What possible transformations can the PLO effect, wonders Ramzy Baroud* When, on 28 January, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal stood before a cheering crowd in Doha, Qatar, and demanded a new Palestinian leadership his words generated panic among leaders of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as traditional Palestinian leadership elites ensconced in Arab capitals. The reaction to Meshaal's call was more furious than most of the statements issued by the PA and its backers during the 22-day Israeli onslaught against the Gaza Strip, which killed and wounded thousands of innocent Gazans. Meshaal, who spoke triumphantly, insisted that the PA "in its current state is no authority". He called for the creation of a new leadership structure that would include all Palestinians. Meshaal remained ambiguous regarding the nature of this new structure, wanting perhaps to examine the reactions to his call before moving forward with any tangible plans. The old guard, conspicuously silent during the Gaza onslaught, reacted with fury at what they understood to be Hamas's attempt to undermine the Palestine Liberation Organisation, vehicle of their own leverage and status. Their outrage was echoed by some PA outsiders who rejected any alternative to the PLO because of what the organisation for so long represented, a platform that in the past had guided and guarded Palestinian national aspirations. But why an alternative to the PLO, and why the fury over a call for a new leadership structure? The two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, agreed in Cairo in 2005 to revamp the PLO, which would allow Hamas and other organisations that operate outside its political structures to join. The agreement was never activated. Each side accused the other of delaying much needed reforms. Then the disagreement appeared factional and political, as opposed to one predicated on principals. Israel's war on Gaza, however, has created a political reality that cannot be discounted as factional. Reverberations of the Gaza war can be felt throughout the Middle East, and even beyond, and it will be some time before the full political and non-political impact of the war is realised. As far as inter-Palestinian politics is concerned the war on Gaza has yielded two distinctly different groups, one that is increasingly referred to as the "resistance factions" (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other socialist and nationalist groups) and the other comprising the Oslo factions (mainly Fatah, but with a few other less known groupings), dubbed such because they embraced the Oslo peace process. Fatah dominates the PLO, which also includes factions that stand in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza and Damascus. Following the signing of the Oslo accords in September 2003 the PA was established at the expense of the PLO, once seen as an organisation that represented Palestinians everywhere. The latter's authority, international import and political relevance dissipated over time to the point where it became an institution that simply represented its members or, at best, a specific faction, Fatah. The PLO would resurface every once in a while to serve as a rubber stamp for PA policies but it had had long ceased to represent all Palestinians or play any significant role in shaping political realities in occupied Palestine or anywhere else. The PLO's state of idleness is a relatively new phenomenon. The PLO was established in 1964, at the behest of Egypt's Gamal Abdel-Nasser. It served a complementary role at the time but grew more independent from Egypt, though not to the extent of escaping wider Arab politics or the hegemony of specific leaders and parties. Nonetheless, the PLO served an important role over the years. It embodied various Palestinian institutions, such as the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the Palestine National Fund (PNF), and more. Oslo demanded a new political arrangement and a non-democratic body that could represent all Palestinians. The PLO was marginalised, almost entirely. Palestinians in the diaspora, especially those lingering in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere, felt particularly disowned, for the PA didn't represent them and the PLO was no longer a body that mattered in any truly meaningful way. The PLO, however, continued in the minds of some as a symbol of the nation's political aspirations. For others it was a useful tool summoned to endorse the PA's political agenda whenever needed. For example, under pressure from the US and Arafat, PNC members met to nullify clauses of the Palestinian constitution that deny Israel's "right to exist", and again, in 1998, under Israeli pressure, and in the presence of then US president Bill Clinton, they were summoned once again to stress Israel's right to exist. The PNC has not held another meeting since. The emergence of Hamas as a political power in 2006 was perceived as a threat to the old guard since inclusion of Hamas carried the risk of cancelling all the "achievements" scored by the PA since Oslo. Hence the delay in implementing the Cairo Agreement. The war on Gaza, which was meant to crush Hamas, emboldened and empowered the movement and its supporters who now insist that any national unity must accommodate post-Gaza realities. In other words "resistance" would be affirmed as a "strategic choice". What is more, a PLO that is revamped based on compromises that satisfy both camps could also mean the end of privilege and the domination of the Ramallah-branch over Palestinian affairs. Thus the pandemonium triggered by Meshaal's declaration. Many Palestinians are still hoping that the PLO can be revamped without the need for further fragmentation. However, since neither the current PLO nor the PA are truly independent bodies, one has to wonder if national unity under current circumstances is at all possible. * The writer is editor of PalestineChronicle.com
