On Sunday 27 October 2013, Abyei held a referendum that could at best complicate the efforts for peace, and at worst lead to a conflagration of animosities. Only members of the Dinka Ngok tribe, which organised the vote, took part. And, not unexpectedly, they voted unanimously on merger with South Sudan. But not even Juba took that bait. The governments of Sudan and South Sudan boycotted the referendum and called it illegal. So did the African Union (AU), which is the chief mediator in the Abyei conflict. The referendum was also boycotted by the Arab Misseriya tribe, which depends on Abyei grassland for cattle grazing. The Misseriya, if asked, would vote overwhelmingly in the other direction; namely for unity with Sudan. Angered by the largely symbolic, but brazenly unilateral move, the Misseriya threatened war, its officials claiming they can raise 30,000 men to invade Abyei. It was interesting to see Khartoum and Juba take a unified stand on this particular move, despite all their political differences and mutual suspicions on other matters. Ignoring both Juba and Khartoum's reservations, the Dinka Ngok staged massive rallies to celebrate its presumed unity with South Sudan. Juba hasn't tried to make political capital of the one-sided referendum, but one cannot rule out that it may try to use it as a bargaining chip in future talks. Juba and Khartoum are trying to steer away from hostilities for the moment, mainly because the governments of Omar Al-Bashir and Salva Kiir have their hands full at home. In fact, the referendum in Abyei wasn't so much meant to antagonise Khartoum as it was meant to undermine Kiir's power at home — by portraying him as not doing enough to defend the rights of southerners. There is enough wealth in Abyei to satisfy the northern and southern populations of the region. But so far, layers of political rivalries block chances for a solution. The peace agreement signed by Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 2005 endorsed the 1956 borders, which place Abyei within the northern zone. And yet, the two sides agreed to allow the region's inhabitants to decide on its future through a referendum. Arrangements for the referendum stalled as disputes surfaced over whom was entitled to vote. Instead of the referendum undermining the authority of Kiir, who edged some of his Dinka Ngok rivals from power in a government reshuffle in July 2013, the referendum added to his political weight. And the international and regional disapproval of the vote subtracted from the political capital of his opponents in the SPLM, including Deng Alor, Luka Biong and Edward Lino. It is hard to see peace returning to Abyei except through a mutually acceptable arrangement between the Dinka Ngok and the Misseriya. This is not as far-fetched a prospect as international officials, including mediators, sometimes make it to be. The two tribes have coexisted in relative peace for centuries, for even occasional disputes over grazing rights were never so difficult to resolve. The problems escalated when Abyei gained international attention as an oil-rich area. And the current stalemate on Abyei is less motivated by differences among tribes than the rival ambitions of politicians living outside the region. It was not inconceivable for the Abyei region to act as a bridge between Sudan and South Sudan, for this is exactly the role this region historically assumed. But international mediators don't seem to understand this point. This is why every solution they came up with managed to alienate the locals rather than further mutual understanding. For example, AU mediators once suggested splitting the area into two equal parts. And the arbiters of the International Court of Justice, too, spent much time focussing on the revenue that the region can generate, rather than paying attention to the subtleties of local life. Money and oil revenues can be split in half, no doubt. But things such as grazing rights and access to water are indivisible. This is why the Misseriya and the Dinka Ngok will have to talk shop rather than get bogged down in international politics. The oil of Abyei will run out one day, some say in five years, or perhaps less. But issues of water, grazing and the need of the population to move freely will never end. Juba and Khartoum have been open to suggestions. They worked closely with the AU technical team delineating the borders, and they held consultations with the joint investigation committee on Abyei. But so far, mediation invariably reached a dead end, including a recent proposal by mediators to give Khartoum 40 per cent of Abyei and give Juba the remaining 60 per cent. With politicians in Khartoum and Juba desperate to find a deal, not only to save the economy of their respective countries, but also to save their own political skins, there is a chance that the next round of mediation may meet less obstacles than those in the past. UN and US mediators are already making the rounds, hoping to come up with a solution. But a solution that neglects the concerns and lifestyle of local tribes would be hard to enforce.
