If the US believes that by cheap ploys it can enlist Damascus as a subservient ally it had better think again, writes Emad Fawzi Shueibi* In political science, a peaceful negotiating climate is a prerequisite for lasting stability and peaceful political conditions. This type of climate can only arise through acceptance of the concept of international legitimacy, upheld by universally acknowledged safeguards and practical arrangements, and through agreement upon a set of internationally accepted aims and means to reach a stable and lasting peace. Washington's Middle East peace conference is less designed to meet such conditions than it is to accomplish certain short-term political aims. If this is the era most dedicated to the quest for Middle East peace, it is also the most disturbingly volatile, largely because the pursuit of peace has been reduced to a form of political manoeuvring. True peace in the Middle East can only arise on the foundation of a stable and universally accepted international order, which is far from the current situation. Washington's call for a peace conference is certainly not inspired by acceptance of the principles of international legitimacy, the meeting itself providing for no truly international forum or internationally accepted rules of procedure, whatever practical arrangements existing to deal solely with those elements to be excluded -- notably, Palestinians of the Diaspora and more than half the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Surely such a prospect is more a PR gambit to market the impression of a peace-seeking climate than it is a serious process designed to attain its purported end. Peace simply for the sake of peace, irrespective of principles of fairness and justice, can be dangerously misleading. It propels the negotiating community to bow to de facto realities and bends the concept of peace to the will of the strongest and most aggressive parties. This is not a formula for peace, but rather a formula for increasing regional and international instability and insecurity. The Arab region has long been at the mercy of this anti-peace international climate. It was a focal point for the backdoor power rivalry between the two Cold War giants. Then, although there emerged a brief glimmer of hope for peace based on the principles of international legitimacy during the post-Cold War transitional phase, prospects for peace soon buckled before the intransigence of Israel, which thrives on confrontation and conflict. As a result, the situation in the region quickly deteriorated until it found itself the arena of another international conflict, namely the Bush administration's so-called pre- emptive war against terrorism. Against this backdrop of aggressive American international policy combined with a virtually non-existent international will for peace, the American-sponsored meeting in Annapolis is to take place. Syria's position on whether or not to take part is clear. If it is to take part at all, issues relevant to the Syrian-Israeli negotiating track must be on the table and in a way that takes Syria's interests into account. More generally, there must be a framework of clearly stated principles and policies, and this framework must address all parties concerned. Damascus will not be moved by charades and flattery; if it attends the conference it will not be in a token capacity but rather in its capacity as a major regional player. Syria is naturally sceptical of the aims of the conference. It does not believe the Bush administration is truly interested in peace and it is suspicious of the vagueness of the conference agenda. It feels that the US must change its way of dealing with Damascus, a way the Syrians strongly resent and that they feel is not conducive to peace. The Syrians realise that Washington is applying the recommendations of the Baker- Hamilton report, albeit as interpreted by Bush. However, they refuse to play along with the Bush administration's game of bullying to lend them a hand. Of course, they are aware of the might of the US and the need not to be pushed into confrontation. However, they also know that concessions only lead to more concessions, unless certain bottom lines are stipulated in advance. The Syrians are in a strong position. The US needs them because they hold at least some of the keys to a successful conference. Even Syria's enemies recognise this. Beneath the headline, "Syria's quest for a political deal", Rime Allaf of Chatham House, makes the following points: "none of the approaches adopted by Syria's opponents so far have achieved their declared aims; in fact, they have mostly been counterproductive, giving the Syrian regime increased leverage, and failing to deliver positive results. "Claims about the regime's weakness in the face of international isolation, or its shaky position internally, are mostly unsubstantiated and pointless. In fact, the Syrian regime is more likely than ever to survive, especially after the failures in Iraq and Lebanon. "The notion that the Syrian regime simply seeks better relations with the US is incorrect; in fact, Syrians cite the example of Libya's transformation in a derogatory way. For Syria to 'capitulate' merely to become a 'moderate ally' seems unthinkable at this stage. The Syrian regime seeks recognition before popularity; it is not waiting for a love affair, but for a business deal. "Attempted isolation has not weakened the regime, but it has weakened the potential to pressure it; Syria now loses nothing by not accommodating various demands. In contrast, engagement brings with it the concept of mutually beneficial relations. "Sanctions, and the threat of sanctions, are mostly ineffective on a country with which no trade is conducted; for the most part, Syrians have already adapted to years of US sanctions on given products. Promised openings of new channels of trade, however, are more likely to result in desired changes of attitude in Syria. "Unproven accusations against the regime [whether on Rafik Al-Hariri's assassination, other murders or chaos in Lebanon] actually strengthen its hand domestically and secure more support from sceptical observers; many Syrian people are increasingly convinced that there is indeed an anti-Syrian conspiracy that goes beyond the regime -- a view that is beginning to take hold elsewhere. "More specifically, the idea that the Syrian regime is necessarily behind many of the criminal incidents in the region that benefit it is losing credibility, and it is not conducive to Syrian cooperation. "The obsession with separating Syria and Iran, erratically translated into engaging with one of them at the expense of the other, is unfeasible while their security is not guaranteed on other fronts. As long as Syria and Iran feel they can maintain leverage by exploiting the situation in Lebanon or in Iraq, they will; furthermore, both countries recognise this leverage is stronger when they are united." This and many other studies suggest it is impossible to circumvent Syria and that Syria has everything to gain by waiting. After all, are not the Syrians the virtual authors of the view that holds "if this generation is not destined to attain our rights why hasten a solution favourable to others?" And are they not masters of the adage, "Biding one's time wins the race?" * The writer is a professor of political science at Damascus University and director of the Centre for Strategic Data and Studies.
