In its written reply to the incentive package of the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, Iran continues to retain the leading edge, writes Mustafa El-Labbad Finally Iran responded, and at length, to the "incentive package" members of the Security Council plus Germany offered to induce the Islamic republic to halt its uranium enrichment activities. Yet in rejecting the package, Iran did not quite shut the door entirely. Tehran's response was Iranian par excellence : long, convoluted and begging more questions than it answered. Iran was originally supposed to reply to the Security Council offer two months ago, but it asked for a postponement until 22 August. Washington, suspicious of how Iran would take advantage of the time it bought and, in any case, inherently impatient and short- sighted, drafted and, against the backdrop of the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon, pushed through Security Council Resolution 1696. This resolution gave Iran until the end of August to halt nuclear enrichment operations or face the possibility of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Naturally Iran is resisting halting its enrichment operations in advance of negotiations as to do so would be to surrender a key negotiating card, the repercussions of which would extend well beyond the question of the country's nuclear technology capacities. In the words of Iranian Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, "to back down on the nuclear issue would be political suicide." Nonetheless, with the deadline of the Security Council approaching, Iran realised that time was now against it and that its position was weakening, even though Russia and China continue to blunt US ambitions in the Security Council. These considerations, along with a range of legal and technical matters, shaped the response Iran delivered to the international community on 22 August. As the international offer took as its primary authority the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- specifically the first two articles of that treaty -- the Iranian response appealed to Article 4 of the same, which grants all parties to the treaty the right "to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes". Evidently, Iran wants to secure international recognition of its alienable right to continue uranium enrichment operations for peaceful purposes; thus in the event that it does freeze its enrichment operations for the moment it will be able to resume them at some point at the future. Once assured of this right, Iranian negotiators will attempt to secure approval for continuing operations on a limited basis -- for example, in certain specifically designated sites and using a limited number of centrifuges -- instead of having to bring operations to a complete halt. Iran wants to sustain its current level of development and not have to begin again from scratch in the event it is unable to reach an agreement with Security Council nations. In this regard, observers anticipate that, at the beginning of negotiations, the Iranians will seek to establish the principle that any suspension of operations would not be indefinite, but set for a limited period of time, for which two to five years are considered a realistic horizon. At the same time, they will insist on their right to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil for research and development purposes. Finally, they will probably try to obtain approval for keeping their nuclear facilities on "warm standby", which is to say poised to resume operations in the event that countries of the Security Council fail to abide by their contractual obligations. In order for nuclear facilities to be kept on "warm standby" a neutral gas, instead of the usual uranium hexafluoride, has to be pumped continuously into the centrifuges so that they can be kept spinning. The process is extremely costly and, therefore, also expected to enter the negotiating agenda. As the package included an international pledge to promote economic and commercial cooperation with Iran, Iranians will home in on America's economic and technological boycott of Iran. To what extent is Washington prepared to ease off on its boycott or even call it off entirely, the Iranians will be asking. They will also be seeking further clarification regarding the European offer for cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Iran. EURATOM helps with the transfer of nuclear technology to its members, but is bound to restrict its help to Iran to the supply of light water reactors, which can only be used for peaceful purpose. Iran, for negotiating purposes at least, will have its heart set on the highest capacity of such reactors, which is available only in Germany. Similarly, Iran will seek clarification regarding the nuclear fuel "storehouse" to be established on Iranian territory, according to the European offer. The capacity of the storehouse, the mechanisms for stocking it or removing stock, and the nature of the guarantees that Iran will gain maximum benefit from it, are among the subjects Iranian negotiators will focus on. Behind the scenes, and in tandem with their response on these issues, the Iranians have also been following up on an earlier Russian offer to enrich Iranian uranium in Russia by a company that would be established for that purpose. The Iranians, who had publicly rejected the offer, are privately pressing to increase the ratio of Iranian uranium to be enriched by that company to more than 50 per cent. They are also seeking guarantees that Iranian scientists will have free and unrestricted access to these enrichment facilities on Russian territory. Iran, thus, has accepted the incentives package, but by means of its counterproposals and requests for clarification on certain issues it is simultaneously asking for more. It is signalling that while international offers have only partially met its expectations it also seeks to avoid a full suspension of its enrichment activities. In all events, it is not prepared to suspend these operations in advance of negotiations and in exchange for vague promises, which explains the "new formula" that the Iranians have proposed in their response. So far, Tehran has ensured itself reasonable cover to protect it from potential military strikes. In this, it has used a set of regional pressure cards in its campaign, but without overplaying its hand and entering into a face-to-face confrontation with the US. As though to underscore this, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, told the six ambassadors to whom he handed Iran's response on the incentives package that his country was "a stabilising [factor]" in the region, adding that Tehran could "contribute to the success of the prisoner exchange process between Hizbullah and Israel." Still, Iran's major strategic problem in its handling of the nuclear issue is sitting in the White House. Every decision the Iranians have taken with regard to either digging in their heels or demonstrating flexibility has had to be carefully calibrated with the incumbent of the Oval Office in mind, because he -- George W Bush -- ultimately, has the power to push final agreements through and to ensure their translation on the ground. Given that the Bush administration has hinted at least 30 times over the past few months that it wants to resolve the Iranian nuclear question militarily, Washington's agreement, two months ago, to hold direct talks with Iran counted as no small victory for the latter. On the other hand, the assault against Lebanon that Israel waged on behalf of Washington indicates that the Bush administration is still determined to escalate its campaign against Iran on all regional and international fronts. From Lebanon to the Security Council, Washington is determined to neutralise Iran's negotiating cards that, in turn, would practically obviate the possibility of an agreement that would satisfy the interests of both Iran and the US. Iran, for its part, realises that it has lost the ability to set the pace of developments because of UN Security Council Resolution 1696, though it continues to possess a strong bargaining hand. Iran has shown itself to be a particularly astute bazaar merchant. It knows its own strengths, the value of what it has to offer, and the complexities of the regional situation. It plays all adroitly to its own advantage within the zone of manoeuvrability it has. Far away, on the other side, sits Rambo who only seems able to satisfy himself against a backdrop of aerial bombardments and acts of war -- from Afghanistan in 2001 to Iraq in 2003 and, via his regional proxy, Lebanon in 2006 -- even though all this violence and destruction worked against his political interests. It is difficult to predict how events will unfold between the clever and patient haggler from the Iranian bazaar and the rash and trigger-happy cowboy, but they are sure to make an exciting addition to A Thousand and One Nights.
