Barack Obama is seeking a nuclear weapons-free Iran in a nuclear armed Middle East, writes Graham Usher in New York "We're not interested in talking for the sake of talking," said Barack Obama on 1 October, after the first direct United States-Iran talks in 30 years. "If Iran does not take steps in the near future to live up to its obligations, then the United States will not continue to negotiate indefinitely, and we are prepared to move toward increased pressure." The talks held in Geneva between Iran and the so-called P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the US, UK, France, Russia and China, plus Germany) over Tehran's nuclear programme were "constructive", said Obama. Iran agreed to open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) its recently revealed "second" uranium enrichment plant near Qom. And it was willing to discuss a proposal under which Iran would send most of its low enriched uranium to France and Russia to be converted into reactor fuel. If carried out, this would be a significant move, says Ray Takeyh, a former advisor on Iran to the Obama administration. "If you establish an arrangement whereby Iran's fuel is exported abroad, then that relieves some degree of your proliferation concern." It would also seem a coup for Obama's policy of engagement with the Islamic Republic. In one sitting he had got more "concessions" from Iran than after years of ostracism and sabre- rattling by the Bush administration. That is the impression, at least. But behind the handshakes -- and informal 45-minute US-Iranian chats in Geneva -- Obama has been rattling a few sabres of his own. Geneva was preceded by Iran's disclosure of the Qom site, an admission forced largely by the knowledge that the US, backed by French, UK and Israeli intelligence services, was about to go public with the information. It was followed by a "leaked" New York Times story on 4 October quoting a confidential IAEA assessment that "Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device" or warhead. This seemed to confirm British, French and Israeli allegations that Tehran is engaged in making a nuclear bomb. And it coincided with reports that the US is reassessing its estimate that Iran was still "years away" from such a capacity. It contradicts the view of Mohamed El-Baradei, outgoing IAEA director. While Iran has not answered questions about a possible military dimension to its nuclear programme, the agency "has no concrete proof" that it is seeking nuclear weapons, much less designing a warhead, he said in September. Charges of covert nuclear sites and contested intelligence assessments are eerily reminiscent of earlier US postures towards Iraq. Are they written according to the same script? Nicholas Burns was a lead "negotiator" with Iran in the Bush administration. He supports Obama's "engagement" but not because he thinks it will elicit Iranian cooperation. "It's likely these talks [in Geneva] will not succeed," he told Middle East Progress on 1 October. "And when they do not succeed, the US and other countries should have a list of sanctions to promote. I think President Obama will be in a stronger position to advocate for sanctions because he will have tried diplomacy." Burns is not a supporter of military action against Iran, if only because of the likely retaliation it would incur. He argues, instead, for policy of containment similar to that imposed on Iraq in the 1990s. The US should "try to isolate Iran: build up our military relationships with Iran's neighbours, and also with Israel, to make clear to Iran that we will limit and contain Iranian power in the Middle East." This sounds a little like the Obama administration on Iran. There is the same belief that a scattergun approach of talks, inspections and sanctions will either force Iranian compliance or weaken it irreparably. There's also the belief that Israel and "moderate" Arab states can somehow be marshalled into a bloc against Iran. Neither is likely. Russia or China will not approve sanctions that hurt their extensive economic, energy and military interests in Iran. And Arab leaders will not convince their peoples that the greatest threat is Iran while Israel remains a nuclear state armed to the teeth and the US has military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf. Instead of pressure Obama should try a real engagement. For years Iranian regimes -- "reformist" and "hardline" -- have advocated what amounts to a "grand bargain" with the US: strategic cooperation on regional conflicts like Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine as well as region-wide nuclear disarmament in return for guarantees that the US would end overt and covert policies of regime change. It was on the table again in Geneva. "We will not discuss our rights" to civilian nuclear energy, said Said Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator. "But we are ready to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation". Obama isn't ready. Such a trade has become harder to sell domestically after the mass protests against Iran's rigged presidential elections in June. But the deeper reason is that such a strategic realignment would mean tackling not only potential nuclear weapon states like Iran but actual nuclear weapon states like Pakistan, India and, of course, Israel. This is the elephant in the kitchen of Obama's engagement policy, says Phyllis Bennis, analyst at the Institute of Policy Studies. "As long as the US demands that only Iran emerge as a nuclear weapons-free country in the Middle East and does not acknowledge a nuclear weapons-free zone across the Middle East -- including Israel's nuclear arsenal -- that part of the negotiations will be a failure," she says.
