When President Omar Al-Bashir travelled to Juba, 22 October 2013, observers took note. This was his fourth visit to the capital of South Sudan since the latter gained independence in July 2011, and one conducted almost under duress. But Al-Bashir's gesture was eagerly welcomed by his southern counterpart, Salva Kiir, who had been in Khartoum only a few weeks earlier. The two leaders, beleaguered at home, challenged by powerful opponents, and tackling nearly insurmountable economic difficulties, seem to have come to the belated conclusion that friendship may hold more promise than the recurring animosity of the recent past. Their motives for friendship cannot be clearer. In Juba, Kiir has been caught in a power game that forced him into a high-stakes sacking of iconic heavyweights, such as Riek Machar, his former vice president, Pagan Amum, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) secretary-general, and Deng Alor, the former foreign minister. In Khartoum, Al-Bashir is clearly fighting for dear life. Not only is his government buffeted by the usual disturbances in Darfur, the Blue Nile, and South Kordofan; and not only is he confronted by a determined coalition of rebels from these areas — the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, which he doesn't seem to be able to intimidate or co-opt; but recently he was challenged by this now familiar spectre: a nation taking to the streets to demand his ouster. The recent riots, triggered by the government's removal of subsidies on fuel, are just another symptom of the multi-faceted malaise that Al-Bashir doesn't seem able to banish. In Juba, Kiir continues to face unprecedented opposition from former allies for the 2015 presidential elections. Riek Machar, a powerful figure within the SPLM, said that he would run for election. And the Dinka Ngok tribe are desperately trying to hold on to Abyei. To survive, the two leaders will have to introduce economic reforms leading to a palpable improvement in living conditions. Both are short on cash. A deal over Abyei and oil would be a godsend for Al-Bashir and Kiir, but can they pull it off? This doesn't seem likely, given the intensity of the tribal rivalry in this oil-rich region. With the Dinka Ngok determined to keep the region within the borders of South Sudan, and the Misseriya Arab tribes, which use the region to graze their cattle, opposed to the idea, the whole Abyei issue, long mediated by international and African officials, including such top-notch dignitaries as Thabo Mbeki, doesn't seem to be approaching settlement. In fact, Dinka Ngok members totally ignored the fact that the African Union (AU) has decided not to hold the referendum on Abyei, due this month, and went ahead with their own one-sided referendum. Even Juba, which encouraged its Dinka Ngok employees to vote, now admits that this is not going to be helpful. South Sudanese Information Minister Michael Makuei recently said that it would be impossible to hold Abyei's referendum in October, regardless of the cost. Now, Juba maintains that the only solution to Abyei's problem will have to come through the good offices of the AU. So far, African and international mediators have failed to get Khartoum to agree to the referendum, and Khartoum, which keeps sending its diplomats to plead with UN Security Council members against the idea, is not in a mood to allow a referendum to go through. So what is left for the two leaders to discuss? Clearly, Khartoum and Juba have a common interest in cooperation in the short run. And the two leaders may try to find a way of not stepping on each other's toes while sorting out their respective oppositions at home. But unless they fix the economy, which means getting a deal on Abyei off the ground, they may not have the resources to stay in office for long. In an attempt to break the deadlock over Abyei, Washington sent a high-level emissary, Donald Booth, to try to help Juba and Khartoum come up with a formula to settle the issue of Abyei. International mediation may have failed in the past, but with both Khartoum and Juba unable to sort out this issue on their own, emissaries from Africa and the UN are likely to continue their efforts to narrow the differences between Sudan and South Sudan. Al-Bashir doesn't seem averse to talking, but he is unlikely to gamble the future of 900,000 of the Misseriya tribe by agreeing to a referendum that may stir more domestic opposition. Similarly, Kiir is not in a position to alienate the Dinka Ngok at a time when his circle of friends seems to be narrowing. In short, the newly found friendship between the strongmen of Khartoum and Juba may be a lovely idea, but it is unlikely to bring about the peace and prosperity their nations have been waiting for.
