Kamal El-Ganzouri's government is unlikely to survive beyond 11 March, writes Amani Maged On Sunday parliament is expected to deliver its verdict on Prime Minister Kamal El-Ganzouri's policy statement, delivered to the People's Assembly two weeks ago. The statement has been described as "flimsy" by Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) Chairman Mohamed Mursi, "emotive" by majority speaker Hussein Ibrahim, and "unconnected to realities on the ground" by Farid Ismail, secretary-general of the assembly's Defence and National Security Committee. Increasing friction between the government and assembly is a sign, says one observer, that El-Ganzouri and his cabinet are "unfit to run the country for even an hour". A majority of People's Assembly committees have already voiced their unhappiness with El-Ganzouri's statement, and the government has been repeatedly criticised for failing to address security and end shortages of butagas and gasoline. On top of that it is now accused of conniving in the release of American and other foreign defendants in the case of foreign financed NGOs. Parliamentary sources from across the political spectrum expect the committee that is reviewing the government statement to reject it on Sunday, the first step in a process that could result in a vote of no confidence. The procedure, though, is complex. First the committee must issue its own rejection of the statement. The committee's report will then be debated in the assembly and put to a vote. Parliament will then appoint a member to question the prime minister on any shortcomings identified in the government's statement. The prime minister's responses will then be debated: if the assembly remains unconvinced it can then table a motion of no confidence providing a minimum of 50 MPs agree to sign it. The motion will then be put to a vote. If passed, the prime minister must tender his resignation. Any parliamentary move to withdraw confidence, some commentators argue, would conflict with the Constitutional Declaration. FJP legal advisor Ahmed Abu Baraka disagrees. He believes Article 33 of the Constitutional Declaration, produced following a referendum held a year ago, is broad enough to provide for such a measure, though he stresses that the FJP would not pursue such a course independently. JFP leaders are consulting with other political forces in an attempt to forge a united position over El-Ganzouri's statement and, if that proves impossible, to ascertain whether procedures for withdrawing confidence should start immediately or be deferred until after the presidential elections. According to the Constitutional Declaration, points out Mahmoud El-Khodeiri, the judge who heads the assembly's Legislative Committee, only the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has the power to appoint or dismiss a government. The withdrawal of confidence is a move that can only really apply in a parliamentary system which has not been established in Egypt. Even if the People's Assembly passes a no-confidence vote, says El-Khodeiri, SCAF would not be legally bound to apply it. It could insist on keeping El-Ganzouri's government and reject any demands to appoint a cabinet agreed by the People's Assembly. He does, however, add the proviso that if and when parliament asserts its right to legislate and to monitor the government SCAF would be best advised to heed its demands. Salafist Nour Party spokesman Nader Bakar says that while his party's final decision on a no-confidence motion will depend on the reports issued by various parliamentary committees 70 per cent of members favour the continuation of the present government at least until a president is elected. The current government has many failings and the Ministry of Interior many officials who should be forced to retire, says Bakar. Even so, while his party is studying the possibility of forming a coalition it continues to caution against precipitous action "in the very delicate circumstances the country will face during the remainder of the transitional period". "I'm also afraid that a Muslim Brotherhood government would encounter a situation similar to that of the first Islamist government when it came to power in Turkey in 1996. In order to stay in power Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was forced to sign the worst possible security agreements with Israel, which proved detrimental to his country and to his personal reputation and that of his party," he warned. Though the Muslim Brotherhood remains publicly keen to form a new government as soon as possible, citing deteriorating economic conditions as its main concern, some political analysts believe such a step could all too easily backfire. Fahmy Howeidy argues that if the Muslim Brotherhood does form a government "it would be forced to make concessions that will undermine its historical assets and jeopardise its legitimacy as a faction of the Egyptian national movement". Howeidy points out that Egypt's relationship with Israel would pose a challenge to any Muslim Brotherhood administration from day one. If it maintains the status quo with Israel it will forfeit popularity at home; if it tries to change it, it will forfeit its relationship with the Americans and with moderate Arab states. A Muslim Brotherhood government, he predicts, would probably face its first crisis within a week of coming to power in the form of an Israeli attack on Gaza aimed at testing the government's intentions and mettle. According to Howeidy, some who advocate a Muslim Brotherhood government want to lead the movement into a trap since given current economic difficulties and foreign policy challenges the government's chances of survival would be slim. A failed government would put paid to Islamist political hopes for decades, not just in Egypt but throughout the Arab world. "It is no secret that certain parties in Egypt, in the Arab world and abroad, are very eager to stem the tide that has brought Islamists to power and into decision-making centres," says Howeidy. He cautions against any comparisons of the situation in Egypt with that in Turkey, Malaysia, South Korea or Singapore, citing three main reasons. First, Egypt has a different weight in international strategic relations. Second, Egypt's shared borders and peace treaty with Israel have ramifications that do not apply to other countries. Third, the achievements of those countries are the cumulative product of 30 to 40 years of experience. Howeidy believes that what Egypt needs is a national unity and not a Muslim Brotherhood government, even if the Muslim Brotherhood could forge one by virtue of its parliamentary majority. That a party wins a parliamentary majority does not, he argues, mean it should assume full responsibility for running the country. He cites the Tunisian experience in support of his position. In the power-sharing system there the majority party heads the government, while the speaker of parliament (in this case the constitutional assembly) belongs to another party, the president to a third. "I am not suggesting that the Muslim Brothers should be excluded from the government. Rather, I believe that the task of forming the government should be assigned to a trustworthy patriotic individual, on the condition that he brings on board diverse national forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis. This will ensure the broadest possible popular consensus," is Howeidy's solution.
