In a skillful move of media diplomacy, Iran buys itself two more weeks before it has to decide which path it will follow, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* With the world holding its breath while permanent representatives of the UN Security Council met in New York to deliberate how to tackle the problem of Iran's nuclear programme, Iran pulled another rabbit out of its hat. This time it came in the form of a letter addressed from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to US President George W Bush, delivered via the Swiss Embassy, which is handling US interests in Tehran. At the same time, considerations of various regional and international parties have altered in a manner that have weakened the American negotiating position in the Security Council and rendered talk of tough action against Iran incongruent with the current mood of the international community. Nonetheless, the third party initiative that all hoped would halt the vicious cycle of escalation between Washington and Tehran, dispelling the looming spectre of another war in the region, was not forthcoming. Ahmadinejad's media offensive was, in a sense, therefore a substitute well-timed. Although the letter contained nothing new with regard to the Iranian stance, it may have bought Tehran precious time as it waits for other parties to toss it a diplomatic lifeline. The arrival of the Iranian letter unleashed a gust of wind across the UN Security Council. Until this point, Washington had been sitting smugly with its transatlantic partners, London and Paris, while across the table Beijing and Moscow seemed uncertain how to play their hand. The letter postmarked from Tehran strengthened the Russian and Chinese position, which is far from supportive of Iranian nuclear ambitions but opposed to the American way of handling the issue. It also set some gears into motion that might upset the neoconservative game plan. International Atomic Energy Agency Director Mohamed Al-Baradei voiced his belief that a constructive solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis was contingent upon US-Iranian negotiations. Similarly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called upon the two parties to hold direct talks. This, in fact, was the subtext of Ahmadinejad's letter. A month ago, reportedly, Iran tried to send to Washington a message stating the same desire. But rather than airing it publicly in an 18-page document, Tehran dispatched Mohamed Reza Nahavandian, an aide to Iran's top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, with the undisclosed purpose of conveying this desire directly. Officials in Washington, unwilling to allow for any opening that might release steam from its anti-Iran juggernaut, refused to meet the Iranian delegate. In response to the snub, Ahmadinejad denied the substantive purpose of Nahavandian's visit: "200,000 Iranians leave the country and come back every year without there being something in it," he said. Ahmedinejad's letter may have been addressed to Bush, but Bush was not the primary intended recipient. Tehran knows that the Bush administration is not going to soften unless Tehran tables something considerably more than a letter. In the past, for example, Iranian officials have used the White House to convey the message to US and international public opinion that Iran is eager to cool down tensions, just as they used the Europeans at the time of negotiations with the Troika to send messages to Washington, which is the only power capable of ensuring that Iran receives adequate compensation for compromising on the nuclear issue. On this occasion, the Europeans picked up the message and announced that they would put together a package of technological, commercial and even "regional" guarantees that they would offer Iran in exchange for a halt to its uranium enrichment programme. "Regional guarantees" is the only addition to European offers to Iran since 2003, but the phrase is no small consideration. It implies international recognition of the legitimacy of the Iranian regime and its right to remain within, and perhaps participate in the shaping of, the "regional order". As this was one of the major aims of the Iranian nuclear programme, the new European offer is a considerable concession to Iran's ambitions as a regional power. More immediately, the offer signals that Tehran has succeeded in driving a wedge between the Europeans, now more keen to reward Iran for cooperating, and Washington, still bent on its siege strategy. Iran has won another two weeks until the next Security Council meeting in order to capitalise on its gains. If, until a short time ago, the Iranian tactic was to flex its regional muscle via strategic alliances stretching from the Shia in Iraq through Damascus and up to southern Lebanon, over the past two weeks it has demonstrated a talent at flexing other muscles. Prime among these is its ability to single-handedly influence the international oil market. Western demand for gasoline rises at this time of year in anticipation of the summer holiday season. When Ahmadinejad disclosed that he had sent a letter to Bush, the price of crude plummeted by a dollar and a half to its lowest level in three weeks. The Iranians then showed how they could drive the price up again, if they wanted. A day after that drop, Ali Larijani announced that there would be "important consequences to the international energy market" if Iran were attacked. Suddenly oil prices climbed by half a dollar. Iranian oil exports are not the only key to Iran's ability to affect the international energy market; the country is also strategically poised over the Straits of Hormuz, through which passes oil from Gulf countries to the rest of the world. The question is, what next? Iranian bodybuilders are renowned for their art. When you see them in the zorkhana -- the traditional gym -- you cannot help but gasp in astonishment at their skill and dexterity. Towards the end of their shows, bodybuilders display their proficiency by using various weights and chains to flex and enhance muscles in rapidly executed routines choreographed to the beat of Iranian tambourines. Yet, as impressive as these performances are, the spectator cannot help but grow weary of the repetition. The same applies to Iranian diplomatic muscle flexing. Ahmadinejad's letter to Bush was a brilliant display of Tehran's dexterity at using the media to win international sympathy. Having come after a period of flexing various other strategic muscles, it represents a new and graceful addition to the routine. However, this strategy's weakness resides precisely in the danger of it becoming routine; of spectators getting weary and saying "Enough already!". Tehran has another two-week grace period. Either it comes up with a new move or two, or it will have to accept compromise, take its curtain bow to applause and calls of congratulation and come back to the table with substantive and final proposals. * The writer is a political analyst specialised in Iranian affairs
