After eight decades, that ranged from understanding to cooperation to tacit approval, the world was taken by surprise last week when a spokesman for the British cabinet announced that the British government decided to look into the record of the Muslim Brotherhood to determine its possible role in recent terrorist attacks, with special reference to the tourist bus attack that occurred at Taba earlier this year and that cost the lives of some South Korean tourists. The official announcement made it clear that the British intelligence services would be entrusted with the task. This clarification raised some question marks on the true purpose of the move. Is this prelude to the UK banning the Muslim Brotherhood? Or is it intended to accommodate the Saudi government after its decision to consider the Brotherhood a terrorist organisation? Or is it, rather, an implicit message to its leaders not to abuse British hospitality and start planning mischief for Saudi authorities and other Gulf countries that decided to stand by Egypt in its hour of need? Or does the British government want to accommodate some political forces on the right wing within Britain? For those who are more familiar with the long-established relations between Britain and the Muslim Brotherhood before and after the July Revolution of 1952, the news was received with some incredulity.
What is more important in analysing the British decision in this respect is its timing. Two developments stand out. The first is the Saudi decision early last month to put the Brotherhood on the Saudi list of terrorist organisations. The second was the visit of US President Barack Obama to Saudi Arabia on 28 March. I think these two developments provide both the regional and strategic context for the British decision.
Saudi-British relations are too important from a British point of view to leave them dependent on the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood in London. Not only do these relations matter, but also relations with the United Arab Emirates matter.
Bilateral relations between the three countries are not only historic but also crucial for the British economy, finance and banking. I do not think that any British government, whether Labour or Conservative, could sacrifice these long and wide-ranging relations with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and nor for that matter with Kuwait, for the sake of harbouring the Muslim Brotherhood. Without entering into details, just imagine the bank deposits of wealthy Saudis and Kuwaiti nationals and Emiratis in British banks. A few months ago, British Prime Minister David Cameron inaugurated a conference in London on Islamic finance. In his opening speech, he said that his government wants to turn London into the international capital of Islamic finance. But from where does the bulk of money under this heading come from, if not from the Arab Gulf region?
Summer is approaching, and with Cairo and Beirut closed for security reasons for wealthy and spendthrift tourists from the Gulf, the city of London cannot afford to lose them to other destinations in Asia or Southern Europe. We are speaking of hundreds of millions of dollars spent in a period that will not exceed two months. The tourist season in London will be considered dead without the largesse of Gulf tourists in upscale London hotels and department stores.
Aside from financial and economic reasons, the British government had to align itself with the emerging alliances in the Arab world — particularly the alliance between Egypt, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other hand. If Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi wins the next presidential elections this alliance will become a solid rock in Arab and Middle Eastern politics that no foreign power can ignore. Britain as well as the United States will have to realign its position, one way or another, with that of those three countries with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood.
This expected repositioning of London vis-à-vis the Brotherhood is a far cry from the tolerance it has shown this organisation since its establishment in 1928. This tolerance had served Britain's strategic interests in Egypt and the Middle East for a long time, but the rules of the game are rapidly changing, and London has to accommodate the new alliances in the Arab world that are expected to outlast the Muslim Brotherhood in the long term. This is probably the reason why one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe warned on 5 April the British government against taking a decision to ban the Brotherhood lest it would face a wave of terrorism. If blackmail has a name, this is it. Of course, his warning is not only addressed to the British government, but to other Western powers. In the event — if unlikely — of Britain declaring the Brotherhood a terrorist organisation, that would set in motion similar decisions by other European governments. Moreover, the warning is intended to solicit intervention on the part of the US administration to persuade the British government not to make a decision that would subject the West to the wrath of the terrorist groups that have risen from within the Brotherhood in the last five decades, including Al-Qaeda.
What is the range of options available to the British government after the official review of the Brotherhood activities is scheduled to reach its conclusion in July? Let me start by the most unlikely, which is banning the Brotherhood. I believe that the British government would not go that far as long as the United States is still working with the Muslim Brotherhood. So a complete ban is not in the cards for the short and medium terms. The other available option is to let the leaders of the organisation stay in Britain but not get involved in overt campaigns to destabilise regimes in the Arab world — nor to incite terror acts in some Arab capitals. The third option would be to not grant political asylum or residency permits for prominent Muslim Brotherhood figures staying in Doha after they fled Egypt. The fourth option will be to ask the Brotherhood to scale down its presence in London and keep a low profile for the foreseeable future until the situation in Egypt stabilises. In this respect, it should not be lost on observers that the conclusion of the review is timed with the completion of the roadmap to the future in Egypt. Maybe that would pave the way for a certain understanding with the Brotherhood in Cairo that would contribute to the end of acts of terror in Egypt.
Whatever the British decision will be, one fact remains, and that is the heyday of political Islam is coming to an end and the West has to reconsider its position vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood. Hopefully, its history and the mayhem it has caused — in Egypt and elsewhere — will persuade the West out of dealing with it as a democratic force or a positive force in establishing sustainable democratic regimes across the Arab world. The writer is former assistant to the foreign minister.
