In a region characterised by tension, the importance of maintaining political relations between Iran and the US cannot be underestimated. It is this relationship that largely determines the geopolitical climate of the Middle East as the two states compete to project their influence. The trajectory of decades-long antagonism and irreconcilable relations changed after former US president Barack Obama laid out his 2013 initiative to unlock the Iranian nuclear crisis, which was followed by the materialisation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. However, the very existence of the deal makes it difficult for the US to confront Iran, and analysts now speculate that in the coming months two possible shifts may create a U-turn in US-Iran relations. The issue of the nuclear deal was centre stage in new US President Donald Trump's campaign. He made a variety of statements about the deal, calling it at various times “stupid,” a “lopsided disgrace” and the “worst deal ever negotiated.” Early on, Trump said he would “dismantle the disastrous deal.” But later, Trump's top foreign policy adviser confirmed that he would neither dismantle the deal nor implement it “as it is.” Rather, Trump, according to an adviser, “is going to renegotiate it”. Iran hawks in the US, Democrats and Republicans alike, cheered Trump's position. In their eyes, the problem with the deal is not just that Iran can retain its nuclear infrastructure and continue uranium enrichment. Rather, their real problem with the deal is that it has effectively paralysed the US's ability to confront Iran if it needs to in the future. Next to military action, sanctions are the best weapon to use to tame hostile governments, but if the US imposes new sanctions on Iran, the deal will effectively collapse. There are also challenges even beyond the nuclear deal. Iran is steadfastly determined to expand its missile programme, something the US establishment as a whole is against. Iran also will not withhold its unwavering support of the Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah, which both the US and Israel allege supports terrorism. Most importantly, Iran challenges US hegemony in every corner of the region. The fall of the Syrian city of Aleppo was a clear manifestation of the decline of American influence in the region and the emergence of a new order in which Iran will play a major role as a regional power. Some notable nuclear deal critics in the US have suggested that Trump could secure “an agreement with Iran to verifiably curb its regional aggression. [And] in exchange, Iran could be given broad-based sanctions relief and even normalisation of relations.” If Trump takes that route, he would be the seventh American president to try to change the identity of the Iranian government. Meanwhile, renegotiation would be extremely difficult. The nuclear deal is a seven-nation accord that was concluded after more than a decade of crisis, at some points inching towards a war between Iran on the one side and Israel and the US on the other, and almost two full years of negotiations. What incentive would Iran now have to negotiate a new agreement to please Trump? In the place of a renegotiated deal or a new deal to curb Iranian aggression, two developments may occur. First, Trump and the US treasury department may refuse to renew waivers on existing sanctions. Every 120 or 180 days, depending on the relevant sanctions law under the nuclear deal, the US president and treasury are supposed to issue these waivers. Second, considering the climate in the US Congress, and the fact that the defeated critics of the nuclear deal are impatiently waiting for Trump to take action, passing a sanctions law against Iran is a possibility. Both cases could violate the nuclear deal, which obliges the US to suspend major sanctions against Iran. Moreover, an American violation of the deal would violate international law, given that the pact is endorsed by the UN Security Council. If either of these two scenarios happens, two further situations are possible. Iran could walk away from the deal – a “golden opportunity” for which radicals in Iran have been impatiently waiting and an act which could seriously increase the likelihood of a war between Iran and the US. Or the Europeans could stop cooperating with the US, disregarding its moves and continuing to do business with Iran, provided that the Iranians stay committed to the deal. In this scenario, the US and Iran's hostile relations would escalate as happened in the 2005 to 2009 period, when former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's and former US president George W Bush's terms in office coincided. Trump's new national security adviser Michael Flynn has written on “regime change” in Iran in his book The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War against Radical Islam and its Allies, which he discussed before the House, foreign affairs and armed services subcommittee in June 2015. The ideas expressed in this book could now become the US administration's doctrine of choice. THE ELECTIONS FACTOR: Meanwhile, the moderates in Iran (also known as pragmatists) along with the reformists and moderate conservatives have formed a coalition against their rivals, the self-branded principalists which include conservatives and hardline conservatives. With the death of Iran's former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on 8 January, the moderate camp has lost its spiritual leader. Now Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is expected to carry the torch and lead it. But hardliner strongholds are deeply entrenched in the Iranian establishment. Among them are the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the paramilitary Basij militia which works under the supervision of the IRGC, the police forces and the perennially conservative judiciary. On any occasion in the past when these factions and the moderates have clashed on any issue, whether the interpretation of Islam, governance, or foreign policy, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has taken the radicals' side. The principalists reject a liberal reading of Islam, and their hardline branch believes in maintaining hostile relations with and resisting the “global arrogance led by the US.” The moderates, unlike their opponents, believe in interaction with the West, including the US. As had been expected, with the May presidential elections in Iran nearing, antagonism between the two camps has reached new heights. In an unprecedented development, Rouhani and radical head of the judiciary Ayatollah Sadek Larijani have publicly accused each other of corruption and demanded clarification from their opponent. Although the majority of analysts in Iran predict a Rouhani election victory, the vast dissatisfaction with his administration's economic performance cannot be ignored. According to a poll conducted last year by the Centre for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland in the US, eight out of ten Iranians say that the economy is not improving, while three out of four say Rouhani has been unsuccessful in reducing unemployment. If they introduce a new face who can run on a platform centred on highlighting Rouhani's economic failures, with strategies to pull the country out of stagflation and combat widening wealth and income inequality, the principlists could have a chance to win the elections. If Rouhani is elected, there would be no change in US-Iran relations from Iran's side so long as the Trump administration cooperates in the implementation of the nuclear deal. If a principalist is elected, on the other hand, many analysts have predicted that tensions between Iran and the US could rise to the point that the deal collapses and radical policies towards the US, as seen during the Ahmadinejad's presidency, return. However, this argument is flawed. It is true that rhetoric and verbal confrontation will most likely heighten, but in practical terms it will be impossible for any Iranian administration to fix the country's economy if paralysing sanctions are re-introduced by the US and international community. Iran's supreme leader has realised the sensitivity of this issue. It is for this reason that he has repeatedly emphasised that “Iran will not initiate the violation of the nuclear deal. Being loyal to one's covenant is a Quranic injunction,” he has said. The writer is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East and US foreign policy in the region.
