In Focus: How will it end? There remains no easy way out, for Iran or the United States, from the crisis over Tehran's nuclear intentions, writes Galal Nassar The Iranian nuclear programme resurfaced in recent days when the Obama administration urged the UN Security Council to impose harsher sanctions on Iran should the latter continue to upgrade its nuclear facilities. This raises some questions: Will the US administration succeed in rallying the international consensus needed to impose additional sanctions on Iran? What if the latter ignores additional sanctions and presses on with its programme? How will the crisis impact oil supplies and prices? How will the crisis affect the international scene, especially the US presence in Iraq? How will it influence political developments in Iraq, the Gulf and Iran? The above questions are the subject of this article, and perhaps future ones as well. Over the past few months, events on the international scene couldn't bring about a turnaround in the Gulf region. Quite a few major countries, such as China, Russia and India, are still opposed to sanctions on Iran, for such sanctions would ultimately harm their own economies. China, for example, is the largest importer of Iranian oil. Any new sanctions on Iran may threaten oil supplies, or push up prices, in a way that would undermine the Chinese economy. The US administration, for all its harsh rhetoric, is actually in the middle of its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression in the late 1920s. Washington, therefore, is not in a position to help its allies if things go bad in the Gulf. The moment of truth is not coming anytime soon. The current confrontation with Iran is likely to remain unresolved for some time to come. Even if the permanent members of the UN Security Council were to agree on new sanctions on Iran, those sanctions are unlikely to mean much for the Iranians, who have long and porous borders and no shortage of friends willing to break the sanctions. The Americans, tough talking as they are, don't seem to be following through on their own rhetoric, at least not for now. Despite the flamboyance of their speech, the Americans are still cooperating with Iran quite closely in Iraq. Consider the reaction of the US administration to recent developments in the Iraqi elections. In the past few weeks, Washington stood idly by as Iran's allies dealt painful blows to America's strongmen Iyad Allawi, Tareq Al-Hashemi, Saleh Al-Motlaq and Iyad Al-Samarraai. Under the Accountability and Justice Law (the law that replaced Bremer's law on the eradication of the Baath Party) the enemies of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki are being liquidated. Political party leaders as well as senior officers who cooperated with the occupation and helped stamp out Iraqi resistance are now being hunted down by Iran's friends: the Daawa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. As a result, it is likely that Al-Maliki's Daawa Party, and Ammar Al-Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council would end up controlling the parliament. The two parties are Iran's best friends in Iraq. What this means is that the US administration is actually strengthening the Iranian presence in Iraq rather than weakening it. The US cannot push Iran around too much without first trying to undermine its influence in Iraq. So far this is not happening. There is no sense in the Americans getting tough on Iran while the latter has Iraq in a stranglehold. The US has the means of weakening Iranian influence in Iraq, but so far it is not doing it. The US tolerance of Iranian political intervention in Iraq doesn't tally with the threats US officials are making to Iran. The whole thing raises questions about the seriousness of US threats to Iran. This doesn't mean that the Americans and their European allies would remain inactive forever about Iran's nuclear programme. The Americans are likely to keep offering the carrot and the stick. Washington will keep offering Tehran technological and economic incentives while threatening to bomb it. At the end of the day, we shouldn't be surprised to see the Americans offer the Iranians a deal at the expense of Iraq, perhaps at the expense of the entire Gulf region. The Russians, meanwhile, will keep pressing Iran to accept enriching its uranium in Russia, and Iran may finally agree. Iran's nuclear policy depends on its domestic political scene. Should the confrontation between the government and reformists abate, the government may start getting pragmatic and move towards a solution. Alternatively, if the reformists continue to harry the government, the latter -- hoping to portray the opposition as unpatriotic -- would posture even more. Which way will things go? The next few weeks and months may have the answer. A likely outcome is that a military confrontation would take place between Iran and the Zionist entity. The confrontation would be kept to a very limited scale, one confined only to Iran and Israel. It would be only a war meant to shake things up. After a few days of tension, the international community would step in, and mediation would be conducted by the Americans, or the Americans and Europeans together. The confrontation would drive oil prices to heights unseen since last year, for Iran would threaten to close the Straight of Hormuz. Before long, oil prices would go back to their current levels. And in the long run, oil prices would depend on how much Chinese and Indian demand would go up. In Iraq, the political map is being redrawn. With some political groups consulting with leaders of the Iraqi national resistance, another round of military confrontation is to be expected right after the Americans leave the country. The lines of battle are being drawn between the Iranian-backed Shia militia groups and their opponents: resistance groups and political groups that have been hurt in recent developments. The Awakening Councils may also join in the upcoming foray, the outcome of which is likely to influence developments concerning the Iranian nuclear programme. Should Iran refuse to cooperate with UN Security Council demands, the Americans are likely to throw their weight behind the anti-Iranian groups in Iraq, thus forcing Iran into a hard spot. It is possible too that the Americans may pressure their friends among the oil-producing countries to increase production and flood the oil markets so as to drive prices down and undermine the Iranian economy. All of this would depend on developments related to the Iranian nuclear programme. When it comes to international politics, the Iranians are not as foolhardy as they sometimes seem. They may push their luck to a point, but would think twice before imperilling their economy and dragging the region into a whirlpool of doom. During the worst part of the crisis, the Iranian public is likely to rally behind its government, pushing reformists farther out of the scene. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government may take the rise in nationalist fervour and religious zeal to clamp down on its opponents. But once the dust has settled, the Iranians will have much soul searching to do. The problems they have are multi-faceted and deep-rooted, and their only way forward is through extensive reforms.
