Turkey's foreign policy won it more recognition than affection in 2010, and there is a danger that its neo-Ottoman ambitions could result in its becoming isolated in the region, writes Gareth Jenkins After years in which it had attempted to balance its traditionally close relationship with the West with growing ties with the rest of the Muslim world, 2010 was the year in which Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) finally made its bid to establish the country as a regional power. Unashamedly nostalgic for the former Ottoman Empire, both Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his energetic Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have never made any secret of the fact that they regard Turkey as being the natural leader not only of the Middle East but of the entire Muslim world. However, although Erdogan's anti-Israeli rhetoric boosted his standing on the streets of the Muslim world, by late 2010 Turkey's increasingly assertive foreign policy had won it more recognition than affection amongst governments in both the West and the Middle East. There was a real danger that instead of dominating it Turkey could become isolated in the region. Domestically, 2010 saw the AKP tighten its grip on power to the point where Turkey now appears to be becoming a one- party state in a remarkable turnaround after an uncertain start to the year. In early 2010, the AKP's so-called "Democratic Initiative" to address the demands of Turkey's Kurdish minority had collapsed into fiasco, the economy appeared to be deep in rececession, and the long-running Ergenekon investigation, which AKP supporters had used to intimidate and imprison hundreds of the government's critics on charges of belonging to a terrorist organisation, had stalled and was largely discredited. Deniz Baykal, leader of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), was then forced to resign as a result of a sex scandal. Cantankerous and ineffective, Baykal had led the CHP for nearly a decade, during which time he had appeared as irremovable as he was unelectable. He was replaced by the popular and softly-spoken Kemal Kilicdaroglu. By May 2010, the CHP had overtaken the AKP in the opinion polls, and there appeared a real possibility of a change in government at the next general elections, slated for June 2011. However, the AKP then gradually began to regain the ascendancy, and after the initial burst of enthusiasm began to fade, Kilicdaroglu began to look increasingly out of his depth. He was unable to prevent the AKP pushing through a series of constitutional reforms in September 2010 that gave it control over the judiciary. By the end of the year, the AKP once again had a massive lead in the opinion polls and seemed set for another landslide victory in June 2011. Massive fines for alleged tax evasion, threats and the occasional imprisonment of critics of the government were all enough to ensure that the Turkish media remained cowed into acquiescent silence. By late 2010, the Ergenekon investigation had been superseded by what was known as the Sledgehammer investigation, in which nearly 200 serving and retired members of the military were charged with plotting a coup d'état during a seminar held in March 2003. Some of the alleged coup plans produced by pro-AKP prosecutors were blatant forgeries, including documents supposedly drawn up in March 2003 that referred to events taking place as late as 2008. However, few journalists were brave enough to mention the anachronisms, and even the once- powerful Turkish military could only look on in impotent silence. Yet, although the AKP's muscular authoritarianism had given it almost complete control over domestic politics, by late 2010 its foreign policy still remained stronger on ambition than on achievement. Despite his energy and unerring self-confidence, Davutoglu often appeared unable to understand how other countries functioned. By spring 2010, Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia, launched in October 2009, had collapsed without any concrete result except to infuriate Azerbaijan, Turkey's once close ally. In May 2010, AKP officials encouraged an attempt by a radical Turkish NGO to send a flotilla carrying aid to try to break the blockade on Gaza, ignoring Israeli threats to use force to stop the ships docking in Palestine. In the early hours of 31 May 2010, Israeli commandos stormed the ships in international waters, killing nine passengers. The deaths triggered a storm of protest against Israel and enabled the AKP to present Turkey as being the one Muslim country prepared to take risks to try to break the Gaza blockade. However, the incident also raised some disturbing questions. Extraordinarily for a government which had repeatedly condemned Israeli brutality in Palestine and its willingness to target innocent civilians, the AKP had not made any attempt to protect the hundreds of people on board the ships. The flotilla incident came at a time when Turkey's relations with the West were already coming under strain. Through early 2010, Davutoglu and Erdogan consistently sided with Iran in its confrontation with the international community over its nuclear ambitions. On 9 June 2010, Turkey further antagonised members of the international community by voting against additional US-sponsored sanctions against Tehran at a meeting of the UN Security Council in New York. On their return to Turkey, AKP officials proudly proclaimed that they had defied the US and the EU and stood up for the Muslim world. They appeared unaware of the fact that the Arab world is probably even more worried than the US and EU at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Nor do Davutoglu and Erdogan appear aware that few in the Middle East share their enthusiasm for Turkey's reassertion as the predominant power in the region. Iran currently benefits from Turkish support because this dilutes the impact of international sanctions. But Tehran has little desire to see Ankara dominate the region, not least because that is a role it has long coveted for itself. Turkey's support for Iran and its aggressive opposition to Israel has further alienated the US at a time when Washington's ties with Ankara were already strained. Moreover, the AKP's refusal to implement long-promised liberalising reforms and its continued failure to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes have ensured that although it remains an official candidate for EU membership Turkey's accession process is now effectively dead. Perhaps most importantly, the AKP appears unable to understand that although Arab states undoubtedly favour a closer economic and political relationship with Turkey, they want it to be one based on cooperation and partnership rather than subordination. Although some may fete Erdogan for his opposition to Israel, there is little desire for the return of neo-Ottoman hegemony in the Middle East.
