Mustafa El-Feki* remembers the Suez crisis as the high point of Arab solidarity, and looks at the effects and importance of that momentous time Arab solidarity peaked in 1956. Across the Arab world, people embraced the Egyptian cause as if it were their own. The Suez campaign ended with Britain losing its grip on the region and ultimately its global empire. I still remember the wave of Western protests against the war. Even in the UK, the opposition to the war was such that a prominent politician, Foreign Office Minister Anthony Nutting, resigned in protest. In order to recall the full importance of the Suez campaign, it may be helpful for me to recount what happened when President Gamal Abdel-Nasser went to New York in 1960 to attend a UN meeting. It was Nasser's first and last time to visit the US. A grey-haired man left his seat at the UN General Assembly and walked over to Nasser and introduced himself. "I am Harold MacMillan, prime minister of Britain." This was a moment of Arab pride in an era that is long gone. Allow me to elaborate: The Suez experience shows that a military loss does not necessarily entail a political defeat. I can cite numerous military victories that were not lasting because the victors were hasty and went for short-term, rather than permanent, gains. And then again, there are military defeats that turned into political victories because the vanquished refused to give in. Nasser was the kind of leader who knew how to turn defeat into victory. He did so in the Suez campaign in 1956. He did it again when Syria broke its union with Egypt in 1961. And he tried to do that again in 1967, before dying like a wounded lion on 28 September 1970. The Lebanese resistance of July 2006 recalls the Egyptian resistance of October and November 1956. Here again, victory was not decided on the battlefield. Military power can overwhelm bravery on the battlefield. But the final outcome of any conflict depends on the spirit of the fighters. Determined fighters can make the aggressors regret their actions. I am convinced that the Arab-Israeli confrontations mustn't be judged alone by military standards, but by the quality of steadfastness and ability of fighters. The world has respect for those who stand up for themselves. I remember when I was a young diplomat in London and went to Heathrow Airport to welcome Hoda Abdel-Nasser, who was going to Oxford University to do research for her PhD dissertation. This was a few years after her father died. I gave Hoda's passport to the customs official. When he saw her name, he asked me if she was related to the great man, without mentioning Nasser's name. I said that she was indeed his daughter. The official made a phone call, then came back and gave Hoda an open-ended visa, wishing her a good stay with a look that may have been one of begrudging respect. Now, let me skip to President Anwar El-Sadat's trip to London in 1975. I went with a colleague of mine to the UK Foreign Office to arrange the visit. It is true to say that Sadat was just as smart and imposing as Nasser was patriotic and charismatic. And yet officials of the Foreign Office began arguing with us about where her majesty the queen would receive the Egyptian president. Would it be at the gates of the Buckingham Palace or at the doors of the residency quarters? A Byzantine argument followed on whether the visit was a "working visit" or a "state visit". I remember saying that if Nasser, who was a sworn enemy of the British, were the one visiting London, the Royal Air Force would have welcomed him at their international borders out of sheer respect and awe. To put it plainly, in international relations, interests come before sentiments. The Suez campaign was a turning point for the region, indeed for the national liberation movement across the world. Nasser spoke out not just for Egypt, but for the region and the world. Historians divide history to pre-Suez and post-Suez. Geography experts speak of the "east of Suez" and the "west of Suez". Such terms are indelible in memory. And they tell us that resolve is just as important as military power. In 1956, France and Britain didn't consult with the Americans. On the contrary, they timed the attack to coincide with the US elections and the turbulence in Budapest. They wanted to punish Egypt for exercising its right to nationalise the Suez Canal, and the Americans didn't appreciate the element of surprise. The Suez campaign, therefore, drew the line between old-style imperialism and a new type of imperialism. Soon afterwards, president Eisenhower came up with his famous doctrine about filling the vacuum in the Middle East. The Arab dock workers who stopped unloading British and French ships and the oil workers who blew up the pipes were all paying homage to the pan-Arab movement Egypt set in motion. The Suez campaign signalled the birth of a pan-Arab leadership and was a turning point in the course of national liberation. India named one of its main boulevards after Nasser. The late king Hussein named a major square in Amman after Nasser. This goes to show that nations remember their champions despite all setbacks and defeats. The Suez campaign needs to be examined at depth, from all political, economic, military and social sides. Here was a conflict that broke the British Empire and left a lasting impression on the Arab psyche. The British and French authorities have recently released many of the documents of that time, all of which indicate that Israel was the main catalyst and facilitator of the war. Initially, French and British officials wanted to send their paratroopers against Alexandria, in a replay of the 1882 British invasion. Then the target was moved to Port Said, and Sinai was invaded as well. The Suez campaign was the culmination of a three-way effort to overthrow Nasser and nip pan-Arabism in the bud. The British wanted to punish Nasser for driving them out of the Suez Canal. The French wanted to punish him for supporting the Algerian revolution. And Israel was being its usual self. This is what makes Suez special. It gives us more than a clue to understanding the schemes being hatched against our beleaguered region. * The writer is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the People's Assembly.
