Since an angry group of young Islamic revolutionaries overran the United States embassy in Tehran in 1979, the US has used every foreign policy tool, including covert operations, to tame Iran's hostile foreign policy. Among these tools, sanctions have played a major role. Indeed, sanctions stood out among other tools at America's disposal in bringing the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme to an end. But the Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has created a significant, but sparsely noted, dilemma for the US. As long as the implementation of the deal is in progress, America's hands are tied simply because the imposition of any new effective sanctions would most likely violate the deal and lead to its collapse. The sanctions that the US imposed in reaction to Iran's March missile test were mostly symbolic and were not in violation of the deal. Following the conclusion of the deal, Iran's supreme leader ayatollah Ali Khamenei instructed Iranian president Hassan Rouhani that the agreement would be rendered void if any future sanctions, under any pretext, were imposed on Iran in the next eight years. The instruction was understandable. Iran can now only maintain a shadow of its nuclear programme, and if it accepted new sanctions adopted against it under different guises, the purpose of agreeing to the deal would be completely negated. As of today, the most contentious points between Iran and the US are Iran's missile programme and its unwavering support for the Hezbollah group in Lebanon. If hardliners in Tehran do not make political waves beyond their typical rhetoric that would provoke the US, Congress in particular, to act, it seems unlikely that a future US administration would initiate steps to jeopardise the deal. This is primarily because the deal is not only a bilateral agreement between Iran and the US. It is also an international agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council, of which the US, of course, is a permanent member. The last thing the chaotic Middle East needs is a new crisis between Iran and the US, but the question is whether the current situation is sustainable over the next several years. As a result of a culmination of sanctions and cancelled contracts since the 1980s, Iran has been left without an effective air force, and it has been unable to purchase jet fighters and bombers. Meanwhile, its regional adversaries – including Israel and Saudi Arabia – enjoy considerable air forces. Consequently, Iran will continue the expansion of its missile programme at the heart of its defence doctrine, something the Obama administration is firmly against. To underscore the significance of the missile programme to Iran, Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif contended in a tweet in March that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein would not have dared attack Iran in the early 1980s if Iran had had missiles at the time. In Iran, there is a politically powerful current that does not shy away from any opportunity to try to reverse the current situation to the pre-deal era and any chance to embrace hostile relations with the West, particularly the US. By day, opponents to the agreement angrily and relentlessly attack the pact, and by night they dream of the deal's collapse. “The [JCPOA] is by no means an honourable document for the Iranian people,” Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said recently. This faction has fiercely criticised Rouhani and his team over accepting what it calls “the humiliating nuclear agreement.” Iran's supreme leader also does not miss an opportunity to discredit the deal in his speeches. Alluding to the reluctance of European banks to work with Iran, he recently argued that the Americans had breached the nuclear agreement and had “constantly created obstacles in economic relations between Iran and other countries.” Adding to the already tense situation, Iranian hardliners have used the missile programme for their own provocations. For example, the long-range ballistic missiles, capable of reaching Israel, that Iran tested in March were marked with a statement in Hebrew that read “Israel must be wiped off the face of the Earth.” Having hostile relations with Israel is one thing, but what could that open provocation have been aimed at? On another front, US and Israeli allegations that Iran supports terrorist groups, namely Hezbollah, could escalate the Iran-US conflict at any moment. The Hezbollah militia group emerged in Lebanon in the 1980s. It was funded by Iran, and its forces were trained and organised by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Iran was seeking to change the balance of power in Lebanon in favour of the minority Shia population and to utilise Hezbollah as a proxy force that would threaten the security of Israel in the context of a deterrence doctrine. On 24 June this year, Hezbollah's chief brushed off fresh US sanctions, saying “as long as Iran has money, we have money... just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel.” Against this backdrop, hawks in the US establishment, particularly in Congress, and the Israeli lobby in the US are waiting impatiently for an opportunity to impose new sanctions on Iran, knowing that these would undoubtedly lead to the deal's undoing. In July, US president Barack Obama made it clear that he would veto any legislation that prevented the successful implementation of the JCPOA. However, things may change in the future. The answers to the following questions may gauge the likelihood of the deal's collapse. If the next president of the United States is Democratic Party candidate Hillary Clinton, the favoured candidate of the Israelis, and Congress remains Republican-dominated after the November elections, would Clinton be prepared to fight with Congress over Iran were Iran to display its missile abilities and accomplishments? How long would she be able to resist Israeli pressure and the Israeli lobby before confronting Iran's support for Hezbollah? But if Republican Party candidate Donald Trump were elected, would he be able to stop himself from cooperating with Congress to impose new sanctions on Iran if it fell into the hands of the Republicans? What if the Democrats regained control of Congress, which is possible, at least in the case of the Senate? In the absence of Obama in the White House to fight tooth and nail for the deal, would Congress be able to enforce sanctions against Iran, given the activities of those in Tehran who are deliberately seeking to escalate tensions with the US? Realistic answers to these questions lead one to conclude that further fallout from the deal is a real possibility over the next eight years. The writer is a political analyst writing primarily about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs.
