In focus: US policy and the Palestinian cause So far, Obama's Israel-Palestine policy appears indistinguishable from that of previous US administrations, writes Galal Nassar A forecast of US policy towards the Palestinian cause in the Obama era requires not only an examination of the new administration's actions and positions so far but also a historical contextualisation in which regard specific consideration must be given to a certain prudence long- lacking in US policy on this issue and to the objective circumstances militating towards change. In the statements issuing from Washington last week, two delivered by US Vice-President Joseph Biden draw our immediate attention. The first cautioned Iran that it would face international isolation if it refused to halt its nuclear refinement activities. One is nevertheless struck by the almost total absence of the language of intimidation and threat that characterised the Bush administration's rhetoric towards Iran. As I suggested last week in this column, Biden's remarks support the likelihood that the Iranian question will remain pending without being addressed face-on by the US administration for the next two years. Additional evidence to this effect is to be found in US Ambassador Ryan Crocker's remarks regarding his recent talks with Iranians. That his statement made no reference to Iranian nuclear activities also suggests that the subject has been shelved until further notice. It could be that Tehran has concluded that the US is not all that serious about its activities, which is why it greeted that statement with a shrug of indifference. It may well have been the relative quiet over the Iranian nuclear question that encouraged some Iranian officials to strike bolder and more arrogant postures and not only insist that Iran will never hand back the Emirate islands it seized many years ago but also resume talking of Bahrain as an Iranian dependency. In addition to fuelling hatreds and sullying relations in the region, such statements constitute a potential threat to Arab national security and demand a collective response from Arab leaders. Biden's second statement expressed reproach against the Nuri Al-Maliki government in Iraq for dragging its feet on national reconciliation. The man who came to power in Baghdad on the back of an American tank responded with unprecedented curtness saying that the time when the US could order the Iraqi government around was over. Of course, at face value it is impossible to take Al-Maliki's response seriously. Anyone familiar with the situation in Iraq knows that the Iraqi prime minister can't move a military regiment without the approval of the occupation authorities and that his very survival in power depends on the presence of some 130,000 plus US troops. Still, his remarks are telling. Above all, they reveal his awareness that the Americans are unlikely to take him on at present and, simultaneously, they betray his concern that US forces could leave sooner than expected, which means that he had better curry favour with Iran, the only power capable of supporting him in a military confrontation with the Iraqi resistance after US withdrawal. Another official statement that struck us in recent days came out of Britain and cautioned that the economic recession in North America and Europe could last more than nine years. The announcement coincided with a report that revealed that for the first time this year China surpassed the US in car sales. Then came the news from Riyadh of the Chinese president's visit to King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz, in the course of which they signed an agreement in which China would construct a railway system linking the main pilgrimage sites. The visit has elevated economic relations between the two countries to a strategic level. The last news item that concerns us here pertains to the victory of the right in the recent Israeli parliamentary elections. Likud leader Benyamin Netanyahu has been asked by President Shimon Peres to form a coalition government, which would certainly feature hawks from the Israeli ultra right. If Netanyahu fails in this task, Kadima leader Tzipi Livni will have another go at forming a government. In both cases, extremists will have greater leverage than ever, which would jeopardise any efforts to promote a settlement with the Palestinians on the basis of a two-state solution. Against this difficult backdrop, US President Barack Obama delegated Senator George Mitchell as his special Middle East envoy. The senator had served in a similar capacity under President Clinton. His marathon shuttles resulted in what has been referred to as the "Mitchell Understandings", in accordance with which the Palestinians and Israelis agreed upon a set of principles, one of which was the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Obama's appointment of Mitchell was thus an early signal of his intent to follow a different course to that of his predecessor. It has long been the custom of incoming presidents to put off the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as long as possible until crisis forces it upon their attention. The Israeli campaign of genocide in Gaza, however, gave Obama little choice but to turn his immediate attention to that intractable problem. Nevertheless, we are still left with the crucial question of the actual substance of US foreign policy under Obama. Here, we need to look first to the structural essence and allies of the Democratic Party whose policies the president represents. Throughout the history of the conflict with Israel, this party has been decidedly biased in favour of the Hebrew state. If we place this factor in the context of the prudence that characterises the new US foreign policy approach -- a prudence that could impact negatively on matters pertaining to our national security -- we can not expect great progress towards the creation of an independent Palestinian state, the dismantlement of Zionist settlements and the recognition of the right of return of Palestinian refugees. We have little to go on so far, but available details do not inspire great hope of a radical change in the handling of the Middle East conflict that would bring within reach the hopes and aspirations of the Palestinian people. Yediot Aharonot of 29 January 2009 revealed certain points that the outgoing Olmert government had agreed to during final status talks with the Palestinians. These included the evacuation of 60,000 settlers from the West Bank and withdrawal to 1967 borders. However, it insisted on retaining major settlement areas that would be annexed to Israel in exchange for compensating the Palestinians with an equal amount of land in the Negev. On the status of Jerusalem, the Olmert government agreed to a division of the city and Palestinian control over East Jerusalem with a proviso that its holy sites be placed under international supervision. It further agreed to guarantee a channel for territorial contact between the West Bank and Gaza, by means of an overpass or an underground tunnel. Then we have the information released on the meeting between Mitchell and Olmert. In addition to reiterating the Israeli "No" to the Palestinian right of return, the outgoing Israeli prime minister informed the US special envoy that more than 440,000 settlers would remain in Zionist settlements in the West Bank. He also insisted upon the release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit as a precondition for any progress towards meeting Hamas's demands with regards to lifting the blockade, stabilising the ceasefire and preparing the ground for the resumption of peace talks. Taking Israeli demands to heart, Mitchell said that a long-term ceasefire between the Palestinians and Israelis was contingent upon a halt to arms smuggling into Gaza, a cessation of hostilities and the reopening of all border crossings in accordance with the US-brokered 2005 agreement. He also reaffirmed the US's commitment to Israeli security and its right to self-defence, as well as its commitment to a solution to the conflict on the basis of the principle of two-states living side-by-side in peace. Olmert's response was to reiterate his linkage between Shalit's release and the question of the truce and lifting the blockade, thereby sabotaging Egyptian efforts to promote the resumption of peace talks against a backdrop of relative stability in the region. The new administration said nothing that might be construed as helpful to the Egyptian drive. So far, therefore, it seems that the US administration is, once again, echoing the Israeli position and that its priorities in dealing with the Palestinian cause are to keep up the pressure on the Palestinians in order to compel them to make more concessions on the questions of Jerusalem and the right to return, while sustaining the strategic relationship with Israel at a level that obviates the exertion of any pressure whatsoever relative to the fulfilment of Palestinian rights. Under the best of circumstances, we might see a new memorandum of understanding or working plan to add to the growing list of partial agreements that came out of Taba, Sharm El-Sheikh, Wye River, Camp David, Oslo and Annapolis, all of which have remained ink on paper. For the Palestinians, therefore, little hope seems to be forthcoming from Washington. The only appropriate and natural solution is for the Palestinians to mend their rift and restore national unity and for the Arabs as a whole to revive a minimal degree of solidarity and to put an end to the polarisation that governed their handling of vital is
