Little of sustenance, writes Abdallah El-Ashaal*, resulted from the Sharm El-Sheikh conference on Iraq The Sharm El-Sheikh conference held 3-4 May 2007 had two different purposes. One was to boost national reconciliation and reconstruction programmes. The other was to sort out the relations between Iraq and its neighbours. Participants ended up promising Iraq over $30 billion dollars for reconstruction and forgiving most of its foreign debts. Analysts were divided about the conference, with some arguing that it was a face-saving event for the Americans, and others saying that some good may come out of it for the Iraqis. The first group of analysts point out that the conference aimed to sort out the problems in Iraq in a way that would allow the US to maintain its presence in Iraq. The US administration is still pretending to be proud of its policy in Iraq. Some officials call Iraq the greatest US achievement since Japan. A despot has been removed, and it is only a matter of time before democracy lends itself to peace and prosperity, we're told. Critics of the Sharm El-Sheikh conference argue that it was an exercise in damage control, one in which the real ailments of Iraq were never addressed. The conference lent a hand of support to the Maliki government in return for promises of the same. But what do promises from a government that is incapable of surviving on its own mean? Iran cast a shadow over the conference. The Americans allowed the Iranians to become powerful in Iraq. Now Washington needs Tehran's help, but is too proud to ask. The conference called on Iran and Iraq's neighbouring states to stop backing the Iraqi resistance, or "terrorist groups" as they were referred to. But neighbouring countries, including Iran, are convinced that resistance will get the US out of Iraq. Should these countries stop supporting the resistance, the US would remain in Iraq and the Americans would be in a position to control the region, including neighbouring countries. So far this is a classic standoff. With prompting from the US, the conference forgave Iraq's debts. But some analysts argue that debt forgiveness will only bolster the incumbent regime and allow corruption to continue. Iraq should only be forgiven its debts when a non-sectarian government is in power. So what about national reconciliation? Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa suggested that the Iraqi resistance should be integrated into the political process and that the Iraqi government should stop supporting death squads. His suggestion didn't appeal to Iraqi or US officials. Fortunately, various Arab countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, backed Moussa's demands. Some went as far as demanding a timetable for US withdrawal, which was refreshingly brave. Supporters of the conference argue that it was not devoid of merit. For the first time, the entire international community -- 60 countries included -- gathered to address the tribulations of Iraq. Unfortunately, no one had the courage to address the real causes of Iraq's problems, which gave the conference a gloss of wishful thinking. Still, the conference gave the Iraqi government opportunity to prove its seriousness. Nonetheless, the conference should have devised a plan to follow up on promises made by the Iraqi government. Unfortunately, no one pointed that out. The conference provided an occasion for sideline discussions, especially between the US and Syria. But the Americans didn't seem willing to discuss things with the Iranians out in the open. And the Iranians were not open to making the first move. Some analysts had expected something to happen on the Iranian front. Some even argued that the whole conference was a diversion tactic designed to give the Americans and Iranians a chance to meet. The reasoning behind that argument is that the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended talks with Iranians and the Syrians. A while ago, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi went to Syria, despite strong opposition from the White House, and some say she is contemplating a visit to Tehran. Still, the US administration seems to be in two minds. The situation in Iraq is quite delicate, as domestic tensions assume a life of their own. But the core problem remains that of the US military presence. Some analysts point out that the incumbent government, sectarian as it is, may be able to forge ahead with national reconciliation. But how long will it be before the Iraqi government heeds Moussa's advice? The Sharm El-Sheikh conference was a mixed bag of promises and reservations. Has it offered Iraq a way out of its dilemma? I, for one, don't think so. There is no guarantee that the promises made by the government would be implemented. Besides, the conference gave the world the impression that national reconciliation is possible, even while the Americans are still in the country, and even as the resistance is still being called an insurgency. Iraq is still poised on the brink of disaster. Should the Sunnis pull out of the government, the prospects for national reconciliation would evaporate. And Sharm El-Sheikh would soon be forgotten. * The writer is former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.
