There may be no nation that has talked as much about reform as Egypt while remaining unchanged. Although everyone here talks about reform, no one ever attempts it. As a result, we have become a country trapped in a vicious cycle for nearly 30 years with no hope for change. To make matters worse for is the fact that Egypt exists within an ideal regional climate for development and democracy. War with Israel ended 36 years ago and Egypt signed a peace treaty more than 30 years ago. During this period, countries such as Malaysia, Korea, Turkey, India, and many countries in Latin America, have made progress while we remain unparalleled in our stagnation. When Al-Masry Al-Youm's Chief Editor Magdy el-Gallad spoke with the eminent journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal last week, they opened up a new chapter in the heated debate about reform in Egypt. The interview should be viewed as a conversation of historical importance, prepared with great skill. If Heikal's words are heeded, they will change the face of Egypt. Perhaps the main idea put forward by Heikal that aroused controversy was his proposal to form a "Board of Trustees of the State and the Constitution," consisting of 12 public figures. Heikal went as far as to suggest seven members for the board, which he said should be placed under the supervision of the president and the armed forces.
As usual, there were many reactions that insolently attacked Heikal. These did not address the issues he raised or even speak against them. This is unacceptable given Heikal's age and status. There were other reactions saying that Heikal had raised these same ideas previously and merely spoke about meaningless procedural matters. However Heikal's suggestions were not intended to take concrete measures, rather to suggest a means of implementing political reform. Heikal put forward names for the board of trustees including Amr Moussa, Omar Suleiman, Mansour Hassan, Hazem el-Beblawi, all of whom can be described as reform-minded and respected. Some of these names are close to the government and some are not, which means that Heikal is not suggesting a "revolutionary" alternative. Also, the supervision of this process by the president and the army indicates we are discussing a reform from within, supported by internationally renowned names who are not opposed to the regime and not at odds with the state, such as Ahmed Zewail, Mohamed ElBaradei and Magdi Yacoub. These men are among the 280,000 best Egyptian minds but they have been forced to move abroad due to bureaucracy and inefficiency. Heikal has even floated the idea of a new ministry to be headed by Rachid Mohammed Rachid or Youssef Boutros-Ghali. Both men are considered right-wing, which would reassure the business sector. This means there is no intention to overthrow the existing conditions. The goal is to fix them. Another public debate has been provoked when Dina Suleiman interviewed Arab League Secretary General and former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. People got the impression from Moussa's statement that he may possibly run for president. This, too, proved that there is tendency among the public to support names that already enjoy credibility from inside the regime. Moussa has this credibility, as well as massive public approval. He is also one of the names nominated by Heikal for the proposed board of trustees. Finally, it is worth noting that Hekial did not select any figures from the opposition or the new protest movements for his proposed board, despite his respect for them. He eventually made up his mind and concluded that change will come from within the regime and with agreement from the president and other national leaders.
Here, Egypt will actually face a dilemma over who will dare to call for re-arranging the house from inside. Who are these reformers within the state who are willing to "take a scalpel" and "start a surgery" for the reform of this country without demolishing the system or defaming the government? Do these reformers exist or are they just in our imagination? The real challenge lies in the ability of these reformers to change governance and persuade the president to accept reform. This difficult task is further complicated by the fact that President Mubarak does not see that the country is in crisis and that he managed to stay in power for 28 years without any major threats. Furthermore, President Mubarak has a large security force that could suppress any movement opposing him. The president is from a background that sees political action is part of professional commitment and views Egypt's problems as best resolved "day to day." Therefore, he is not expected to accept these proposals, or even listen to them. The regime has two possible plans. It can either nominate the current president for a sixth term or attempt to pass the presidency on to the president's son. But could either plan take into account a third alternative, one that includes Heikal's suggestions? Moreover, what tools does the regime have to implement any of those plans? The Egyptian regime and the Egyptian state include thousands of people who want to reform the conditions of the country. Many of these reform-minded individuals took up ministerial posts, but a large number of them are not willing to even take part in dialogue on reform.
When Magdy el-Gallad asked me in a phone call to open the "future dialogue," I was in Paris to attend the annual conference of the Center for Political and Security Studies. Among the participants was former Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Maher. As usual, Maher's presence was prominent and influential due to his straightforwardness and broad cultural experience. When I asked the former minister to write in this dialogue on the future, he declined apologetically, although he says he agrees with what I and others write about the challenges facing Egypt. But Maher reiterated in an interview that he "loves President Mubarak." His loyalty to the president in public is the same in secret. This is real and worthy of respect. Participation in a dialogue about Egypt's future is not conditional on hatred of President Mubarak. On the contrary, those who love the president are most needed to take part in the dialogue and are most capable of influencing its course. What is required is not confronting the president, but drawing attention to the need for change, particularly a change in which order is maintained, the trend of long governance is corrected, and the disaster of the inheritance of power is blocked. Another important incident occurred in the dialogue following the iftar banquet held by Al-Masry Al-Youm during Ramadan last month. Some 30 people, including officials, former ministers, journalists, writers and literary figures took part in the dialogue. When this greatly "gentle" and "reform-minded" small group moved to talk about the future of the country, a minister peculiarly excused himself from the meeting. The man is known for his honesty, integrity, and professionalism and he was removed from office in an incomprehensible cabinet reshuffle. Nonetheless, he could not sit in a meeting to chat about the future of this country. There are reformists in the regime and the even in the National Democratic Party. However, the system of which they are part doesn't allow most of them to even discuss ideas like asking the president to take some rest by not running for reelection. And so the scenario of persuading the president to step down is almost impossible. The possibility of pressuring the president and the tight circle around him requires certain conditions that have not yet met, because the new protest movements aren't yet part of the political equation. They do, however, influence the political equation, even if indirectly, by pressuring the current regime and accusing the inheritance group of being responsible for the deterioration of standards of living. The crisis of the Egyptian political elite can be best viewed in light of its response to Heikal's propositions. The response of a large sector of the elite to any reform initiative, whether from the regime or not, is the most serious risk we face. We tend to lose focus on the main objective as we get involved in smaller, less important battles. We have a problem with anyone who takes initiative in this country, whatever his name or position. There is a state of unprecedented apathy as the regime has succeeded in deflecting the elite's attention toward minor issues. Debates over the future of a nation threatened with chaos and witnessing a state of social, ethical, professional, and political decline don't seem to be getting the attention of many. A sectarian incident, or a demand put forward by a certain category of people, or even a soccer match, on the other hand, seem garner the attention of thousands. Egypt will not succeed at sports, cinema or theater, and will not be back on its feet economically without political reform. Herein is the importance of the "discussion of the future." It is a dialogue that took place in several societies that only recently became democracies. Such a discussion should stop us from living the illusion of a popular revolution, not because we're a submissive nation, but because this was the scenario in nations that recently transformed into democracies. Moreover, such a dialogue would be an opportunity to talk. The bottom line is that it is Egypt's future that matters most. Translated from the Arabic Edition.
