Mahmoud Murad* plots the significance of the 1956 nationalisation of the Suez Canal The value of the battle for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the golden anniversary of which we have just commemorated, resides in the hope our continued commemoration of this act gives to the peoples of the world, and especially the peoples of the Arab world. It is a reflection of our resolve to recover our legitimate rights and stand as one against the vicious practices of the new colonial powers -- or let's just say it right out: the superpower at the top of the current monopolar global order whose government is in the process of brutally implementing a project of imperial hegemony. By "government" I am not referring just to the administration that is currently occupying the White House, for this is only the tip of the iceberg. Rather, I am also referring to that enormous infrastructure that lies below the surface, consisting of the Department of Defence, the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, the mammoth transnational companies and their government think tanks and university research centre mouthpieces as well as pressure groups and lobbyists. For no group can have a say unless it its organised and has a mechanism to make its voice heard, which is why the Arab voice in the US is so frail, in spite of the fact that about five million Americans are of Arab descent, which is to say equal to, if not more than, the number of American Zionists. America's political forces began formulating their country's imperialist enterprise in the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. It is constantly developing and mutating in according to circumstances. If the American enterprise has manifested itself most flagrantly in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is also glaringly obvious in the ravages of rampant economic deregulation and the patterns of investment that are devoid of any sense of social justice. Such are the signs that the spectre of total foreign control is once again encroaching upon the natural resources and primary economic facilities of states that have been variously referred to as the Third World, developing countries and the South. The aim is the same as it was half a century, indeed two centuries, ago when European companies sought to secure access to the mineral and agricultural wealth of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and towards which end their governments asserted control over such international waterways as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab Al-Mandab, the Isthmus of Suez, the Strait of Gibraltar and, at the heart of these, the Suez Canal. As we know the Suez Canal is the most strategically and economically important waterway in the world, furnishing a shorter and cheaper route between East and West. Thousands of years ago the same considerations inspired the ancient Egyptians to construct a canal linking the Nile and the Red Sea. Named after the Pharaoh Sosostris, it enabled trading vessels to transport their cargoes directly from the Red Sea to the Nile and then down one of its branches, of which there were seven at the time instead of two, to the Mediterranean. Following the decline of the ancient Egyptian empire the canal fell into neglect and was left to be buried in sand. With the Islamic conquest of Egypt some thought was given to reconstructing it but it was not until after the Napoleonic expedition at the turn of the 19th century that the idea resurfaced in full force. Napoleon had been lured to Egypt precisely because of this country's strategic location and the dream of linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. Following the expulsion of the French Mohammed Ali brought over a group of Saint Simonians who helped construct the barrages on the Nile but whose proposal for creating a new waterway to the Red Sea was turned down by the Egyptian ruler for fear it would attract the voracious European powers. It was Mohammed Ali's son, Said Pasha, who concluded the deal with the French for the construction of the Suez Canal, which was completed under Said's successor, the Khedive Ismail, after which followed the train of events that led to the British occupation of Egypt and the conversion of the French- owned Suez Canal Company into a state within a state. The pre-1952 Egyptian ruling order failed to accomplish two major national objectives, in spite of the momentous sacrifices made in the course of the popular struggle: full independence and social justice. When the July 1952 Revolution erupted, these two causes were its foremost priorities. In accordance with an agreement signed with the British in 1954, the last British soldier vacated Egypt on 18 June 1956. Social justice, on the other hand, is not so straightforward a matter. This can only be achieved when the national will is fully free and in complete control over its resources and economic potential -- a much more difficult goal to attain than the physical expulsion of foreign forces, no matter how numerous and well-equipped. Gamal Abdel-Nasser was entirely aware of this dynamic, even if he did not expound on it fully. Yet when we give close study to his Philosophy of the Revolution it becomes apparent that he realised that his strategic vision of an "Arab sphere" at the conjunction of the Islamic and African spheres could not be fulfilled unless the Arabs liberated themselves from all forms of military and economic colonialism and assumed complete control of their primary resources. President Nasser, according to the testimony of all his friends and colleagues, was a bookworm. But it was not only through avid reading combined with his alert and contemplative assessment of national and regional events that he formed his political and cultural outlook. His insatiable spirit of inquiry led him to visit the headquarters of