Nazim Al-Jassour* ponders the destruction of Falluja Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is among the very few to have been honoured with a standing ovation by the US congress. Allawi went to Washington not to discuss the crisis engulfing the Iraqi scene, the political, economic and security chaos that is the everyday reality for Iraqi citizens. These are, after all, things the Americans know all about. Allawi was in Washington to endorse the re-election of President George W Bush. Allawi stood at the dais of the US congress as a representative of a supposedly new and democratic Iraq, a nation that sides with Washington in everything it does in the name of fighting terror. And in return Allawi wanted something. He wanted the Bush administration to support his government to the fullest possible extent, including sacrificing the lives of US soldiers. At the heart of the war on terror is Falluja, a stronghold of resistance, deemed to be the hotbed of opposition to US presence in the region. The city is supposed to have attracted droves of anti-US militants from across the region. The destruction of Falluja has become tantamount to the elimination of terror, in Iraq and the region -- this much one can read between the lines of Resolution 1546 of 2004. The Allawi government and the US military command have decided that Falluja is the key to lasting security; that the city is responsible for all the car bombings, all the abductions, all the killing of hostages, all the handiwork of Abu Mosaab Al-Zarqawi and his followers. The destiny of America's presence in Iraq and the region, we are led to believe, hinges upon events in Falluja. The outcome of the first onslaught on Falluja in April 2004 disappointed both Washington and Baghdad. The dismembering of four Americans in the city, said to be CIA agents, was a less-than-good excuse for demolishing an entire city. Besides, the turmoil in Najaf and Al-Sadr city distracted the Americans, all the more so because the insurgents were Shia, people who initially welcomed the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. The US military command had to forget about Falluja for a while, accepting a peaceful settlement that ended the fighting and allowed an Iraqi brigade to be deployed in the city. The Americans gained time, during which they turned their attention to Najaf and Al-Sadr city. The US aim was to prevent the insurgence spreading to other parts of Iraq. The US command forced everyone into negotiations, following the same tactic it applied in Afghanistan. Falluja was told to handover its foreign fighters or else. Having no way of handing over the fighters, the city came under attack. The onslaught on Falluja was postponed until the US elections were over, but it was only a matter of time. Falluja had to be subdued to discourage the flow of men and materiel to the resistance and to soften the resolve of insurgents across the country. The destruction of Falluja would also rob the Muslim Clerics Association of its trump card in Iraq's political process. The stakes are high in Falluja. This is why the city was so utterly devastated, and the death toll so high. Washington says Falluja is now under control except for pockets of resistance. But as more fighters head into the city and key terrorists escape the picture is far from clear. The Americans claim to have lost 50 troops and 200 more are said to have been injured, but these figures may not be accurate. As fighting in Falluja enters its third week, we have every right to ask why Baghdad fell in three days and Falluja is lasting so long? * The writer is the head of the International Studies Centre at Baghdad university and prominent Iraqi analyst.
