In Sharm El-Sheikh, Dina Ezzat saw little evidence that the latest regional and international conference on Iraq will help end the Iraqi crisis Last week, Egypt hosted two consecutive meetings on Iraq: the first for members of the International Compact with Iraq, an international mechanism ostensibly concerned with restructuring and reconstructing Iraq; the second a meeting of Iraq's neighbours, Egypt, Bahrain, the G8 and five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The US and Iran -- currently the most influential state players in Iraq -- were present in both meetings. It was hoped that such joint participation would allow US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Iranian counterpart Manouchehr Mottaki to meet. That this didn't happen, despite the diplomatic fanfare and much speculation, was indicative of the failure of the two gatherings overall to address the core issues that have pulled Iraq towards the brink of civil war, particularly US military presence and the moribund Iraqi "political process". Before arriving in Sharm El-Sheikh, Rice had indicated that she "would not exclude" a meeting with Mottaki but "did not chase it" when there. The Iraqi government delegation billed the meeting as potentially important in reducing violence in Iraq. Iranian sources participating in the gatherings said the US "did not directly come with an upfront request for a meeting", and that they were not planning on pursuing such a request. During the two-day conference, American delegates were secretive on the possibility of a meeting. In consecutive press conferences, Rice said the meeting did not take place because "the opportunity did not rise," while Mottaki said there were "certain requirements for [such] a meeting [to take place]. First, the political will on both sides [to resolve differences]. Second, we should be clear about what we are going to discuss. Third we should be clear about the outcome." For Mottaki, "such a meeting should be substantive and not theatrical." Diplomats surmised that the US is willing to talk to Iran on Iraq and take into account Iranian views, but it is not going to link any such dialogue -- at least not directly and not immediately -- to its stand on Iran's contentious nuclear programme. On the other hand, the Iranians sought to underline that candid discussion would be inevitable, were any high-level meeting to occur, on all aspects of US-Iranian bilateral relations, including the nuclear issue and US short and long term military designs in the Gulf region and Iraq in particular. Gentle but firm efforts by Egypt to set the stage for a Rice- Mottaki meeting were shrugged off by the Iranian foreign minister who declined to exchange social niceties over lunch with his US counterpart and who chose to exit an official dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit after making a fuss over the dress of a female musician entertaining the dignitaries. "It was very obvious that while the Americans were willing to sit and talk, the Iranians were not forthcoming," commented one Arab diplomat who asked for his name and nationality to be withheld. A possible Rice-Mottaki meeting was given so much airtime because the Americans want to end what they qualify as terrorism in Iraq conducted by militant groups supported by Iran, though they are not willing to discuss tentative dates for their departure from Iraq. Iranian inclinations were far different, however, as Mottaki made clear in his speech to the "Iraq neighbours plus G8 plus P5" meeting, referring to an "axis of occupation- terrorism" and underlining that, "the US must accept the responsibilities arising from the occupation of Iraq and should not finger-point or put the blame on others in an irresponsible attempt to escape [those responsibilities]." So instead of a high-level and potentially incendiary meeting, Rice and Mottaki, responding to a Saudi-Egyptian proposal, designated aides to talk privately. Not much came out of that meeting, sources say, except for a demand made by Iran that Iranian diplomats held by US forces in the Kurdish zone in northern Iraq be released in return for some security cooperation in Baghdad. Iraqi delegates lamented that this meeting did not enhance the level of US-Iranian contact already existing before Sharm El-Sheikh's weekend gathering. "The Americans and Iranians are fighting their own bloody war in Iraq, and it is Iraqis who die, and it is the Iraqi government who is being blamed," said a senior Iraqi official while taking part in the proceedings. Another meeting that proved tough to set up was one between Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, widely perceived in the Arab world as sectarian in orientation and set against Sunnis. According to Saudi and other Arab officials, it is not just Faisal who questions the intentions of Maliki to act in good faith on behalf of all Iraqis. In the words of one senior Arab diplomat, "Maliki has yet to act on his many promises made to many Arab capitals to curb the actions of Shia militias against the Sunni population." Indeed, despite the exchange of niceties in Sharm El-Sheikh, many Arab ministers expressed concern about Maliki's ability, or his will, to contain sectarianism. It is this scepticism, sources say, that prompted many Arab delegations to insist that the documents adopted in the gatherings make the financial and political support of the international community conditional on the Iraq government taking firm action to end current pro-Shia bias on many fronts -- especially in the constitution -- and to reign-in Shia militias. Officials stressed that they were not marking out Shias in Iraq as devils and Sunnis as angels, but they were qualifying the Maliki government as pro-Shia. This mistrust between Arab delegations and the Iraqi government was manifest in their failure to agree on a cohesive mechanism for Iraqi reconciliation. While Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa proposed the resumption of the reconciliation process started by the League two years ago (and which was interrupted by escalating sectarian strife), Ali Al-Dabbagh, spokesman for the Iraqi government, insisted that "the Iraqi government is working already on a reconciliation process, and we think that the Iraqi government is capable of handling reconciliation, and that Baghdad is the venue for this to be pursued." This stand by Dabbagh was seen by some Arab sources -- in and out of the Arab League -- as an attempt to evade handing the reconciliation process to an independent body. According to some Arab sources, the general air of Arab scepticism about Maliki is slowly but surely seeping through to Rice, who was not defending Maliki as robustly as she did just a couple of months ago. Indeed, in her press conference, Rice indicated that by September she expects to see progress made by the government of Maliki. By then, "we should have a better vision of how they are doing," she said, though she insisted that the US "wouldn't put everything on September either." Though disappointing on Iraq, the Sharm El-Sheikh gatherings saw the first meeting in two years of the US and Syrian foreign ministers, orchestrated with much encouragement by Egypt. Rice's meeting with counterpart Walid Al-Moalem, according to one senior source, was "fairly friendly and indicated the will of both sides to start a process in motion. This process of consultations, which should cover all aspects of US- Syrian bilateral relations, would be coupled with closer cooperation on Iraq." In her press conference, Rice conveyed a similar understanding, though -- and to the interest of a worried Lebanese government -- she insisted that her meeting with Moalem focussed solely on Iraq. "We do not mind if Syria and the US talk. We encourage reconciliation, but we just want to make sure that no agreements between any two countries would be made at the expense of Lebanon or its sovereignty," said Marwan Hemadeh, Lebanese communications minister, following talks in Cairo with Moussa less than 24 hours after the Moalem-Rice meeting. The Lebanese fear that in the pipeline of an American-Syrian accord on reducing the support extended by Damascus to militants acting against US forces in Iraq would be a reduction of US pressure on Syria in relation to the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the suspected killers of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. Informed Arab and Iraqi sources say, however, that the meeting of Rice and Moalem was not that conclusive. In the view of one senior Iraqi official, it was more an exchange of good will that will be tested by the reduction of support offered by Damascus to militants in Iraq. As host of the two gatherings, Egypt accepts that the Sharm El-Sheikh meetings did not necessarily put in motion a process of reconciliation or open the way to end violence and the occupation in Iraq. These meetings were not expected to, Egyptian officials argue. According to Foreign Minister Abul-Gheit, however, the documents adopted by the meetings established in an unequivocal language growing regional and international understanding that military- security schemes cannot alone bring an end to the Iraqi crisis; that an all- inclusive process of reconciliation needs to start, and that without achieving reconciliation reconstruction and economic reform will be illusive. As both Moussa and UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-Moon said in press statements, all participants felt a vested interest in working towards ending the current crisis in Iraq.
