assassination of President Sadat a few months after the election of President Reagan meant that Sadat could not adjust to the change in US policy. It was President Mubarak who led Egypt through the difficult time of the 1980s. Adjusting Egypt's foreign policy to the challenges brought by the new US policy, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the new reality that was brought by the US- blessed 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the disintegration of Arab solidarity was Mubarak's immediate and pressing task. During the first decade of Mubarak's presidency, Egypt's foreign policy sought the restoration of Egypt's relations with the Arab world and the consolidation of Arab solidarity while balancing relations with the US. Such a policy was not cost-free regarding Egypt's relations with both Israel and the US. President Mubarak, nevertheless, was willing to pay that price in order to restore a certain level of balance to Egypt's relations with the US, the Arab world and Israel, and -- in general -- to Egypt's foreign policy itself. The Gulf War was a turning point in Egyptian- American relations. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a wakeup call to the US vis-�-vis its relations with Egypt. President Bush Sr's administration realised the instrumental contribution Egypt could make to reverse the outcomes of the Iraqi invasion. The Bush administration's reappraisal of Egypt's regional role granted relations between the two countries a new beginning. The close cooperation between Egypt and the US during the Gulf crisis and the Middle East peace process that followed has been instrumental in launching a new phase in Egyptian-American relations. The Democratic administration of Bill Clinton continued to work closely with Egypt towards the fruitful conclusion of the peace process thereafter. However, the serious efforts that were exerted to consolidate and upgrade Egyptian-American relations during that decade achieved limited success only. The American Egyptian strategic dialogue and Mubarak-Gore initiative were great ideas that did not fly high. Egyptian-American relations were not fortunate during the following decade. The failing Middle East peace process, the advent of George W Bush's administration, and the 9/11 attacks were too much for relations between the two to take. These developments combined with radically transformed US policy in the Middle East. The US, that had been a status quo power and stabilising force in the region during previous decades, became a revisionist power seeking a wide range of far-fetched goals of regime change, deep cultural transformation and the restructuring of the Middle East order. The new US policy went directly against the early strategic understanding upon which Egyptian- American relations were established a quarter of a century earlier. The US, together with the Middle East, has paid a high price for the Bush Jr years. The US has learned the hard way that ignoring Middle East realities can be detrimental. Egypt is part of the Middle East's realities that were ignored by the US in the past few years. The interest that President Obama has demonstrated to restore American-Egyptian relations to the old good days testifies to new convictions in Washington. There is no reason to see in President Obama anything but a genuine realist. In his campaign's discourse, Obama refrained from making strong moral arguments detached from American national interests. A realist leadership in America can better serve the interests of the US, its allies and the world at large. This is exactly what the Bush administration failed to do. Deviating from the established principles of realist foreign policy, the Bush administration committed serious mistakes. These include the simplistic dichotomous vision of a world divided between the forces of good and evil, the messianic vision of America's role in bringing democracy to the Middle East, allowing ideological blinders to distort US Middle East policy, ignoring the reality of power distribution on the global and regional levels, unrealistic belief in American power and its ability to achieve American goals regardless of the opposition and resistance of other world and regional powers, the marginalisation of diplomatic means in the package of instruments applied towards the pursuance of US foreign policy, and overemphasising the role of military power in achieving US goals. The return to realism under Obama's presidency is conducive for restoration and improvement of relations between the US and Egypt. Egyptian-American relations are set to begin a new era. Even during their bad days, the two countries have been able to maintain a minimum level of cooperation that both of them found indispensable. The challenge the two countries need to face now is to secure a larger number of dimensions of their mutual relations against the pressures of politics, whims of leaders, and ideological fashions. * The writer is Director of with Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
