Turkey is continuing to fashion itself as a reliable umpire in the international arena, notes Gareth Jenkins On Sunday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu repeated Turkey's willingness to try to break the international deadlock over Iran's nuclear power programme by storing the country's stockpile of enriched uranium on Turkish soil. It is still unclear whether Tehran will accept the offer. But there is no doubting the Turkish government's eagerness to store the uranium. Privately, Turkish officials admit that not only are they keen to contribute to averting what could still escalate into a major confrontation between Tehran and the West, but that they would relish the opportunity to demonstrate that the Turkish government's policy of engagement with countries regarded as pariahs by much of the international community, such as Iran, Syria and Sudan, can have concrete benefits. The proposal for Iran to store its stockpile of enriched uranium outside the country was first raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October. Although Iran has processed uranium, it has still not been sufficiently enriched to be used in a nuclear power station, much less to the level where it could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. The IAEA suggested that the uranium that Iran has already enriched could be stored in Turkey, and a third country such as Russia or France could then provide Tehran with uranium which had been enriched to a level suitable for nuclear power but not a nuclear bomb. In this way, Iran would receive the uranium it needs for its peaceful nuclear power programme and the international community could be sure that it was not enriching uranium to the level required for an atomic bomb. The Turkish government has long defended Iran's right to have a nuclear power programme. In fact, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly attacked the EU and the US for applying pressure to Tehran and insisted that both should instead focus their attention on the one country in the region which is known to have nuclear weapons already, namely Israel. Erdogan's public defence of Tehran's nuclear ambitions is in line with its overall détente with its Shia neighbour and the Muslim world in general. Since Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (JDP) first came to power in November 2008, bilateral trade between the two countries has risen more than eightfold from $1.2 billion to over $10.2 billion. There has been a parallel rise in the number of official visits between the two countries. Despite protests from Washington, in October this year Turkey and Iran signed a preliminary agreement providing for Turkish investment in Iran's South Pars natural gas field. Concern in the US and the EU that Turkey is moving away from its traditional alignment with the West has been reinforced by the enthusiasm with which the JDP has cultivated closer ties with countries such as Syria and Sudan. Erdogan has also vigorously defended Hamas against both the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel. In August, the JDP refused to allow Israeli warplanes to participate in a long-scheduled trilateral military exercise with NATO and Turkey. The JDP has refuted accusations that it is moving Turkey away from the West by claiming that it is merely trying to improve relations with all countries. It has argued that its increasingly close ties with countries such as Iran could actually benefit the EU and the US by enabling Ankara to serve as an intermediary when the countries have disputes with the West. In recent months, JDP officials have also begun to promote Turkey's ability to serve as a bridge to try to revitalise Turkey's ailing bid to join the EU. At a time when there are genuine concerns that, if a solution is not found in time, either the US or Israel may launch air strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, the storage of Iran's stockpile of uranium would enable the JDP to provide a concrete example of Turkey's value as an intermediary. None of the parties involved has any doubts about Turkey's ability to store the uranium safely, probably in Istanbul. Currently, the main obstacle to the deal appears to be Iranian national pride. Although Tehran has had no hesitation in cultivating warmer ties with Turkey, it has skillfully turned the closer relationship to its own advantage, both politically and economically. Not only have Tehran's close ties with Turkey demonstrated to the West that it is far from isolated internationally, but the balance of bilateral trade between the two countries is currently four to one in Iran's favour. Initially, Iranian officials dismissed the IAEA's proposal that Tehran should store its low-enriched uranium in a third country and insisted that any swap for high-enriched uranium should take place on Iranian soil. Whether or not Iran finally relents and agrees to store its uranium in Turkey is currently unclear. However, a final decision is likely to depend not only on the sincerity of Iran's repeated declarations that it has no desire to manufacture an atomic bomb but also whether it is willing to be seen to be beholden to a country which -- despite the recent rapprochement -- it has long regarded as a political and cultural rival.
