In a few weeks, US President Barack Obama will visit Saudi Arabia to hold talks with the Custodian of the Holy Shrines, King Abdullah, on a range of regional and Arab questions that have seen growing disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the United States in the last three years, ever since the Arab world and the Middle East witnessed upheavals and uprisings in the name of democracy and human rights. For the last six decades, Saudi-American relations — some would say alliance — stood the test of time, during the Cold War years and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Saudi Arabia had been a staunch backer of Washington in the New World Order that emerged after the fall of the former Soviet Union and the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991. For both countries, their alliance has served their strategic interests well, and their almost identical positions on regional and Arab issues — for example the Middle East peace process and Gulf security — have been the bedrock of a quasi stability in the region. However, things have been changing during the last three years to the extent that there are questions, today, on the future of Saudi-American relations in a rapidly changing regional landscape. Friction and tension began with the way Washington had dealt with the Egyptian uprising in early 2011, and later on with the way the Obama administration managed the situation in Egypt after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood from the favour of the Egyptian people. The way the United States had dealt with former president Hosni Mubarak in the three weeks leading to 11 February 2011 sent shockwaves across the Gulf, with the exception of Qatar who has sided with American positions all along, not only in the context of developments in Egypt, but also on a range of issues whose outcome, whatever it will be, will determine the future of the Arab world, and the Middle East, for decades to come. The other issue that has raised questions in Saudi Arabia about American policies in the region is Syria. Till last September, Saudi and American positions on the future of President Bashar Al-Assad were identical. The two sides were of the opinion that he had to go, and the two provided full support to the opposition, called moderate. Saudi Arabia welcomed the strong stand by the Obama administration against Damascus after the use of chemical weapons last August in Syria. The Saudis and the Americans had accused the Syrian army of committing the crime, and the Saudi government welcomed American threats against the Syrian army with the hope that it would be accompanied by coordinated attacks on the ground with the aim of bringing down the Syrian regime. The big shock to the Saudis came with the US-Russian Framework Agreement on the disarmament of the Syrian arsenal of chemical weapons. This agreement made the Saudis question the true aims of American diplomacy in Syria. It also raised questions on the consistency of American foreign policy in the Middle East. The third area of tension is the Palestinian question, and the American draft Framework Agreement that is being negotiated between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government. One basic element in this draft is the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, which means no right of return for Palestinian refugees as stipulated in various resolutions by the United Nations. The fourth and most crucial issue is Iran, and American and Western attitudes towards the future role of Iran in the Middle East and the Gulf once the Iranian nuclear question is settled. The interim accord between the P5+1 (the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) and Iran last November, and the warm reception afforded to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in the West after his election last year, raised alarm bells in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries concerning the future role of Iran in a new Middle East. From a Gulf standpoint, the question is legitimate. Supposing the interim agreement will lead to an accord between the P5+1 and Iran before the resolution of other pressing regional issues, like the situation in Syria and its ramifications in Lebanon, in which Iran is a principal protagonist in a face-off with Saudi Arabia, would the West be open to normalise relations with Iran at the expense of Saudi and Arab interests? Contacts between the US administration and the Muslim Brotherhood despite the decision by Egypt last December to consider it a terrorist organisation raise questions on the finality of American foreign policy in the Middle East and, ultimately, in the Gulf. One big question, from a Saudi perspective, is the position of the United States government vis-à-vis Egypt under a possible presidency of Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi in case he wins the next presidential elections before next summer. In other words, will the United States keep working in close relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Egypt as before the departure of former president Mubarak from power, or will the United States replace Egypt by Iran under Rouhani once there is a final agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme? Put differently, will Washington come up with a revised version of its twin-pillar strategy of the 1970s when it depended on both Saudi Arabia and Tehran to defend the security and stability of the Gulf and to meet threats from the north? Back then Egypt was out of the equation. Today, Saudi Arabia would like to know what place Egypt has in the emerging Middle East if Egyptians elect Al-Sisi as their next president. During the course of this month, Saudi Arabia — whether unilaterally or with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain — took decisions that were timed before the visit of the US president to Saudi Arabia. The most telling was the decision to consider the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation with other five extremist groups, like Al-Qaeda, for instance. The other decision was the recall of the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors to Doha in protest against the meddling of Qatar in the internal affairs of other Gulf countries and its acceptance of opposition leaders from these countries who undermine the security of their respective governments. This move is unprecedented in the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It goes to show the gravity of the situation that Qatar chose not to escalate and denied there are differences of opinion regarding relations among Gulf countries. Many observers took this to mean that the real differences revolve around the situation in Egypt after 30 June 2013. Put differently, the major differences centre on the role of political Islam in the new Middle East and the Gulf. The answer in Doha is obvious, and it comes within an alliance that stretches from Washington to Ankara and Doha, in face of a new realignment of Arab and Gulf countries that extends from Cairo to Riyadh, passing through Manama and Abu Dhabi. In reaction to the recall of the three ambassadors from the Qatari capital, the US State Department said that the US administration is willing to mediate between Riyadh and Doha. The question in this respect is on what ground would Washington mediate if such mediation were accepted? I personally believe that any mediation will fail if it does not address the root causes of the growing disagreements between two opposing camps in the Middle East. The one, backed by the West, believes that the future in this part of the world is in the hands of political Islam; the other wants more open and plural societies and regimes in the Middle East, disengaged from Western plans and visions. Against this backdrop, it will not be a surprise if the Obama visit will be short on concrete results and long on promises and assurances. The writer is former assistant to the foreign minister.
