With the appointment of Ibrahim Al-Jaafari as head of the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, the controversy over Iran's influence in Iraq has resurfaced. Rasha Saad reports Whenever Iraq's recently appointed premiere Ibrahim Al-Jaafari is interviewed, enquiries over his links with Iran predominate. The triumph of both Al-Jaafari and the Shia-based United Iraqi Alliance appears to set alarm bells ringing. Washington, regional powers and even some Iraqis suspect that Tehran is trying hard to install a pro-Iranian theocratic government in Iraq. They are especially suspicious of the two parties within the United Iraqi Alliance with long standing ties to the Iranian regime and seen by some Iraqis as Iranian fronts -- the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Al-Jaafari's Al-Daawa. During preparations for January's elections United States officials charged parties of receiving financial aid from Iran. Outgoing defence minister, Hazim Shaalan, a secular Shia who has accused Iran of being the biggest source of terrorism and the number one enemy of Iraq, has derided the Shia slate as "an Iranian list". Iraqi Sunnis also fear the possibility of dealing with a government that owes allegiance to Tehran. In this context, Al-Jaafari's common identification as "an Iraqi official with close links to Tehran" sounds more like an accusation than a mere label. In fact Al- Jaafari's connection to Iran dates back to 1980 when he fled Iraq as former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein cracked down on his party and killed its spiritual leader, Mohamed Baqer Al-Sadr. Al-Jaafari, a Shia physician born in Karbala slipped into Iran on foot and spent nine years there, before moving to London with his family in 1990. He continued to vehemently deny having special links with Iran. In a recent interview he said that suspicion over his ties with Iran was a "mistaken belief". He also explained that it was normal for the party to leave Iraq after the mass executions of Al-Daawa Party leaders took place. "Some went to Syria and others to Iran or other Arab countries while some remained inside Iraq. Since then, coordination between the group members in different countries was launched. That is all. However, the group in Syria was accused of being loyal to Syria, the group in Iran was accused of having links to Iran," Al-Jaafari recently told reporters. While the US did not oppose Al-Jaafari's appointment, one senior administration official declined to say how US officials view Al-Jaafari. "We have a studied neutrality on Al-Jaafari's appointment," he said. This cautious welcome was seen not only as a further confirmation of the wisdom of Washington's policy and its sincerity in establishing a peaceful and stable Iraq but also proof of Washington's confidence in Al-Jaafari. In fact, in 1990 a significant split reportedly occurred in the Al-Daawa Party dividing it into two camps, one backing closer ties with Iran and the other opposing Iranian influence. The departure of Al-Jaafari to London at that time seems to have convinced Washington that he was on the side opposing Iranian influence. Meanwhile Iran's influence in Iraq continues to be a source of much controversy, raising questions about the role Iran is playing in shaping the future of Iraq. A widely circulated report from the International Crisis Group published in March attempted to provide some answers. Summarising months of extensive research in both Iraq and Iran, the report finds that despite widespread allegations of intervention, actual evidence of Iranian attempts to destabilise Iraq is rare and evidence of successful intervention is rarer still. The report, however, does not deny that Iran has vital interests in what happens in Iraq, it affirms that "there is little concrete evidence to back the claim that Iran has been a major source behind the unrest in Iraq. Even US officials admit this much," Karim Sadjadpour Crisis Group's analyst based in Iran told Al-Ahram Weekly. "Iran has exercised its influence in Iraq with considerable restraint thus far." Sadjadpour believes that Iranian interest in Iraq is starting to resemble Iran's influence in south Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s. "They fund political groups, social welfare programmes, and propaganda campaigns, and flex their muscles when necessary. But they are not necessarily out to create an Iraqi regime in their own image. They want to see a 'little brother' government in Iraq," he added. Iran's strength, however, lies in the fact that its security agencies are highly familiar with Iraq's physical and political terrain and are able to sustain an active intelligence presence in southern Iraq, Baghdad and Kurdistan -- having fought a brutal eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s. "Iranian levers of influence include a widespread network of paid informers, the increasingly assertive Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and petro-dollar funded religious propaganda and social welfare campaigns," stated the report. According to Crisis Group, Iran shares with other neighbours of Iraq an interest in preventing the country's break-up as a result of war, insurgency and secession. In an effort to both broaden its influence in Iraq and dissuade Iraqi Kurds from pushing for independence, Iran has been supportive of the Kurdish leadership's bid for appropriate political representation in Baghdad. Tehran's approach, according to the report, is not one of threats and confrontation but rather consists of nudging Iraqi actors with separatist inclinations back into the fold of the central state. As one Iranian official told Crisis Group, "Iran offers soft power in Iraq, while the US uses hard power. Iran maintains dialogue and relations with Shia, Sunnis and Kurds." Iranian officials do not hide their desire for a Shia-led Iraq. One Iranian commentator explained that "just as they say that 'democracies don't fight democracies', we believe that Shia don't fight Shia." Iranians, however reject any suggestion that they are interested in seeing a theocratic regime modelled after the Imam Khomeini model especially "given the heterogeneity of the country". Mohamed Sadeq Al-Husseini, Iranian analyst and adviser to Iranian President Mohamed Khatami admits that Iran has vested interests in Iraq but is critical of Washington's suspicions of Iran, insisting that Iranian involvement in Iraq only occurred after the US-British invasion of Iraq. "Are the Americans the sons of Basra, Mosul and Najaf? Is it legitimate for them to speak in the name of Iraqis? Why are we [Iranians] seen as suspicious when we take an interest in Iraqi affairs?" Al- Husseini told the Weekly. "Iran is reluctant to make the Americans' job easier in Iraq especially in light of the US-led war fought under the pretext of changing the political culture of the Middle East. A US success in Iraq would embolden those in Washington who would like to adopt a more aggressive approach towards Iran," Sadjadpour said. Iran's interest in Iraq relates to its attempt to prevent its encirclement by the US. The prevailing view in Tehran is that the US, if not intent on removing the regime, is at least using the threat of its removal to pressure it into ending its suspected nuclear weapons programme and support for Lebanon's Hizbullah; Iranian officials see the occupation of Iraq as an integral part of that strategy. For this reason, the report stated, Iran seems to have pursued a policy of "managed chaos" in Iraq as a way of safeguarding its interests. Iran's pursuit of managed chaos in Iraq entailed a careful strategy of hedging its bets over who among the country's political actors might best serve its interests in both the short and long term. In a pattern that has often puzzled observers, Iran has built ties with an array of diverse and at times competing political forces -- Shia Islamist parties, of course, but also Kurdish parties. In so doing, Tehran can maintain influence regardless of political developments and help steer those developments in less hostile directions. Should Tehran's perceived threat increase or should the US or Israel strike Iran's nuclear facilities, Iran may choose to respond in Iraq. As Iranian commentators often hint, the presence of 140,000 US soldiers in Iraq is not an American asset. It is a liability, for they offer a target in the event that we are attacked. But where does this leave the Iraqis? Insisting on the Lebanese parody, Sadjadpour believes that like the war in Lebanon, which was in many ways as much a regional turf war fought on Lebanese soil as it was a civil war, there is a danger that Iraq could be thrown into a similar predicament. "The US strategy of antagonising Iran while at the same time trying to maintain a close rapport with Iraqi Shia groups may prove difficult to achieve," Sadjadpour pointed out.
