Events this year have indicated a heightening of inter-religious tensions, behoving all Egyptians to insist upon a renewed national partnership, writes Samir Morcos* This time last year, this author warned of the dire repercussions of religious tensions in Egypt, this bleak forecast coming true in the form of the Nagaa Hammadi incident and subsequent events. In the face of the deterioration in Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt, the political leadership has declared its commitment to reinforcing the principles of the civil state, at the heart of which resides the concept of equal citizenship. The civil state offers an overarching form of affiliation that brings the people of a single country into an all-embracing national framework in which they are able to live and work together, rather than in isolation from each other in separate groups bound by other forms of affiliation. The civil state thus holds the key to transcending religious tensions. Last year, Al-Ahram Weekly published a special edition on visions for the new decade (2010-2020), in which I had the privilege to contribute an article on religious tensions in Egypt. In the interests of continuity, I will briefly recap the substance of that article and discuss salient developments that have occurred in this domain over the past year. I will then propose ideas that I believe will help to overcome the problem of religious tensions. In my earlier article, I observed that we were passing the "safety level" of religious tensions, a problem made more dangerous by the fact that some were refusing to recognise how far Christian-Muslim relations had deteriorated. Looking back over this relationship over the past 40 years, one can identify four phases of escalation. The first phase (1972-2000) was characterised by random acts of violence on the part of extremist religious groups against Copts. The second (2000- 2005) brought mounting polarisation and mutual recrimination across the religious divide. The third phase (2005 to the present) added the doctrinal element, as the two sides began to challenge each other over their respective theological and moral merits. Satellite television networks contributed to fuelling the debate and stoking passions, and the period ushered in a phase of entrenchment and violent inter-communal clashes over such issues as the construction of a church or religious conversions. Indeed, the situation had now reached a stage where virtually any dispute -- financial, commercial, or personal -- involving a Muslim and a Christian could spiral into violence. I went on to caution that mounting religious tensions (a term that I prefer to "sectarian tension" when applied to Egypt) over the past four decades could ricochet through society in a way that could undermine the bonds of citizenship and favour religious affiliations. This could lead to the reclassification of Egyptian society in accordance with the latter form of affiliation alone and to the transformation of the public and political spheres into purely religious ones. Three approaches to handling the question were discussed. One would be to treat the Copts as a discrete homogeneous class or sect and to grant them specific rights. Such privileges, as history has shown, are granted on the basis of a calculation of the balance of power, shifts in which could threaten revocation of such privileges. The second approach was termed the sectarian state. Its population would be treated in terms of religious affiliation, the majority being made up of affiliates of one religion and the minorities consisting of the affiliates of others, each living in a separate space. Finally, there is the civic state, based on full equality among all citizens and equal opportunity for all. Such a state would be capable of uniting different people into a single, joint enterprise. Barely had 2010 begun when the Nagaa Hammadi affair erupted. This complicated incident not only reflected how acute religious tensions have become, but also the extent to which they are interwoven with many different elements -- kinship/regional connections, political interests and concerns and manifestations of underdevelopment, among others. Reactions to the Nagaa Hammadi violence were numerous, but on the whole they gave the impression that people had awoken to the fact that this was a situation that we could no longer live with and that it had to be dealt with immediately and without delay. It is also worth noting that the more the commentators and analysts focussed on the social and historical aspects of the problem, the more they also highlighted what people had in common. This is important because it means that there is something that can bring people together and that can be used as a starting point, regardless of inflexibility on one point or another. As far as attempts to treat the political aspects of the matter were concerned, in spite of strong elements of bias (which are natural) and the occasional intrusion of narrowly defined interests, these could not escape the sense that the Naga Hammadi incident had exposed something disturbing beneath the surface of Egyptian life. They also underscored the importance of historical study, which could work to revive collective national memory. Another positive outcome was the consensus to keep the question of Muslim-Christian relations outside the immediate political sphere and the forthcoming elections in Egypt. In spite of a lack of clarity over whether Copts should be treated as fellow citizens or as a religious group, there was a consensus that they should be brought back into the polity, which can only occur if they have a political and civic presence and if they are able to re-emerge from the safety of isolation. Perhaps the most important positive outcome of the foregoing was the announcement on the part of the political leadership of its firm "commitment to the modern civil state," at the heart of which resides the principle of equal citizenship, and its resolve to combat religious tensions. This was clearly expressed in President Hosni Mubarak's address on Police Day and in his subsequent speeches, the most recent of which was delivered at the beginning of the new parliamentary term. As far as religious tensions were