Nazim Al-Jassour* argues that UN Resolution 1546 is the real impediment to a genuine transfer of power to the Iraqis Typically, when reading a United Nations resolution, one would start by the preamble, which includes both references to earlier related resolutions and the statement of aims and principles. In the case of Resolution 1546, however, it seems appropriate to begin with Paragraph 32, which emphasises the UN Security Council's determination to remain deeply involved in Iraq's affairs. This paragraph has been affixed to the end of all Security Council resolutions on Iraq since August 1990, while it is conspicuously absent from all resolutions passed by that UN body on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, moreover, never invoked Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. But then again, things are very different when it comes to Iraq. The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure that the Iraqi case remains securely trapped within the corridors of the Security Council -- and thus remains openly vulnerable to the ever looming threat of the United States veto -- and encumbered by the obligations under Chapter Seven, which implies that Iraq is still a threat to international peace and security. As long as this is the case, everything we have been hearing about the transfer of sovereignty and the establishment of an independent national government with absolute authority over Iraqi affairs is little more than ink on paper. In reality, Iraqi politics will continue to be controlled by American advisers and the multinational force under US command, which, in accordance with Paragraph 10, "shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq... including by preventing and deterring terrorism." Indeed, while Paragraph 1 endorses the formation of a sovereign Iraqi government, that government must refrain from taking any actions that might affect Iraq's destiny. The paragraph says that the Security Council "endorses the formation of a sovereign Interim Government", which is supposed to refrain from taking any actions affecting Iraq's destiny "beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transtional Government of Iraq assumes office". Nor does the resolution make any reference to the creation of a national army, which would in theory constitute the backbone of national sovereignty. Instead, in Paragraph Eight, it calls only for the development of "Iraqi security forces", which are to operate "under the authority of the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors". By "successors", the resolution refers to the governments that will be formed following the elections of January 2005, or following subsequent elections held under the new constitution in December 2005. Instead, military affairs will be handled by a multinational force. And if the function of the Iraqi security forces is to maintain security and stability in Iraq, the function of the multinational force is to "defend Iraq". From the outset, the resolution does not seem to suggest that Iraq's military affairs will be entirely out of the Iraqis' hands. For it notes that the mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the Iraqi government, or 12 months from the date of the issuing of the resolution -- in other words, by the end of 2005. It further states that "this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in Paragraph Four," and, according to Paragraph 12, the Security Council "will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the Iraqi government". Unfortunately, statements issued by US military and political leaders have given an entirely different impression: that US forces are in Iraq to stay for a very long time, perhaps beyond the first quarter of this century. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 of 2003 explicitly referred to the US-led coalition forces in Iraq as "occupation forces". Under the UN Charter and international law, resistance against such forces is legitimate. But, in Paragraph 11, Resolution 1546 recasts these forces as multinational, and operating within the framework of "a security partnership between the sovereign government of Iraq and the multinational force", and thus by default provides the legal backing to occupation and delegitimises any Iraqi resistance. A comparison between the draft resolution and the resolution that was actually brought to the vote in the Security Council highlights the amount of international pressure that had to be brought to bear in order to place some restraints, however minimal, on the US. The final document contains 32 paragraphs, as opposed to the original draft's 22, and that alone is significant. More specifically, Paragraph 11 of the draft resolution provided merely for a review of the mandate for the multinational forces, leaving the duration and termination of the mandate open. Nothing could be more indicative of the US's determination to sustain its military presence and its aversion to the transition to an elected national government as provided under Paragraph Four. It is little wonder, therefore, that France and Germany campaigned so forcefully for the inclusion of a new paragraph -- Paragraph 12, cited above -- which stipulates explicit conditions for the termination of the mandate. We find an equally telling discrepancy between the draft and the final resolution on the issue of the Development Fund for Iraq. The draft resolution stated that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board -- referred to in Resolution 1483 -- would continue its activities in monitoring the fund, and that it would include an additional member representing the sovereign Iraqi government. Originally, it further stated that petroleum proceeds would continue to be deposited in this fund, which had been supervised by the coalition authority, in accordance with Paragraph 21 of Resolution 1483 of 2003. By the time the resolution was put to the vote, Paragraph 24 had been modified and extended to read: The Security Council "notes that, upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed solely at the direction of the government of Iraq, and decides that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be utilised in a transparent and equitable manner and through the Iraqi budget, including to satisfy outstanding obligations against the Development Fund for Iraq that arrangements for the depositing of proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas established in Paragraph 20 of Resolution 1483 (2003) shall continue to apply, that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board shall continue its activities in monitoring the Development Fund for Iraq and shall include as an additional full voting member a duly qualified individual designated by the government of Iraq." Resolution 1546 has rendered the relationship between Iraq and the US hazier than ever. But what is certain is that the resolution has effectively "legitimised" the US presence in Iraq, as it is an extension of Resolution 1373 of 2001, thereby rendering any military action against the "multinational force" a terrorist act. * The writer is the head of the International Studies Centre at Baghdad University and a prominent Iraqi analyst.
