Stripped of its stalwart Arab defender in Mubarak, the Palestinian Authority is under greater pressure than ever to cut all relations with Israel, writes Khaled Amayreh in occupied Palestine With its "bargaining position" vis-à-vis Hamas getting constantly weaker due to revolutionary changes in the Arab world, particularly Egypt, the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) is voicing unprecedented willingness to offer drastic concessions to Hamas. This coincides with renewed and more determined popular calls for "ending divisions" in Palestinian politics. However, it is premature to say for sure if this willingness is genuine or just a tactical response to unforeseen developments. With the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime, Fatah lost its chief Arab patron in the Arab region. Moreover, the so-called "Egyptian document" -- the reconciliation paper supposed to have led to rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas -- has now become effectively irrelevant. Fatah had signed the document but Hamas showed reluctance to do so, arguing that the bridging proposal was too biased in Fatah's favour. In addition, Hamas felt that the Mubarak regime's approach towards the Islamist Palestinian movement was never friendly, probably as an extension of the regime's vindictive policy towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the ideological precursor of Hamas. Egypt also served as an apologist and even guarantor of PA "peace steps" with Israel, steps that met little acceptance among most Palestinians. Indeed, when the PA was criticised harshly following the revelation of the so-called "Palestine Papers" by Al-Jazeera Television recently, Abbas and other PA officials sought to defend themselves by arguing that "everything that we did was conveyed to our Arab brothers," a reference to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Now, in light of radical regime change in Egypt, the so-called moderate Arab camp has suffered a serious blow, which is undoubtedly bad news for the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. All this seems to have seriously affected the PA's position vis-à-vis Hamas, which also explains Fatah's unusual overtures and ostensibly generous proposals for national reconciliation and restoration of Palestinian national unity. The declared overtures towards Hamas include a recent statement by the prime minister of the Ramallah-based government, Salam Fayyad, who reportedly said that he would agree to form a government of national unity with Hamas even if that meant that Hamas would retain the Gaza Strip under its control. It is not certain if Fayyad's statement reflected his personal view or was coordinated with the PA leadership. Fatah distanced itself from the statement, saying that it went too far and essentially reflected Fayyad's views. Nabil Shaath, a leading Fatah politician and negotiator, was also quoted as saying that Fatah was willing to accept most -- if not all -- of Hamas's demands and objections relative to the Egyptian proposal. However, it seems that this is easier said than done given the adamant opposition by PA security agencies in the West Bank to any genuine rapprochement with Hamas, especially allowing the Islamist movement freedom of action within the occupied territory, which these agencies fear might enable Hamas to rebuild itself and reclaim its erstwhile influence. Fatah, in cooperation with Israel and US General Keith Dayton, had been making strenuous efforts to weaken Hamas in the West Bank, arresting thousands of Islamist suspects and closing down hundreds of Islamic institutions. More to the point, Abbas has said that no elections would take place in the West Bank unless elections took place in the Gaza Strip. His remarks to that effect were viewed as a vindication of Hamas's stand that national consensus must precede any future elections in the occupied territories since elections without agreement would only deepen the rift between Hamas and Fatah. Abbas's remarks drew cool reactions from some of Fatah's leftist partners within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) who viewed the remarks as "surrender to the coup in Gaza". Prior to the revolutionary changes taking place in several Arab countries, Fatah and the PA more or less adopted hostile attitudes towards Hamas, with some Fatah spokesmen accusing the Islamist group of wanting to build a terrorist Islamic emirate, Bin Laden style, in the Gaza Strip. At one point, some PA officials went as far as warning Hamas that Fatah would seize Gaza by force, presumably either in cooperation with Israel and the former Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak, or by fomenting local insurrection against Hamas. Such phraseology has now completely disappeared. In addition, the recent veto by the United States of a draft resolution condemning Jewish settlement expansion in the West Bank, which was tabled by the PA, has seriously embarrassed the PA leadership, if only because it demonstrated that Palestinians can't really rely on the US to broker a just and dignified peace in the region. One PA official commented on the American veto at the UN Security Council by saying that "we are deceiving ourselves if we think that the US will give us a state. In order to have a genuine Palestinian state, there must be genuine American pressure on Israel, but the US lacks the ability and perhaps the inclination to pressure Israel." Then there is the Israeli factor. Israel continues to hold the PA by the throat to the extent that any serious movement by the Ramallah regime towards true and sincere rapprochement with Hamas would be resisted -- even violently -- by Israel. Needless to say, this puts the PA leadership in an unviable position, with little margin for manoeuvre. Meanwhile, the PA security agencies continue daily arrests of Hamas members, though on a decreased pace. Similarly, security coordination with Israel, even in its most scandalous expressions, continues to be the norm rather than the exception. Some observers argue that the PA is so deeply implicated in security coordination agreements with Israel that terminating these agreements might endanger its very existence. And it is well known that for Fatah to get closer to Hamas, it means moving away from Israel. Fatah has always sought to find a magical formula whereby it could appease both Israel and Palestinian public opinion. However, given the current political realities in the Arab world, especially the demise of the Mubarak regime, what was possible three months ago is now not. The moribund peace process with Israel, the blind American embrace of Israel, and the latter's hawkish and extremist policies, including unmitigated settlement expansion, are putting even more pressure on the PA to divorce itself from the US-Israeli axis. Whether it can do so and survive is another question.