concerned, then, 2010 opened on a sobering note. Yet, this did not prevent a reoccurrence of religious violence, which was handled in conventional ways in spite of the fact that each new incident has produced a qualitative transformation in thought and behaviour. First, there was the renewed bout of religious debate, the destructive effects of which began to warn about some years ago. Then there was the incident of the woman who was reported to have converted to Islam. This was followed by an open exchange between Muslim and Christian religious authorities that approached some dangerous, mine-laden areas. However, the most dangerous development in this domain this year was the battle that unfolded in the digital arena on YouTube, which reflected just how fraught the climate between Christians and Muslims has become. There have been hundreds of videos put on this site, many carefully constructed, conveying extremely nasty messages to the other side. The most moderate Muslim one called for a boycott of the Copts for ostensibly disparaging and demeaning Islam (I say "moderate" because harsher ones included lists of targeted Coptic businessmen and other figures). The Coptic videos gave the impression that Copts were intent upon retreating further into a world of their own, as a result of a succession of religiously motivated attacks. Such exchanges over the Internet shape the hearts and minds of millions. They also tell us that there are Egyptians who do not subscribe to moderation and who seek to damage the moderate mainstream. The Muslims among these are engaged in political mobilisation using religious slogans, while the Christians among them are responding with a menstality that seems bent on reinventing the Ottoman milla system. The upshot of all this, not so much of 2010 alone, but instead of years or decades of religious tension, is that on the one hand we have seen a trend bent on drumming up Islamist fervour and on the other a trend determined to erect the bulwarks of a religious community's self-pronounced seclusion. In the middle stands what I believe is the mainstream trend, which supports the concept of equal citizenship. The political leadership has said that it has taken an irrevocable vow to promote the modern civil state. I believe that the major challenge that lies ahead, and the most important task of the moderate trend, to which the vast majority of Egyptians subscribes, is to respond effectively to this call in practical ways in order to renew the national partnership between Egyptians and to reinvigorate the common bond of citizenship. Towards such ends we should agree to accept as the conceptual starting point the premise that healthy human societies are built upon an acceptance of diversity and pluralism, not upon the enforcement of uniformity and conformity, and that the bond that cements the heterogeneous religious, ideological and political elements of society is the citizenship bond. From this it follows that we must work together to put an end to attempts to categorise Egyptians along religious lines. We must keep foremost in our minds the fact that an individual Egyptian is a citizen who devotes his skills and energies towards the national welfare and happiness of all Egyptians without discriminating among them. After agreeing on these principles, steps we can take towards renewing the Egyptian national partnership include the following. First, we must halt the religious debate and the attendant phenomena of mutual recrimination, slights, and provocation in the media, notably by insisting upon media professionalism and integrity. Both sides must grasp the fact that the freedoms of expression and belief do not extend to offending the other or to boasting of one's own alleged superiority over the other. Both must work to reaffirm the principle of "cultural citizenship", which is the principle of full equality among citizens in matters of faith and belief, and the respect for the religious properties, sensitivities and symbols of others. Second, we must take advantage of the constitutionally enshrined principle of freedom of worship and of the exercise of religious practices (Article 46 of the constitution) and pass laws to regulate pending issues related to it. It is important in this regard to distinguish between problems of a purely religious nature, such as the construction of houses of worship -- where the religious establishments can communicate with the relevant authorities in order to find solutions that meet certain agreed upon criteria and regulations, as occurred with the Waqf foundations, for example -- and problems of a civic nature that are related to day- to-day concerns in the public and political spheres. Here, solutions should be found that apply civic criteria and that reaffirm the civic, as opposed to religious, affiliation of the citizenry. Third, we must strengthen commitment to the rule of law, which is one of the prime components of the modern state, and strengthen the conviction that any concession on this point in favour of traditional ways of handling problems only works to undermine the modern state. Fourth, we must devote closer attention to the educational system and the media. Above all, we must ensure that the value systems, outlooks and modes of behaviour that these promote work to reaffirm the notion that Egypt's particular genius resides in its cultural wealth, deriving from the fact that Egypt is a multifaceted cultural mix, whose strength lies in its particular nature. Fifth, we must bring people back into the public and political spheres by encouraging membership of associations, societies and syndicates devoted to civic, intellectual, political, artistic and other non- religious pursuits, thereby strengthening awareness that Egyptian Christians and Muslims can be bound in hundreds of meaningful ways, whether occupationally, socially, or culturally. These are steps that we should take, and they show that it is eminently possible to revive the Egyptian national partnership on the basis of equal citizenship, equality of opportunity, productive work and the rule of law within the framework of the constitutionally grounded modern civil state. * The writer is chairman of the board of trustees of Al-Masri Foundation for Citizenry.
