Is the roadmap really a recipe for success, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed Two important events occurred this week. The first was Bush's decision to end major combat operations in Iraq, and to begin a phased pullout of the troops which helped him score what he called a second victory, after Afghanistan, in a war on terror that began on 11 September 2001. True, Bush warned that transforming Iraq into a democracy would take time, but, without fixing any specific dates, he promised that American forces would withdraw as soon as their mission is over. The question is when their mission will be considered over. Is it when the weapons of mass destruction for which they originally went to war are found? Or is it when Saddam Hussein, who has seemingly vanished into thin air, is found? Or is it when the continuing attacks against US troops stop? The second event was the release of the long-awaited roadmap for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The roadmap calls for an immediate cease-fire, a campaign to disarm Palestinian militants, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories under Palestinian Authority rule and the dismantling of Jewish settlements built in territories occupied since 2001. The goal is a comprehensive peace agreement that will be implemented in stages leading ultimately to the establishment of a Palestinian state by 2005. The two events put forward a number of questions: will America's military victory in Iraq encourage it to launch more wars in the Middle East, or does the presentation of the roadmap signal that a process towards peaceful resolutions of regional problems is in the making? Will the hawks in the Bush administration continue to have the upper hand, or will the partisans of the diplomatic approach prevail? In other words, will Rumsfeld or Powell, who both visited the region last week, have the last word? Observers describe Powell's visit to Syria last Saturday as the most important leg of his trip. The Syrian file contains more than one issue. To begin with, there is the question of the former Iraqi officials who fled to Syria after the breakdown of the Saddam Hussein regime. Then there is the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, which is being challenged as no longer legitimate following the recent expiry of the agreement by which Lebanon authorised Syria to station troops on its territory. There is the question of Syria's harbouring of organisations which Washington brands as terrorist, with not only Hizbullah and Hamas maintaining offices in Damascus but also radical Palestinian organisations belonging to what is commonly referred to as the "rejectionist front". There is also Syria's production of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons including anthrax and VX. Powell laid the groundwork for his visit to Syria by announcing that the removal of Saddam Hussein from power had changed the balance of power throughout the Middle East, and opened the window of opportunity for a resumption of the peace process. With the help of the roadmap, a Palestinian state could come into being by 2005. However, the sudden interest in Syria was overshadowed by an unexpected and worrying development in Iraq, as some two million Shi'ites took to the streets of Karbala last week to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein, reviving a religious ritual that had been banned under Saddam's rule. For Washington, this raised the spectre of growing Iranian influence in Iraq and forced it to revise its priorities, as the realisation sank in that the administration could not afford to devote all its attention to Syria at a time the Iranian threat was growing in magnitude. Indeed, one cannot exclude the possibility that some surviving members of Saddam's inner circle, most notably Tareq Aziz, may have tried to exploit the situation to their advantage by convincing the Americans that they have far more to fear from Iran than from a revamped Ba'ath Party, and that, indeed, this latter could serve as a counterbalance to the "Iranian threat". This could explain why, in his discussions with Bashar Al-Assad, Powell insisted on making the dismantling of Hizbullah the first item on the agenda. Bashar had already given in on a number of issues raised by the US administration, especially in regard to expelling the Iraqi officials who had taken refuge in Syria. However, he balked at granting America's request to dismantle Hizbullah, on the grounds that this touched on Syria's internal affairs. He said that Syria was willing to engage in a dialogue with, but not to receive ultimatums from, the Americans. How the Hizbullah issue will play out could be a test of what Syria really means by making a distinction between dialogue and ultimatums. Syria has strong links with the Shi'ite regime in Iran, and how it deals with Hizbullah, a Shi'ite organisation supported by Iran, is an essential component of its relationship with Tehran. Any measures Damascus takes against the organisation will be seen as a hostile act by Tehran, and is bound to sour relations between the two countries. However, that is not the only reason Syria cannot easily acquiesce to Washington's demand concerning Hizbullah. There is also the fact that giving in on this issue would only encourage Washington to come up with even more exorbitant demands, such as a Syrian pullout from Lebanon. If Syria succumbs to American extortion, it could eventually find itself dragged into a military confrontation with the United States. The scenario that unfolded in Iraq before the war could be repeated with Syria, and perhaps even with Iran. In the final analysis, what will determine whether the region is headed towards a new war or towards a settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict is not the roadmap but the pro-Israeli lobbies in the United States. A week ago, Abu Mazen, in the presence of a number of his newly constituted cabinet, received the official text of the roadmap from the Quartet. Bush, for his part, downplayed the importance of the event, announcing the release of the roadmap through a spokesman. With an eye on the presidential elections next year, he is more interested in catering to his domestic constituency (only 40 per cent of which want an independent Palestinian state), especially the powerful pro-Israeli lobbies, than in celebrating the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. It has been said that Bush adopted the roadmap only to please Blair and help him mend the rifts his support for the war on Iraq caused in the ranks of the Labour Party. However, observers believe Bush will not allow the roadmap to endanger his relations with the pro-Israeli lobbies or to adversely affect his chances for reelection. Not all pro-Israeli lobbies in America are Jewish. Most pro-Bush lobbies are from the Christian neo-conservative far-right, who call themselves "Judeo-Christians" or "Christian Zionists". The Jewish vote has traditionally gone to the Democratic Party, but Bush's unbending support for Israel could change the pattern. Some of these lobbies are betting on the fact that neither side is ready to make the necessary concessions for the successful implementation of the roadmap. The Israelis have already asked for 100 amendments, while Hamas has declared that it will cut off the hands of whoever tries to strip it of its weapons. They are also counting on the fact that the Israeli peace camp is in shambles, especially following Mitzna's surprise resignation this week, and that Abu Mazen's government is unlikely to survive. As matters now stand, America's pro-Israeli lobbies have a very good chance of collecting on their bet and, roadmap notwithstanding, we are unlikely to see a resumption of negotiations any time soon.
