Lebanese politicians are again optimistic that a cabinet will be formed, but they seem in no hurry, reports Lucy Fielder in Beirut Haggling over ministerial appointments continued this week, although most major points of contention over places in the national unity cabinet appear resolved, a mere five months after elections were held. Only the politicians from each side remain interested in this game of musical chairs as they jostle and row over seats. Most ordinary Lebanese are stifling their yawns on the sidelines and looking forward to home-time. Amid the endless discussions, meetings and statements to the press over who gets what, a glimmer of optimism has emerged in the weeks since the Syrian-Saudi summit of October. The summit removed the external obstacles, since Syria was backing the opposition and the Saudis the majority. Now the squabble has become largely domestic, revealing the flaws and contradictions in a complicated sectarian system that seems to be grinding to a halt in the post-Syrian era and the absence of any serious attempt at reform. According to Jean Aziz, columnist and news director for Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun's OTV channel, most of the major squabbles over portfolios have been resolved. "We could see a government in the coming hours or days. We are more optimistic and waiting for a positive answer from [Saad] Al-Hariri," he said. "The basic principles of the solution remain the same." For Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, keeping the Telecommunications Ministry as well as at least three other ministries is considered a minimum demand; it now seems likely that the telecoms file will remain with Aoun. Sources differ, however, on whether incumbent Gibran Bassil will be able to stay in the role as part of the deal. The majority rejects Aoun keeping his son-in-law as telecoms minister, with objections ranging from the charge of nepotism, which rings somewhat hollow given the prevalence of political dynasties in Lebanon, to the point that Bassil was not re-elected for his seat in parliament in June, and therefore, they argue, should not be a minister. This appears to be a new rule; most analysts say this point has not prevented ministerial appointments in the past. Aoun, a fiery former army chief of staff, has reacted angrily to suggestions that the other side could influence the choice of "his" ministers. The ministry is strategic in Lebanon for a number of reasons. One is economic: Lebanon's extortionate mobile phone networks are a national cash cow, and telecoms contributes $1 billion a year to the treasury, a vast sum for this tiny country of four million people. Two companies control the cellular network as a duopoly and further privatisation is planned. The FPM says such a step would simply channel profits to a few politicians and Gulf millionaires. "We are in a Third World country where corruption is phenomenal, and there are no means and ways to control privatisation of the sector," Aziz said. The Future Movement of premier- designate Saad Al-Hariri believes the state has failed to manage the sector and should profit instead from its sale. There is also the security aspect. Lebanon's pervasive intelligence agencies can use the network to track the movement of any citizen with a telephone. The international tribunal into the killing of Al-Hariri has based part of the case so far on cell phone calls, although since the investigation moved to the Hague, it is unclear whether control of the ministry in Lebanon has any further bearing on proceedings. Most importantly, Hizbullah relies on its own communications system in the south to maintain military readiness against Israel. A government attempt to clamp down on that network last year prompted a brief takeover of western Beirut and other parts of Lebanon by the group and its allies. "Hizbullah has a big interest that the telecommunications portfolio does not end up in the hands of Al-Hariri's intelligence people," Aziz said. Aziz said this week that Al-Hariri's rush of meetings with various political figures on Sunday and Monday had further boosted hopes for an imminent solution. One possible compromise was that Bassil would remain a minister, but not keep the telecoms post. Aoun would, however retain the Telecoms Ministry and also get the Energy Ministry and two less strategic ministries. Such one-upmanship and face- saving has come to characterise these negotiations. The main strategic issue, at the heart of many a political struggle over the past few years, is Hizbullah's weapons, but since agreement on a national unity cabinet that in effect gives a thinly disguised "blocking third" to the opposition, the group has left the alliance's haggling over seats mainly to Aoun. Under the agreed formula, 15 seats will go to the majority, which in fact won the June elections, 10 to the opposition and five to the president; however, it is understood that one of the president's share would be a minister whom the opposition trusted to vote with in any key vote, particularly concerning the Shia guerrilla group and political party's formidable arsenal. With détente between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Syria and Hizbullah's key demand met, the domestic jockeying for power has essentially been between the Christians, hence the focus on Aoun's demands. He argues that with 27 seats, by far the largest Christian bloc in parliament, he is the main representative of the Christians. His opponents in the anti- Syrian "14 March" movement, that commands the majority of seats, point out that they too are many and that they won the election. But the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces command five seats each and other Christian MPs are splintered. Lebanon's political system combines a Westminster-style majoritarian system with a caveat that all sects must be fairly represented. Since Syria's dominance over Lebanon ended in 2005 after the assassination of prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri, that contradiction has regularly paralysed the system, and never more so than during this summer's interminable government crisis. Add to that the sectarian aspect of all the main parties and pervasive patronage networks, and you have a recipe for institutional crisis, where forming a government or appointing a president rests on nothing short of national agreement on a range of issues.
