Change does not happen overnight. And without the necessary planning it does not happen even over a decade, writes Samia Farid Shihata* The anticipation among Egyptians that major reform may finally lie around the corner is palpable. This optimism, though, is tempered by an ever-present undercurrent of scepticism towards the oft-repeated pronouncements of government officials that they are committed to meaningful reform. The first contested presidential elections and the promises President Hosni Mubarak and the NDP made during the campaign have clearly fuelled expectations not only of the usual cabinet reshuffle but of the beginning of meaningful, comprehensive reform. If past experience is any guide to the future, though, Egyptians may once again be in for a disappointment. We have heard these promises of reform many times before, only to see them remain just that -- empty promises that bear no relation to action on the ground. Such thoughts came to my mind as I was re-reading Wasseyeti Li biladi, the late Ibrahim Shihata's seminal book on Egyptian reform. In the first part of the book, written in 1994, Shihata emphasises that a comprehensive re-organisation of the Egyptian state is the necessary prerequisite to the successful implementation of any comprehensive reform programme. He stresses that successful implementation of serious reforms remains impossible without first reforming the government bureaucracy. While he presents detailed proposals for the re-organisation of that bureaucracy it is not the specifics of his proposal that strike the reader trying to draw lessons for today's Egypt from this valuable resource: as Shihata noted, the exact blueprint for administrative re-organisation is not what matters and his is just one of many possible alternatives. More poignant is the author's simple yet compelling explanation of the reasons why the repeated promises of major reform remain unfulfilled: quite simply, the necessary planning and preparations for change have never been made. As President Mubarak embarks on his fifth term in office, amid heightened anticipation of major change and serious reform, a review of Shihata's words, written over 10 years ago, may help ensure that recent campaign promises translate into reality this time round. It is striking how relevant his words remain. "In the run up to the referendum on the third presidential term of President Mubarak," he wrote, "the media was awash with reports of major changes, not only in government personnel holding high office but also in the government's policies and mode of operation. Immediately after taking the oath of office in 1993 President Mubarak himself emphasised the necessity of instituting major changes in his acceptance speech, saying: 'I bring not only a new programme but a steadfast determination to institute a comprehensive change in the methods of operation of the Egyptian state to make it more responsive to the demands of the people who continue to suffer from slow decision- making, low levels of service provision, an absence of accountability and inadequate coordination among the different organs of government. This comprehensive change cannot be achieved without introducing new blood to energise the political and executive apparatus. What is needed are new elements eager to innovate and take the initiative, embrace economic and political reform enthusiastically, and capable of understanding the growing role that science and knowledge must play in government administration.' "Such rhetoric notwithstanding, it was unrealistic to expect a change of such proportions to be effected... comprehensive change cannot be achieved overnight, or in the brief period it takes to form a new cabinet, not without the necessary preparations for reform having been undertaken. The reality is that talk of impending change was not accompanied by any of the necessary preparations whether in terms of defining the objectives of the desired change or prioritising the sequence of steps necessary for its implementation. As a result, while the new cabinet brought some new faces and some minor changes in ministries, it did not bring about the major change that people rightfully expected. "Students of reform programmes in different countries know that it is not enough to have a clear programme of reform and a committed leadership capable of making a convincing case for change. The state apparatus must also have the capacity to implement the programme and achieve its objectives. It must have the necessary technical and administrative capacity, a strong commitment to the objectives of reform and a determination to implement it with integrity. Any vision of the future role of the state in the context of a comprehensive reform programme must, therefore, include a detailed plan to re-build the executive apparatus responsible for implementation. Without such a plan the reform process lacks the technical base needed for its sustainability. "A change in officials is not sufficient. It is essential to change the systems and rules that govern the state apparatus responsible for implementing the desired reform. Changing personalities while maintaining the same policies, the same way of doing business and the same decision-making processes is a waste of time and has a limited impact no matter how qualified and efficient the new officials are. "However, changing systems and rules and establishing an efficient and honest apparatus require much thought and preparation. If this preparation is not undertaken soon and completed within a reasonable timeframe, then when the time comes for another cabinet change Egypt will once again be faced with the situation it faced in 1993, when the government failed to deliver expected reforms due to a lack of planning. The result will be a heightened sense of disillusionment and frustration as people realise that despite repeated pronouncements on the need for change everything remains the same: the system, the slogans and even the faces." * The writer is an independent economic consultant.
