Before engaging Iran in dialogue, Arab governments and the Sunnis should review their placatory thinking on authority and resistance, writes Abdallah El-Ashaal* A couple of decades ago the term "interfaith dialogue" gained currency, even though there is essentially one faith with a diversity of prophets. People also began to speak of sectarian rapprochement by which they referred to the Sunni-Shia divide in Islam. Committees were formed, in Al-Azhar and elsewhere, to examine the areas where Muslims of different denominations differ, and these efforts succeeded in the second task, having determined that there is no dispute between Sunnis and Shia over the essential five pillars of Islam. Not that this was a new revelation. Rather, it was more in the nature of a reaffirmation that was needed to counter that perpetual problem of the political exploitation of religious or sectarian differences; or more precisely politically motivated attempts to drive wedges between the adherents of different religious denominations. This has always been a prime tactic of enemies of the Islamic world both at home and abroad. In fact, differences between Shia and Sunni are essentially juristic and would never be sensed by the respective adherents of the two sects except in politically charged sectarian climates such as that which exists in Lebanon and in the friction points between some Arab countries and Iran in the Gulf. The Shia principle of the rule of clergy does not apply solely within a single country but to all Shia. In other words, the ruling cleric in Iran is theoretically the imam of all Shia in the world -- the figure whose picture they hang in their homes and the one to whom they owe allegiance and obedience. This can lead to an intersection between religious and political loyalties. Numerous factors can contribute to this, among which is the inability of a state to secure the allegiance of its Shia communities which, in turn, look to religious authorities in their own country and to the superior Shia religious authority abroad. One of the effects of international tensions between Iran and some countries in the Gulf has been to expose Shia communities in the Gulf to suspicions of conflicting loyalties, a problem that became particularly acute as the Iraq-Iran war dragged on. The Iranian-US standoff and its connection with the Arab-Israeli conflict has generated a different type of distortion. Some have gone so far as to claim that animosity towards Israel is a fundamental part of Shia creed and that the Shah's alliance with Israel was one of the prime motives behind the Khomeini revolution that aimed to restore integrity to the Shia creed. Many external actors have contributed to fuelling Shia- Sunni tensions. The UN University in Tokyo is one, and yet Islamic countries help fund it. I was asked by that university to undertake a study on the stance of Sunni jurists on recourse to force in international relations. I was given to understand that the study was part of a project intended to promote a more scientific approach to the fight against terrorism. I explained to them that there is no difference between Sunnis and Shia on this matter and that the whole body of Islamic jurisprudence should be consulted. Then, after I sent in my conclusions, consisting of more than 16 pages in English, they remained silent. Apparently they thought well of me at first but were taken aback by my position. There may well be some difference in opinion between Sunnis and Shia on recourse to force, but if there is it is not so great as to merit two separate studies. We need a broader basis of definition of all Islamic schools in the interest of raising public awareness and putting paid to theological ruses that politicians resort to in order to rally support. The differences between Shia and Sunni initially stemmed from political beliefs more than they did from doctrinal ones. In fact, the term "Sunni" was not originally used in juxtaposition with Shia when the first Shia parties emerged, since the Shia, too, recognise and revere the Sunna, or path, of the prophet. Nevertheless, I do not believe that pointing out that Shias and Sunnis agree on more than 90 per cent of juristic questions will solve the sectarian dilemma. What is needed is an extensive campaign that reaffirms that differences within a single religion furnish no justification whatsoever for ill-feeling or intolerance as long as all recognise that there is one God, one Quran, one prophet and one Mecca to which we turn in prayer. Although the doctrinal differences that do exist are not important in and of themselves, it is important to note that Muslim clerics play an important political role in society. This applies especially to the Shia, for whom clerics are also political leaders wherever theology offers the scope for political say and status. Sunni clerics, by contrast, tend to prefer not to become involved in politics and to support the ruling authority, although they are obliged to advise the authority and not to confer their approval on religiously sanctioned policies. For this reason, Shia jurisprudence is filled with rules regarding rebellion against unjust authority, whereas Sunni jurisprudence tends to exaggerate reverence for the guardian authority, a tendency that has imbued Sunni political thought with a placatory character that has sometimes lent itself to the service of unjust rulers and to religious officials citing segments of religious scripture out of context for that purpose. This issue should receive the fullest possible attention at this time when Muslims and Arabs have been made targets of hostility and attempts to sew strife among them. In addition to the need to raise awareness, there is a number of measures that could be taken to forestall such attempts. The first is to work in countries that have Shia minorities or majorities in order to affirm the concept of citizenship in a modern state, in which religion retains its moral but not political status. This in turn will require tangible efforts to promote the culture of the state of its citizens in practice. Towards this end, enlightened media must play an active role in nation building by promoting a sense of overriding allegiance to a state in which all are equal under law. The need for this cannot be overstated in view of the extent to which corruaption and monopoly by a privileged minority over national resources have worked to exclude the majority of the people, even those who share the same religious affiliation. Another important step is to sustain an Arab-Iranian dialogue that can serve as a safety valve once it leads to the recognition that both sides share legitimate common interests. There has long been a deep crisis of confidence between Iran and the Arab world. Although this crisis stems in part from ingrained attitudes on both sides, it stems in larger part from the conflict between Iran and the US and Israel. Iran has effectively become the sole supporter of Arab resistance, now that resistance is no longer part of the official creed of Arab governments. As a consequence, Iranian stances on a number of crucial issues place Arab governments in awkward positions with respect to their own people. True, Tehran may be defending Arab dignity and rights without this necessarily being its ultimate objective. But this is all the more reason that Arab governments must resolve their own dilemma on the question of resistance that was forced on the Arab world by Israeli and American usurpation of Arab territory and rights. In fact, efforts in this regard are an essential prelude to dialogue with Iran. It would be a great pity if Iran were to sort out its problem with the US in a manner that places Iran on the same footing as Arab governments, but in one way or another aligned with the US or Israel. * The writer is former assistant to the foreign minister.
