The United States has a problem with Pakistan -- and no solutions, writes Graham Usher in Islamabad At an edgy, pre-dawn press conference in Islamabad on 18 November, United States envoy John Negroponte laid bare his country's dilemma with the military ruler a week before he had called an "indispensable" ally in the war against "violent extremism". "We value our partnership with the government of Pakistan under the leadership of President Musharraf," he said. "Unfortunately, the recent police actions against protesters, suppression of the media and arrests of political and human rights leaders run directly counter to the reforms that have been undertaken in recent years". The deputy secretary of state then marched out to a plane waiting to fly him back to Washington, his chin sunk on chest. He was the most senior foreign diplomat to visit Pakistan since General Pervez Musharraf imposed martial law on 3 November. And it was clear he had a problem. Negroponte had been dispatched to convey two "strong messages", said diplomats. First, that "emergency rule is not compatible with free, fair and credible elections, which require the active participation of political parties, civil society and the media". And second, that efforts should be made to resurrect the "reconciliation" the Americans had finessed between the Pakistani leader and opposition leader and ex-prime minister, Benazir Bhutto. He failed on both counts. Musharraf told the quiet American: "the emergency is meant to reinforce and strengthen the law enforcement apparatus in the fight against militancy and extremism." It would "only be lifted once the situation regarding law and order improves". Prior to Negroponte's coming, the Pakistani leader had given two reasons for martial law. One was to curb a surge of Islamic militancy sweeping from Pakistan's borderlands with Afghanistan to the settled North West Frontier Province. And the second was to purge an "overactive" judiciary that was making governance impossible. The first reason is spurious. Senior army officers admit martial law grants them no more powers to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda than they had previously. And the second has been accomplished. The US has quietly agreed to gloss over the sacking of Supreme Court judges -- including Pakistan Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohamed Chaudhry -- so long as Musharraf lifts martial law, steps down as army chief and holds free elections. But Musharraf is not interested in free elections. He wants to rig them so an absolute majority can indemnify him against actions -- like the imposition of martial law -- he now concedes were "constitutionally illegal". On 16 November, he swore in a caretaker government stuffed with cronies to ensure that end. And on 19 November a new sanitised Supreme Court dismissed five out of six petitions challenging Musharraf's presidential "election" in October. Bhutto has filed for political divorce. Asked whether she could resume a dialogue with Musharraf, she answered: "I can't see how I can team up with somebody who talked to me about a roadmap to democracy and [then] imposed martial law". Instead she is appealing to other opposition leaders -- including her old nemesis ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif -- to forge a "unified front" to foil Musharraf's attempts to hold "fake" elections. But given the enormous distrust sown by her botched tryst with the regime, it's not clear whether the leaders will bite or whether the Americans any longer see her as useful. "America has its own interest and we have our own," she said on 17 November, without Negroponte. American failure in Pakistan is a debacle of potentially Iraq proportions. Since 9/11 -- when Musharraf changed sides in the "war on terror" -- Washington has sustained military rule in Pakistan by about $1 billion a year. At first the General delivered, handing over a steady supply of Al-Qaeda scalps, including the alleged 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohamed. But mounting civic protests as well as the army's manifest failure to check a Taliban insurgency first in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan compelled a rethink. "Having relied on Musharraf exclusively, the US roped in Bhutto. She was supposed to provide the populist legitimacy the regime lacked. But now that policy too has fallen apart," says analyst Hassan Askari Rizvi. US officials talk darkly of terminating all aid if their turbulent ward refuses to play ball. But it's more bluster than bang, says Zaffar Abbas, another analyst. "Musharraf's gamble is that Washington needs him more than he needs them." He may be right. Seventy-five per cent of all supplies to US forces in Afghanistan go through Pakistan. And the more America ratchets up tensions with Iran, Russia and Central Asia the more vital Islamabad becomes as a regional ally. There is only one case where Washington could exert leverage, says Rizvi. "If the opposition could mount street protests against the regime on a sustained basis, this would rattle the army. The Americans could then tell Musharraf to back off or else". But so far protests have been muted and the army has shown absolute loyalty to their commander. As long as that's so, "Musharraf can hang on," says Rizvi. And America will hang on to him, even though it knows "deeply flawed" elections will do nothing to redress the crisis of legitimacy that assails the Pakistani state and which remains the principle political cause behind the growth of the Taliban. There is of course an irony here. For six years, Washington placed all its bets on one man, one institution and one military solution to combat Islamic militancy in Pakistan. On 3 November that institution empowered that man to impose that solution -- not against the Taliban but against its own people.
