Islamists rise to the challenge

Pervez Musharraf's decision to cooperate with the US has been met with staunch opposition from religious groups in Pakistan. Iffat Malek reports from Islamabad
When German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder landed in Islamabad on Sunday, he became the latest in a long line of international figures to call on Pakistan's military leader, General Pervez Musharraf. Like Musharraf's other guests, the chancellor offered his appreciation for his host's decision to cooperate with the US -- specifically for Pakistan's help in military action against Afghanistan.
Among his own people, however, the general is far less appreciated. Although the majority of ordinary Pakistanis seem to accept his explanation that he had no option other than to help the US, there is a big difference between that sullen resignation and approval. One section of Pakistani society has gone further, rejecting outright the government's attempts to justify itself and choosing instead to vocally oppose Islamabad's cooperation with the US. They are, in President Musharraf's own words, "the extremist minority" -- Pakistan's religious groups and their supporters.
On the streets, Islamist groups have both led opposition to the government and supplied the vast majority of protesters. Of Pakistan's myriad religious parties, two groups -- Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jama'at-I-Islami (JI) -- have been especially active. Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) membership is split between two distinct factions: the Punjab-based JUI(F), led by Fazal-ur-Rehman, and the smaller JUI(S), led by Sami-ul-Haq and based in the North Western Frontier Province which borders Afghanistan. Both factions, but especially Maulana Sami-ul-Haq's, claim that the Taliban emerged from their madrassas. The JUI has a strong following in the NWFP and Balochistan. It is a Deobandi organisation -- the same Sunni sect followed by the Taliban and most Afghan Pashtuns.
The other prominent religious party is Jama'at-I-Islami (JI), headed by Qazi Hussein Ahmed. The JI has a following throughout Pakistan. It claims to be non- sectarian: in practice, however, it is close to Saudi Arabian Wahabism. The JI is the most organised of the religious parties and has a disciplined membership that it can mobilise at will.
Smaller parties and groups are also involved. One of these is Azam Tariq's Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) -- an extreme, anti-Shi'i group which has its roots in southern Punjab. Another is Maulana Sufi Muhammad's Tehreek-I-Nifaz-I- Shariah Muhammadi (TNSM), which has a strong following in pockets of the NWFP.
Each of these groups has responded individually to the current situation, but there has also been a collective response in the form of the Pakistan Afghanistan Defence Council (PADC) -- an umbrella group comprising some 25 religious parties including JI, both JUI factions, SSP and TNSM. Its leading figures are Maulana Sami-ul-Haq and retired General Hamid Gul. Gul was once head of the Pakistani army's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the major agency in Islamabad's Afghan policy.
The government's initial decision to cooperate with the US was condemned -- in no uncertain terms -- by all the Islamist groups. They have kept the heat on Musharraf ever since, strongly criticising the use of Pakistani airspace for bombing missions, the handing over of Pakistani air bases to the US, and other practical effects of Pakistani-American cooperation.
The Islamists' motives are far from straightforward or uniform, although all take exception to the fact that Afghanistan is a neighbouring Muslim country being attacked by a Western state. As a result, all oppose their government's actions, and those of the United States, but beyond this each group has its own interests.
The JUI has historical links with the Taliban and therefore wishes to see them retain power. Many of the JUI's supporters have ethnic ties with the Afghans, as do supporters of the TNSM. The JI, by contrast, does not support the Taliban -- its primary motive is ideological. The SSP shares the Taliban's Deobandi faith, and many SSP activists allegedly received training in Afghanistan. Kashmiri militants are also said to receive training there.
Beneath the Islamists' support lie more mercenary motivations. Some analysts allege that some of the religious parties -- the JUI in particular -- have benefited financially from drugs, arms and other smuggling through Afghanistan. Many leaders are also using the Afghanistan crisis to gain publicity and thereby boost their own status in the public eye.
The Islamists also differ in the kinds of actions they will support. The JI claims to remain within constitutional means, and condemns violence. The JUI, too, opposes violence -- though it enjoys less control over its cadres. Other groups, such as the TNSM, openly condone the use of force in what they see as a jihad.
The activities of the religious groups have increased in intensity as the crisis in Afghanistan has developed. They started with rallies and demonstrations, and a series of Friday strikes in which the government was simply urged to withdraw support for the US. At subsequent rallies their demands were escalated: threats against the government were made, which led to open calls for its overthrow. The protests also became more forceful. The JI attempted to stage a sit-in at Jacobabad, the city where one of the air bases handed over to the US is located. The TNSM began recruiting for a jihad weeks ago, and last weekend it led a convoy of some 10,000 armed volunteers to the Afghan border. The PADC staged a 'million man march' in Karachi on Friday, though in reality only 50,000 people showed up.
The most striking thing about all these demonstrations and protests is that they have failed to galvanise ordinary Pakistanis. Though few are happy about what is happening in Afghanistan or their government's role in it, few have come out on to express their anger on the streets. Even now, four weeks after military action against Afghanistan started, the protests are predominantly carried out by religious cadres. Even amongst these religious groups, there is little genuine passion. To those who witnessed the anger and violence of JI demonstrations against Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in 1999, these anti-US marches appear like a picnic.
The government's response to the religious opposition has changed to match the intensity of that opposition. Peaceful protests were allowed in the initial days after 11 September, even though there is a ban on political rallies in Pakistan. The aim was to allow people to vent their anger and thereby prevent more serious violence. At the same time President Musharraf made a number of addresses to the nation in an attempt to counteract the Islamists' appeal. He also warned Afghans living in Pakistan that they would be deported if they were caught engaged in any kind of anti-government activity.
But as the Islamists have become more militant, Islamabad has taken a harsher line. Fazal-ur-Rehman, Azam Tariq and Sami-ul-Haq were all put under house arrest (though Haq was later released). Qazi Hussein Ahmed was banned from entering Sind for 30 days, and was later stopped from boarding a flight to Quetta, bordering Afghanistan, where he was due to address a rally. Other leaders have been charged with inciting violence after they made speeches calling on the army to overthrow the government. And a TNSM convoy was stopped from crossing into Afghanistan.
So far the government has managed to contain the situation. People have been killed in protests and some property destroyed, but on the scale of civil violence in Pakistan this can be seen as negligible.
Whether this state of affairs will continue is debatable. Much will depend on the war in Afghanistan. Rising civilian casualties there are having an impact on the mood of ordinary Pakistanis -- and public anger is on the rise. Recently there have been small anti-war demonstrations by sections of society -- doctors, women -- that can be seen as unambiguously "non-fundamentalist." Furthermore, Ramadan is around the corner. Attacks on fellow Muslims in this holy month will definitely serve to heighten the passions of the general public -- and of course those of the Islamists. Musharraf is well aware of this: his pleas to the US for a "short, targeted" campaign to end before Ramadan were made for more than just humanitarian reasons.
President Musharraf and Pakistan's religious parties are engaged in a tussle for public support. So far, the president seems to be winning. If Pakistan is to be saved from mass civil unrest and anarchy, he has to go on winning.
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See:
War special pages
War 18 - 24 October 2001
War 11 - 17 October 2001
Fall-out 4 - 10 October 2001
Fall-out 27 Sep. - 3 Oct. 2001
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