Finally, after an almost two-and-a-half-year long vacuum in the presidency, presidential elections were held in Lebanon and Michel Aoun emerged the winner. He had long aspired to this post for which he fought with an unshakable resolve. However, his success comes at a time of extraordinary local, regional and international circumstances and, secondly, it was the product of a political deal that simultaneously boosted Saad Al-Hariri into the post of prime minister. This new situation could either perpetuate the Lebanese crisis through different modes of management, or it could pave the way to a genuine solution, and not just a solution in form. At a broader level, is there a possibility that the Aoun presidency and Hariri premiership will generate a unique opportunity for collaboration that will contribute effectively to rescuing not just Lebanon but the entire Arab world from the deep chasm that awaits us all if Arab official policies continue as they are? The election of Michel Aoun precipitated a storm of conflicting reactions, as expected. While some homed in on the general's character and personality traits which enabled him to settle the contest in his favour, others tried to analyse the event from a political party, sectarian or ideological perspective. One view holds that the Aoun victory is a victory for the Hizbullah movement and a defeat for that led by Saad Al-Hariri and that this will work to strengthen the Shia component and weaken the Sunni component in the balance of forces in Lebanon. Others hold that it is a victory for the Iranian-led alliance over the Saudi-led alliance and that this will lead to increased Iranian influence in the region. In the opinion of others, it is a victory of the international coalition led by Russia which, in turn, will favour a rise in Russian influence, which has returned in full vigour to the region, in contrast to shrinking American influence. There may be some truth in each of these opinions or analyses, but they do not reflect the whole truth. The Aoun victory was not a conventional event produced by customary political manoeuvres and alliances under circumstances such as these. It was the result of an obligatory interplay that culminated in a deal between two sides that are difficult to separate: Aoun as president and Al-Hariri as prime minister. Since the regional and international environment has remained so tense that it could not help to promote a consensus president, the interplay, this time and most unusually, took place within a purely Lebanese incubator, free of regional or international pressures and influences. If this deduction is correct, it can only mean one thing. The Lebanese polity is in a state of “cool rebellion” against regional and international conditions that have frequently controlled it, dictated its laws, and fixed its political balances with no consideration for the welfare of the Lebanese state and society and that have been the chief reason for the stagnation that has prevailed in Lebanese political life for the past few years. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that Aoun and Al-Hariri have suddenly turned from being fierce enemies to fond friends. The deal they struck was more in the nature of an alliance into which both sides were forced than a collaboration between people drawn together by mutual understanding. Some observers have noted how quickly Iran congratulated the winner, which it took to signify “a victory for the axis of resistance”. Saudi Arabia, for its part, dispatched a delegate to bless the results. But to most observers this was purely a token gesture required by protocol, for Riyadh could not conceal its concern for what it regarded as a “great risk.” In all events, the fact remains that the Lebanese government will be unable to function with the necessary efficacy at this sensitive juncture in its history unless Aoun and Al-Hariri work out a formula for a cooperative relationship that will enable them to overcome the many and complicated obstacles facing the Lebanese system. In my opinion, the conventional institutionalised power-sharing formula that calls for a Maronite president and a Sunni prime minister will not be able to withstand the challenges. What is required is a search for a way to make it possible to contemplate introducing fundamental changes into the Lebanese political system, albeit it at some later stage. The Lebanese state acquired its particular character upon its establishment in 1943 when it adopted a system of government based on a precisely worked out formula intended to realise peaceful coexistence between the country's diverse faiths and sects. Lebanon's founding fathers felt that the best way to sustain this system was to ensure that Lebanon remained aloof to the conflicts between rival camps in the Arab region, which explains Lebanon's sometimes overzealous adherence to the idea of Lebanese “sovereignty”. For example, the Lebanese representative in preliminary negotiations for the establishment of the Arab League in 1944 rejected absolutely all notions of a unified, federal of confederated Arab state. Subsequent developments proved that it was impossible for Lebanon to isolate itself from events in the Arab world and that the sovereignty of Arab states could only be safeguarded through a minimum degree of solidarity and political unity between them. Lebanon, like other Arab states that lacked an Arab umbrella, became an open field to all forms of foreign penetration and influence. I am not one to underestimate the danger from the spread of Iranian influence or the influence of any other foreign power in the Arab world. However, I am uncomfortable with theories that exaggerate the Iranian danger and portray it is the sole or greatest threat to Arab national security. A quick perusal of most of the published commentaries and statements on the significance of the election of Aoun as president is sufficient to tell us that the overwhelming trend in the Arab media is to magnify the Iranian threat. But if we take a closer look at the Lebanese condition, we will discover that the Lebanese system of government has been severely structurally flawed from the outset and this was one of the most important reasons for the spread of chaos and unrest in Lebanon at various junctures in its history. The flaws were the main reason for having to call in the American marines in 1958, for the eruption of the long civil war in 1975 and the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1978. All these, which are only a few of many possible examples, took place long before Hizbullah was founded and, indeed, before the Islamic revolution in Iran. In fact, we could say that the establishment and arming of Hizbullah was one of the by-products of the flaws, rather than one of the causes. However, since remedying the flaws requires extensive time and proper preparation, it would not be wise to put it onto the Lebanese agenda at present. Nor would it be in Lebanon's interests right now to bring up such delicate issues as Hizbullah's weapons or asking Hizbullah to call back its forces fighting alongside the regime in Syria, unless such issues or demands are framed within the context of a comprehensive and agreed upon vision for the reform of the Lebanese political system. Accordingly, the best course of action at present would be to focus on how to reduce the intensity of sectarian tensions in Lebanon as a prelude to the search for ways and means to alleviate sectarian tensions in the region as a whole. Lebanon at all times, including during the country's most gruelling crises, has enjoyed quantities of freedoms and liberties unparalleled in any other Arab country. Nevertheless, the system of government is far from democratic precisely because of its sectarian foundations. Real democracy is based on the principles of citizenship, non discrimination and full equality under the law. A sectarian based system is inherently antithetical to this because it is discriminatory by nature. I believe that the presence of Michel Aoun and Saad Al-Hariri at the head of the Lebanese executive at this rare and exceptional moment presents a historic opportunity to propel the democratic transformation process forward in Lebanon. In his capacity as president for the next six years, it will be in Aoun's interests to capitalise on both his longstanding alliance with Hizbullah and his new working relationship with Al-Hariri, now prime minister, in order to stimulate efforts to change the Lebanese system of government and shift it from its current denominational quota system to a democracy based on the principle of full and equal citizenship. This is the greatest challenge that the Lebanese state and society will face in the forthcoming period. If the old sectarian ailment of the Lebanese system had spread like wildfire into the surrounding Arab environment, especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, perhaps the antidote — democratisation on the basis of full and equal citizenship — could also spread throughout the surrounding Arab environment, halt the deterioration in the state of the Arab world, and reverse the trajectory of events. The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
