Pakistan has returned to the Commonwealth, though not yet to democracy, writes Graham Usher in Islamabad The Commonwealth heads-of-government summit held in Valletta, Malta, on 25-27 November was significant for one reason -- the attendance of Pakistani Prime Minister Shawkat Aziz. It was the first time a Pakistani head of government had graced the 53-state "club" of former British colonies since October 1999, when Islamabad was suspended after General (now President) Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in a military coup. Nor is Pakistan a democratic, law-based state just yet, according to the final communiqué of the Malta moot. While "welcoming the progress made by Pakistan in restoring democracy and rebuilding democratic institutions... [the] holding by the same person of the offices of head of state and chief of army is incompatible with the basic principles of democracy. Until the two offices are separated, the process of democratisation will not be irreversible," it said. The Commonwealth heads of government urged Pakistan to "resolve this issue as early as possible, and not beyond the end of the current presidential term in 2007 at the least". Aziz acknowledged the concern in an interview with the BBC. "It was necessary that the president be allowed to keep his uniform because we were facing many challenges like the war against terrorism and other security issues," he said. But he implied the issue would be "resolved" by 2007. There are grounds to believe him. As the Commonwealth heads were gathering in Malta, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) released a report on Pakistan's recent local government elections, held in three phases between August and October this year. Trumpeted by Musharraf as an example of devolving power and local empowerment, the ICG unmasks a litany of electoral fraud, including: the "gerrymandering of districts to split support for political opponents of the military; reshuffling supervisory officials to ensure those favourable to the military- controlled elections; rejecting the nomination of opposition candidates; giving direct support to certain candidates even though the elections were supposed to be 'non-party'; and direct rigging, including ballot-stuffing, intimidation and seizure of voting stations." There was also political violence. During the three polls 60 people were killed and over 500 injured. "The military regime distorted its own devolution plan through manipulated polls to ensure its supporters won, to weaken further the mainstream opposition parties, and to set the stage for maintaining control of parliament and the presidency in 2007 and beyond," was the grim verdict of ICG South Asia director, Samina Ahmed. But to what end? Local and provincial government wields little real weight in Pakistan given the control over resources by the army and the bureaucracy in the central government. But it does provide machinery and patronage for candidates seeking election to parliament. And parliament forms the electoral-college for the presidency, with a two-thirds majority required for any constitutional change, including the move from a nominally prime ministerial system to a militarised, presidential one -- which, say analysts, is Musharraf's preference and the condition for him ditching his uniform. In the 2002 parliamentary elections Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) won a slim majority, due to opposition from local officials, many of them affiliated to Pakistan's two main opposition parties; the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) headed by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) headed by Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf's massive rigging of the 2005 local elections was the first step in the manufacture of a new, unassailable parliamentary majority, says Pakistani analyst, Shafqat Mahmoud. "General Musharraf can only get elected as a legitimate president if a majority of his supporters are elected in 2007 to the national parliament and provincial assemblies. A 'positive' result in the local elections is not the only variable for this to happen but it is an exceedingly important one." Musharraf will probably get his way, and not only because of the supine international response to his undemocratic rule. Another reason is the weakness of the PPP and PML-N secular opposition. Their leaders are both in exile and the political system (as the local polls attest) rigged against them. But they are also internally divided, thoroughly corrupt and prone to fragmentation. In the recent suffrage the PPP lost many seats in its heartland Sindh, while the PML-N fared as badly in its bastion of the Punjab. Nor is the Islamist opposition as strong as it was. In the North-West Frontier Province -- school of the Taliban and currently under Islamist provincial control -- Islamist candidates saw their vote cut by half, suggesting that the anti- American sentiment that made the Islamists the largest opposition bloc in the 2002 parliamentary elections is starting to ebb. "They failed to deliver to their electorates", says Ahmed. But this will make them more amenable to Musharraf's "one-man democracy", she predicts. As long as Musharraf gives them a "stake in the system" the Islamists will accept both his domestic and foreign policies, no matter how much they rail publicly against them. The same pragmatism rules Musharraf's attitude to them. "He still needs the Islamic parties to neutralise the secular parties, which he feels present an even greater threat to his rule," says Ahmed.
