Egypt's now-ruling military council facilitated the resignation of Egypt's 30-year president earlier this year to protect its own interests, according to TIME magazine's Tony Karon. In a blog post yesterday, Karon acknowledged that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – in charge of Egypt's administration since February – sees Turkey, with its pluralistic democracy, as a model for Egypt. However, he suggests that rather than modern Turkey, the SCAF generals “are guided by their own Turkish model, of an earlier era - a military autonomous of civilian political control, claiming veto power over the democratic process and intervening at will as self-appointed guardian of secularism and the national interest.” One slogan which filled the air in Cairo's Tahrir Square and other squares across Egypt during the January 25 Revolution – “The Army and the people are one hand” – “was wishful thinking rather than a statement of fact,” according to Karon. He argues that the military has been the foundation of Egypt's political regime since the 1952 Revolution – alternately termed a military coup. Each of Egypt's four presidents since 1952 has been a military leader. Karon argues that quelling the popular revolts that brought millions of Egyptians to the streets was necessary for the military to protect its own interests, including its stake in the Egyptian economy, U.S. military aid and “the legitimacy required for it to play its central role in society.” The military requires stability, wrote Karon, and stability had become impossible while Hosni Mubarak remained in power, hence the military's decision to facilitate Mubarak's resignation. Karon says many generals also welcomed the opportunity to ensure Mubarak's younger son, Gamal, would not inherit power over a “military elder.” Karon also says the decision to delay parliamentary elections from September to November indicates that “no smart money should bet on the election being held before next year,” despite the fact that the majority of Egypt's political forces – with the notable exception of its Islamist groups –have insisted elections be delayed. He notes, however, that none of Egypt's political forces, from Islamists to liberals, “are willing to see the army have the same power over Egypt's elected government as the authority claimed by unelected clerics in Iran over that country's parliament and presidency.” Finally, Karon correctly states what the Egyptians who continue to gather in Tahrir and across Egypt have insisted for months: “Rather than its denouement… Mubarak's ouster in February [was] simply the first act of the Egyptian revolution.”
