Recently released facts shed new light on the preparations for the war in Iraq. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed discusses the implications The New York Times recently revealed details of what it called a "murky operation" by which, at least three months before its invasion of Iraq, the United States sought to forge alliances with Iraqi military leaders and persuade commanders not to fight coalition forces. According to the paper, "even after the war began, the Bush administration received word that top officials of the Iraqi government, most prominently the Defence Minister Sultan Hashem, might be willing to cooperate to bring the war to a quick end and to ensure post-war peace." Noting that the Ministry of Defence was never bombed by the US during the war, the paper quotes Iraqi exiles as claiming that the Pentagon's decision not to knock Iraqi broadcasting off the air permitted Hashem to appear on television with what they call "a veiled signal to troops that they should not fight the invading allies". Hashem's fate is not known. Some Iraqi exiles say he was shot, and perhaps killed, by Saddam loyalists during the war. Other exiles, and American officials, say he survived the war. According to the Times, two Iraqi leaders said his family staged a mock funeral to give the impression that he was dead. Meanwhile, the extent to which the operation was successful remains uncertain. Although, according to the paper, "people behind the effort claimed they had succeeded in persuading hundreds of Iraqi officers to quit the war and to send their subordinates away [..]. And Iraqi military officers confirmed that after being contacted by Americans and Iraqis, they carried out acts of sabotage and helped disband their units as the war began [..]. Others in the know claimed the United States might have missed an opportunity that could have stabilised Iraq as the government crumbled." Still, there seems to be no doubt that the United States did succeed in infiltrating the Iraqi military. This was confirmed by Saddam's daughter Raghd, who in the press conference she gave on her arrival in Jordan, said her father had been betrayed. But while it is certain that parts of the Iraqi military decided to withdraw their allegiance to Saddam, their defection can be explained as placing the need to save Iraq from widespread destruction over the need to save the life of the Iraqi leader and ensure the survival of his regime. The New York Times story casts new light on America's strategy to overthrow Saddam Hussein as well as on the realities of the situation in Iraq on the eve of the war. It is not true, for example, that the Bush administration depended only, or even mainly, on the Iraqi opposition groups in exile, for a variety of reasons, including deep divisions within their own ranks. Nor is it true that, as was widely believed at the time, Saddam was still capable of eliminating any form of opposition as soon as it emerged, and that a rebellion, or a coup within the military, was unthinkable. Indeed, even after the war began, there were dire prophecies of a protracted and bloody resistance by regular Iraqi forces. We now know that the main thrust of Bush's strategy to topple Saddam Hussein was directed at infiltrating the ranks of the Iraqi military, including its top echelons if the story of the defence minister is true. Thus his declared strategy of focussing mainly on the political opposition was a smokescreen aimed at diverting attention from what was really going on. Some of the scenarios that were considered possible before the war was one that I referred to in a number of articles at the time. In this scenario, the invasion would be preceded by a campaign of saturation bombing designed to convince the Iraqi military that safeguarding Iraq from widespread material destruction was more important than protecting the regime, opening the way to a military coup against Saddam Hussein. It is perhaps this scenario -- the possibility of a negotiated settlement following a military coup -- which can explain the statement by Information Minister Mohamed Said Al-Sahhaf after he turned himself in (only to be promptly released by the occupying power), that it was too early to come forward with a comprehensive analysis of what happened, because too many of the facts are still not known. Washington seems to have realised quite early on that it could not pin its hopes on the fractious Iraqi political opposition when the real key to how the war would play out lay in the hands of Saddam's military commanders. Hence its decision, some three months before the war, to launch a covert operation inside Iraq aimed at coopting and neutralising some of the top military brass. In the light of its acknowledgement that the serious interlocutor with whom it would have to deal was the military not, as was generally believed at the time, the civilian opposition, how credible is Washington's claim that it aims at establishing democracy in Iraq? In the final analysis, what is the decisive factor that will determine the shape of Iraq's future? More immediately, will the course of events in the country be determined by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) under American civil leadership, or by the armed resistance attributed mainly to remnants of the former regime? Washington decided to launch a war against Iraq, in disregard of Security Council Resolution 1441, and now, in the post-war conditions, the same questions remain valid, albeit in a different setting. Is the confrontation still military in nature or can the situation be dealt with democratically and within the context of international law? With armed resistance showing no signs of abating, is it not wiser to act under the umbrella of the United Nations? Although the Bush administration is not willing to expand the role of the UN in the occupation, it tabled a resolution at the Security Council moving for the recognition of the IGC set up by the US and Britain. Last Thursday, 14 of the 15 Security Council members voted in favour of the resolution, but only after the word "endorses" was replaced by the word "welcomes", with Syria, the only Arab country on the Council, abstaining. The US-led occupation picked the members of the IGC, selecting them from the various political, ethnic and religious groups that constitute the fabric of Iraqi society, while allowing the head of the civilian administration in Iraq, Paul Bremer, to veto any resolution passed by the Council. In other words, the IGC enjoys no sovereign prerogatives. The Arab stand on the IGC is an ambivalent one. Although the Arab League issued a statement describing it as a step in the right direction, it has also stated that it would not recognise an administrative body in Iraq that derives its legitimacy from the occupier. And yet Syria, which now heads the Security Council, chose to abstain from voting on the resolution rather than take a stand that would place it in opposition with the other members of the Security Council. Actually, Resolution 1500 is based on a contradiction, with the same countries that voted in favour of "welcoming" the IGC openly declaring that they were not ready to "endorse" it! In casting their near unanimous vote, Security Council members were treading a very fine line as they tried to reconcile two mutually exclusive considerations. On the one hand, a fundamental legal principle holds that what is based on an illegality is itself illegal, which makes the IGC illegal because it was set up by an illegal occupation. On the other, the international community is keen for political reasons to reinstate Iraq within the framework of the United Nations and international legitimacy. The Syrian ambassador to the UN tried unsuccessfully to introduce a number of amendments to Resolution 1500. He argued that the Iraqi people alone are capable of governing their own country, and that it was not the job of the Security Council to "welcome" the IGC. The Syrian ambassador also tried to include a provision in the resolution setting a time table for the restitution by Iraq of its sovereignty, and was backed in this respect by the French delegation. As to Russia, its delegate insisted that the Security Council retain strong prerogatives when it comes to the reconstruction of Iraq, and that the IGC contribute to the creation of a legitimate government in the country. Resolution 1500 represents a significant success for US diplomacy. Washington succeeded to have its cake and eat it: it acted in open defiance of the United Nations when this served its interests, then in returning to the UN when it considered that its interests would be better served if it acted under the umbrella of international legitimacy. But has American diplomacy succeeded in overcoming this crisis? The resistance movement continues to frustrate Washington's attempts to stabilise democracy and legitimacy, and it is hard to see how genuine democracy can come out of such a confrontational situation, as made clear by the attack against the UN compound in Baghdad. The hudna in Palestinian-Israeli relations has not succeeded so far in stabilising the cease-fire. Can Bush bring about the necessary changes in American policy at a time he is becoming increasingly absorbed in the forthcoming US presidential elections? As to the Arab parties, is "abstaining" from conducting any positive policy the maximum they can do?