contemporary political organisations, both official and underground ones, in order to meet with their leaders and apprise himself of their ideologies and programmes. He also met frequently with intellectuals, both before the revolution and afterwards. Armed with considerable erudition and political awareness Nasser quietly began to restore Egypt's national rights, beginning with the nationalisation of the banks and then the momentous decision to turn the international Suez Canal Company into a purely Egyptian venture. We must pause here to make two important points. Firstly, Nasser's decision to nationalise the banks could not possibly have stemmed immediately from the World Bank's refusal to grant Egypt a loan to build the High Dam. A week would never have provided sufficient time for an idea of such magnitude and potential repercussions to be given appropriate study. The World Bank's refusal, therefore, must have been the trigger that hastened the implementation of an idea that had been under consideration for some time. This conclusion also fits with what we know of Nasser's desire to restore national autonomy. As for the nationalisation of the canal, it is a logical extension of this desire, especially in view of the fact that the power that controls this vital maritime juncture also controls, or participates in the control of, the Red Sea and Mediterranean. The franchise on the Suez Canal was due to terminate just over a decade later, in 1967. It was well-known that Egypt would not be willing to renew it. Egypt was thus faced with the spectre of a foreign invasion in order to secure control over the canal or the prospect of the Suez Canal company closing its doors after destroying or smuggling all its documents out and leaving the machinery and equipment to fall into disuse because Egyptians had not yet been trained how to run and operate the facilities. Such fears are supported by reports and other documented evidence. President Nasser therefore laid his plans in advance in the utmost secrecy. Again, the nationalisation of the canal could have taken place at a later date but was brought forward following the World Bank's refusal to help finance the High Dam at a time when Egypt was only receiving ten per cent of the revenues from the canal. When President Nasser announced the nationalisation of the canal in his speech in Manshiyya Square, Alexandria, on 26 July 1956, the thousands who were there to see him and the millions who heard him over the radio broke into cheers of triumph and jubilation. This was a democratic decision by all standards, receiving the full and unanimous support of the people in a direct and open referendum. A popular response of that spontaneity and that scope could not possibly have been artificially organised in advance or by collective brainwashing. As I pointed out above, the plans had been kept under the tightest secrecy, so much so that many top officials only learned about it a few hours before the president's speech. The nationalisation decree stated that shareholders in the Suez Canal Company would be compensated in accordance with the value of their shares at the closing time of the Paris stock exchange on the previous day. In other words, care was taken to strictly observe the law, the relevant international agreements and the rights of company employees. To say Egypt "seized" the canal is to misrepresent the facts. What Egypt did was to regain its right to administer a vital facility for the construction of which it had paid an exorbitant price: some 120,000 Egyptian laborers perished in the course of digging the canal and the enormous debts Egypt incurred in order to provide the world this facility led to foreign control of the national economy, occupation and war. This is the lesson that the nationalisation of Suez has imparted to freedom fighters, strengthening their resolve and inspiring their speeches as they moved to liberate their nations. Testimony to this can be found in Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba, Peron in Argentina and other leaders in the countries of the Third World. This is the value that must stand tall and erect. It is the value that we must cherish and defend. By we I refer specifically to the Arab people facing the spectre of an American enterprise for world domination and hegemony. This enterprise has allied itself with the Zionist project, following the rise of Jewish Zionist influence in the US. In terms of politics, the American project seeks to create a vast empire that dominates the entire world. This bid for global hegemony has begun by the attempt to seize control of this region, which they are now calling the "Greater Middle East" and where they hope Arabism and its beliefs will dissolve. Whoever controls this region can easily dominate the world. The Zionist project seeks to establish a Greater Israel, extending from the Nile to the Euphrates and swallowing up Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. This state is to become the platform for their drive to dominate the world. So which of the two will gobble us up first and then prevail? Will we, the Arabs, occupy spectators' seats even though we are the victims? If we agree upon the fundamental value and meaning derived from the momentous decision to nationalise the Suez Canal, then we must begin to act. We must take up the defence of our country, the Arab nation, our people, our future generations and, indeed, life itself. Taking action is a sacred duty. It can take the form of individual action, but collective action is more powerful and more effective. Organised activity, through civil society organisations that depend on their own resources as opposed to notorious foreign aid, will ensure solidarity among the various social forces and fruitful and plentiful results will follow at all levels. * The writer is deputy chief editor of Al-Ahram.
