With the Bush administration on the way out, Iraqis await a much needed new voice in Washington, writes Salah Hemeid By all accounts, the war that the United States waged against Iraq in 2003 to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein was George W Bush's war. It is true that the oddly assorted alliance of American neoconservatives, the oil monopolies and the arms industries had built on the national excitement following 11 September to push for that adventure, but it was still Bush himself, who unleashed the dogs of war, driven by his messianic vision and obsession with Saddam. Now with a new president to take over in Washington in a few weeks, the question is what policy towards Iraq he will make, regardless of both Bush's legacy and the rhetoric of the election campaign. The new administration will most certainly draw on the deep resentment Americans have showed against the war to determine its Iraqi policy, though that won't necessarily mean a total disengagement from Iraq, which by all means, will remain an area of tremendous strategic interests to the United States. As for the Iraqis, they will pay keen attention to the newcomer in the White House, realising that whatever policy he forges towards their country, it will certainly change the course of their history, for better or worse. While ordinary Iraqis hope that the next US president will repair the damage Bush leaves behind, ambitious Iraqi politicians seem to be in the usual business of securing their hold on power, regardless of who the next master of the White House is. At any rate, the new president will take command of some 130,000 US troops still in Iraq leaving it to him to decide first a timetable for withdrawing American combat brigades and secondly, the future of their long-term presence, in line with a controversial security accord under negotiation with the Iraqis. As the accord stalled over conditions and demands made by Nuri Al-Maliki's Shia-led government, the new occupant of the White House has to gaze thoughtfully into the future and try to figure out how to deal with Iraq while keeping in mind American interests in Iraq, the Gulf and the entire Middle East. Pulling out of Iraq will be very difficult, to say the least, as it must be done without leaving Iraq to slip again into chaos and even a sectarian war. Some analysts believe the plan of getting all American combat forces out of Iraq by April 2010 is flawed and even say that it is extremely risky. On the other hand, leaving even 50,000 American troops as advisers, trainers and counter- terrorism units in Iraq after the withdrawal of the 140,000 troops by 2010 would be protecting a sectarian political regime that is linked to death squads, militias and a detention system now holding 50,000 Iraqis in violation of human rights standards. The incoming administration's successful Iraq policy will have to make an objective, realistic assessment of the security situation, as well as the outcome of the ongoing political process. In order to avoid any setback or misguide policies, it is important to take into consideration the fact that both Iraq and the region will not be stable and secure before proposing a realistic solution to the Iraqi dilemma. A unilateral decision for withdrawal, similar to the one Bush made when he launched the war would be devastating for Iraq, the region and US interests in the whole Middle East. There are increasing signs that Iraqi leaders who are divided over the security agreement and Iraq's future ties with the United States will be trying to manipulate policy- making in Washington. While Kurds are totally against an American disengagement in Iraq and would hope to see the next president maintain formidable military bases in Iraq, Sunni Arabs are worried that an abrupt American withdrawal will squander all the security gains and leave Iraq to the mercy of Shias and Persian Iran. Such a Shia empowerment will leave them with only two options: either accept Shia-Iranian domination or secession. As for Shias, it is quite obvious that the ruling Shia alliance is procrastinating on the security accord until Bush leaves office because they want to see the new president pull out of Iraq leaving them in full control of the country. It is quite possible that the next president's regional diplomacy, including bargaining with Iran could further aggravate fears among moderate Sunni Arab governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that it would give the Shia Persian nation and its Shia allies in Iraq a leverage that they will use to strengthen their influence in the region. Though these governments try to avoid taking a public position on the American troop's withdrawal, they have never tried to hide their concern that Iran will ultimately take advantage of a premature withdrawal to fill in the security and political vacuum. The new administration's options in Iraq are too complicated to reduce them to either a quick withdrawal or a long stay. The incoming administration will have to take into consideration current political and security issues such as the war in Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear programme and increasing regional influence, and the "war on terrorism". These will all factor heavily into the Middle East policy strategies adopted by the next administration, regardless of their political affiliation. For Americans, the next president's policy towards Iraq could be more about rebuilding their fractured national front, economy, the human cost of the war and America's status in the world. But if change is inevitable, then this raises crucial questions regarding how Iraqis will react towards the expected policies of the upcoming administration in Iraq. For them it's all about their future and the fate of their country, which unfortunately again they see hinging on the new American president.
