Since Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert shelved his unilateral withdrawal, or "convergence plan for the West Bank, his government has had no political agenda at all for dealing with the Palestinian issue. Between the weakness displayed by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the escalating military activity in Gaza brought on by Hamas' arms buildup and aggression, it is not easy to conceive of such an agenda. Yet a total political vacuum between Palestinians and Israelis is extremely dangerous. Not only does it advance the arguments of extremists on both sides, but in the post-Lebanon war era it also disappoints Israel's moderate Arab neighbors and friends in the West who seek to make common cause against Iran, yet need to point to some sort of political momentum that reflects Israeli goodwill toward the Palestinians. A few on the Israeli left continue to argue that comprehensive peace negotiations with Abbas are possible and desirable right now. Most Israelis, this writer included, accept that the gaps are too great and the leadership (on both sides) too weak. That leaves interim measures. Their advantage for Israel is that, logically, the concessions such measures require of it in terms of land and authority should be politically more tolerable for the Olmert government, while they might serve as a vehicle for moderating Palestinian positions and building confidence. Palestinians, for their part, would be required to make fewer (if any) concessions as part of an interim agreement, but would have to postpone realization of at least a portion of their ultimate goals and rely on assurances that an interim achievement would not close the door on an eventual comprehensive deal. Current Israeli-Palestinian political realities point to two conceivable interim directions. Neither appears particularly promising. Yet cautiously probing them is better than doing nothing. A deal done with Abbas, which would be designed to strengthen his position and authority, could involve Israeli territorial concessions in the West Bank and be legitimized as "road map phase II (a Palestinian state with temporary borders) or even the second further redeployment of the 1998 Wye agreement. The problems with this approach are manifold. After this summer's war in Lebanon and Gaza discredited Israel's unilateral withdrawals, it will not pull out of additional Palestinian territory where security cannot be guaranteed by a reliable force. Yet Abbas is not currently capable of fielding such a force, and deployment of an international force would constitute a radical and risky departure. Nor will Palestinians easily agree to declare a "temporary state without adequate guarantees for the future, although an increasing number of moderate Palestinians are apparently prepared to consider this avenue for lack of anything better. An alternative interim approach would involve Hamas. That movement's spokesmen have in recent weeks sought to present the idea for a temporary but long-term ceasefire, or truce, as an attractive option for Israel given the current impossibility of engaging in final-status negotiations. They hint that a prolonged ceasefire could even eventually pave the way for a more permanent relationship. Here the problems are different. It is assumed that Hamas could indeed enforce a truce more effectively than Abbas could ensure security. But in order to negotiate such a deal, Israel would have to abandon or modify its (and the Quartet's) three conditions for entering into contact with Hamas: the movement's recognition of Israel, its acceptance of past agreements, and an end to violence. It would also, effectively, have to abandon Abbas, if only to allow Hamas to enforce a ceasefire in the West Bank as well as Gaza. This would require problematic coordination with the Quartet, and particularly the United States. It would also almost certainly strengthen the grip of a militant Islamist movement on Palestine. Moreover, Hamas' recent overtures regarding a truce have carefully avoided mention of its own conditions. Judging from past discussion of this option by Hamas, these are totally unacceptable to Israel: Hamas appears to insist that Israel accept the 1967 borders and a comprehensive refugee right of return as a quid pro quo for a 10-year ceasefire. This is more than Fatah demands in return for comprehensive peace and a two-state solution, and is hardly compatible with the interim nature of the Hamas approach. Nor does a truce apparently require that Hamas abandon its militant Islamist creed, which rejects Israel's right to exist. Still, these are Israeli suppositions about Hamas' position. Conceivably they could be clarified in informal talks, where Hamas might show enough flexibility to make it worth entering into more formal discussions. Abbas is too weak to pull his and Fatah's weight in an attractive interim deal on the West Bank, while Hamas is too extreme to be a candidate for an alternative interim deal. Yet, in the absence of better alternatives, these avenues of political movement are worth further investigation. Yossi Alpher was director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and was senior adviser to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This commentary is taken from bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter that publishes contending views of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
